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ABSTRACT
MEASURING VULNERABILITY INTERDEPENDENCE: TO WHAT EXTENT DO
CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA MAKE CHINA VULNERABLE?
Nurullah Ayyılmaz
Old Dominion University, 2018
Director: Dr. Jesse T. Richman

The pace of Chinese investments in Africa accelerated after the 2000s as one of many
consequences of China’s “going out” policy. The importance of Sino-African investment
relationship has been signified by conveying large-scale tri-annual collective dialogue forum,
named Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), first in 2000. It is generally assumed that
Africa needs China, mostly due to being recipient of Chinese investments, but what about the
opposite and what would that mean for China? This dissertation looks at the bilateral relationship
between China and Africa from the perspective of creating vulnerability for the investor party.
Accordingly, the research questions of this study are: How can we measure the extent to which
the external investor is vulnerably interdependent? To what extent is China vulnerably
interdependent in Africa? The dissertation answers the first research question by using
vulnerability interdependence theory and putting forth an index to measure the level of investor
country’s vulnerability. The index of vulnerability interdependence has five dimensions –asset
specificity, switching costs, ratification and compliance costs, proportionality, and issue
linkages—which are represented in 17 questions. In order to answer the second research
question, Chinese investments in three of its top five Sub-Saharan African trading partners are
analyzed as a case study by using the vulnerability interdependence index.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“… a useful beginning in the political analysis of international interdependence can be
made by thinking of asymmetrical interdependencies as sources of power among actors.”
(Keohane and Nye, 2012, p.15)1

China’s interest in the African continent has been on the rise since the beginning of the
millennium. It is not surprising that world’s second largest and fastest growing economy shows
an interest in the world’s fastest growing and one of the most promising continents. Chinese
interest in Africa is caused by many factors. Africa’s unexploited mineral and fossil fuel
resources, its position as a market for China, the strategic location of Africa, employment
opportunities for Chinese labor and the 54 votes of African nations at the UN are the leading
reasons of Chinese involvement in the region.2
China has been criticized for exploiting African countries by taking away raw materials
from those countries and selling consumer goods in return.3 China’s approach to its bilateral
relationships is that a bilateral relationship should be mutually beneficial for both sides. Africa is
no exception. China expects to get something from Africa in return for its investments. The
benefits for the Chinese side have mostly been natural resources, access to African markets and
employment opportunities for Chinese local people. In a sense, the bilateral relationships
between China and the African nations are “benign but hardly altruistic”.4

1

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 15.
The Economist, “Asia’s Scramble for Africa”; The Economist, “China Goes to Africa”; Albert, “China in Africa”;
Patey and Chun, “Improving the Sino-African Relationship”; Sun, “China’s Increasing Interest in Africa.”
3
Sanusi, “Africa Must Get Real about Chinese Ties.”
4
Sun, “China’s Increasing Interest in Africa.”
2

2
China has made substantial investments in the African countries and continues to do so.5
It is generally assumed that Africa needs China, mostly due to being recipient of the Chinese
investments, but what about the opposite and what would that mean for China? This dissertation
looks at the bilateral relationship between China and Africa from a different perspective. The
relationship is examined from the perspective of creating vulnerability for the investor party.
Accordingly, the research questions of this study are: How can we measure the extent to which
the external investor is vulnerably interdependent? To what extent is China vulnerably
interdependent in Sub-Saharan Africa?
An important contribution of the dissertation is challenging the general acceptance about
the investor-recipient relations. General acceptance would state that the Sino-African relations
make the African countries vulnerable since China is giving away its money to them mostly by
way of debts.6 This study, however, hypothesizes that China’s bilateral relationships make it
vulnerable in its relations with the African countries, whose industries and infrastructure China
sinks its money into. It further hypothesizes that what makes China more vulnerable is its
investments in heavy industries, such as industries related to steel production or mineral
production.7
The study answers the research question by using vulnerability interdependence theory
and putting forth an index to measure the level of investor country’s vulnerability. The index of
vulnerability has five dimensions, which are represented in 17 questions. Most of the questions
are directed to projects that an investor invests in a foreign country. Some questions require

5

Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.”
Koran, “Why China’s Footprint in Africa Worries the US”; Hurley, Morris, and Portelance, “Will China’s Belt and
Road Initiative Push Vulnerable Countries into a Debt Crisis?”; “Chinese Investment in Africa Could Create
Economies ‘Entirely Dependent on China.’”
7
The research in the following chapters shows that this type of investments makes the investor party more
vulnerable because they are not easy to be pulled out and moved in case of having a disruption in bilateral relations.
6

3
answers at the state level, and thus require data on interstate relationships, such as volume of
exports and imports. Hence, this study uses both country-level data and project-level data
regarding the Chinese investments.
The dissertation adopts a mixed method approach, in which both quantitative and
qualitative methods are used. The index of vulnerability interdependence forms the basis of the
quantitative part with case study chapters adding qualitative analysis of the research question.
The qualitative part of the dissertation comprises of four subsectors of investment projects and
three African countries.
China’s projected energy demand growth has been one of the leading reasons for its
expanding presence in Africa. Increases in China’s energy consumption are projected to be one
of the most important developments in the demand side of global energy market.8 While global
energy demand has currently been clustered mostly in developed countries, it is now expected to
have increase in developing countries in near future. More precisely, the focal point of energy
demand shifts from the United States and European countries to China, India, South Korea and
the Arabian Gulf. Africa has unexploited mineral and fossil fuel resources. This makes the region
one of leading places for China to be interested in. When analyzing a leading hypothesis of this
study –China is more vulnerable in its bilateral relationships with the African countries, whose
heavy industries China sinks its money into— Chinese investments in the energy sector in Africa
which are the result of China’s growing energy demand will be examined from the perspective of
creating vulnerability for China.
There are, of course, other benefits that China may get by expanding its place in Africa.
Besides mineral and fossil fuel resources, there are some strategic locations where developed

8

U.S. Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Outlook 2017,” 16.
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countries compete against each other. The geostrategic importance of various locations of the
continent is one of other reasons why China is interested in the region. It built its first overseas
base in Djibouti9, for example.10
Trade volume between China and Africa rose 22-fold in the one and a half decades since
2000, from $20 billion in 2000 to $220 billion in 2014.11 African oil and minerals have almost
made up half of this amount. China, in return, makes infrastructure investments in African
countries such as roads, bridges, railways, and telecommunication infrastructure as well as
industrial investments such as investments in metals and energy sectors.
Not only China but also many developed and developing countries are engaged strongly
with Africa. The European countries –which have a history of colonization in Africa—and the
U.S. are the leading ones. What causes the interest of the European countries and the U.S. in the
region are mainly the aforementioned benefits; mineral and fossil fuel resources12, strategic
locations or military engagement13, and trade benefits14. Turkey, Brazil, India, and Japan are
other leading countries in terms of their presence in the African continent.15 Among the countries
that are interested in Africa, China has been more associated with the continent as a country that
has a rising level of engagement by making many investments, providing loans, sending labor

9

Although Djibouti is an important country for China to engage militarily, there are not much Chinese investments
in this country. Chinese investments totaled $1.7 billion with only four transport projects until the beginning of
2018. See Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.”
10
Lendon and George, “China Sends Troops to Djibouti, Establishes First Overseas Military Base.”
11
Patey and Chun, “Improving the Sino-African Relationship.”
12
The Economist, “The Scramble for Africa”; Stäcker, “Opinion: Angela Merkel in Africa — A Transparent Tour.”
13
Schliess, “US Shows New Interest in Africa”; Mugabi, “EU-Africa Summit: ‘Big Issue Is Trade’”; Schmitt, “U.S.
Signs New Lease to Keep Strategic Military Installation in the Horn of Africa.”
14
The Economist, “The Scramble for Africa”; Schliess, “US Shows New Interest in Africa”; Mugabi, “EU-Africa
Summit: ‘Big Issue Is Trade’”; Stäcker, “Opinion: Angela Merkel in Africa — A Transparent Tour.”No Reference
15
“Beyond the Big Three”; Kenyon, “Turkey Is Quietly Building Its Presence In Africa”; Basu, “India Enhances
Ties Across Africa”; Basu, “Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor”; World Bank,
“Bridging the Atlantic.”
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force and exchanging people for cultural expansion. Examining this rising level of engagement
from the perspective of vulnerability interdependence theory provides a good understanding of
the Sino-African relationship.
One of the most important contributions of this study to the literature will be the index of
vulnerability interdependence, which aims at understanding the extent to which investor
companies of a country makes it vulnerably interdependent in its relations with the host country
of investments. Although discussed and used widely in the literature, Keohane and Nye’s
vulnerability interdependence theory does not have a well-defined measurement method. The
increasing number of bilateral and multilateral relationships in the world as the result of
globalization makes it more useful and necessary to have a well-defined method for measuring
vulnerability interdependence to make it easier to understand the level of vulnerability between
interdependent actors.
The index of vulnerability that this study introduces considers vulnerability of a country
in its bilateral relationship with another country as consisting of some country-level and
investment project-level components. The components of the index are namely; costs of asset
specificity, switching costs, ratification and compliance costs, proportionality, and issue
linkages. The first three components require project-level analysis while the last two require
country-level analysis.
Table 1: 17 Questions of the Vulnerability Interdependence Measurement Index
Asset Specificity
Location Asset Specificity
1. Are the assets or productivity mobile? (infinite immobile=3, immobile=2, mobile=1, infinite
mobile=0)
2. Are transportation costs amenable to decentralized production? (infinite not amenable=3, not
amenable=2, amenable=1, infinite amenable=0)
3. Is the value per unit of end-product’s weight high? (infinite high=0, high=1, low=2, infinite
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low=3)
4. Is it the production of a natural (extracted) resource? (yes=1, no=0)
5. Are the assets generally co-located with other productive activities within a host country?
(yes=1, no=0)
Physical Asset Specificity
6. Does production require investment in specialized (single-purpose) equipment? (yes=1, no=0)
7. Are fixed production costs (as percent of total costs) high or low? (infinite high=3, high=2,
low=1, infinite low=0)
Human Asset Specificity
8. Does production require a specialized, high-skilled workforce? (yes=1, no=0)
9. Is the workforce mobile? (no=1, yes=0)
Plant Asset Specificity
10. Is physical plant dedicated to the productive purpose? Or can it be repurposed? (dedicated=1,
repurposed=0)
Switching Costs
Relational
11. Are there a small number of available market participants with whom to partner? (Oligopsony
or oligopoly) (yes=1, no=0)
Opportunity
12. Is the produced good storable? (no=1, yes=0) (It is always 0 if it is a public good)
Financial
13. Are assets characterized by high sunk costs? (infinite high=3, high=2, low=1, infinite low=0)
Ratification and Compliance Costs
14. Does information asymmetry favor investing party or hosting party? (0 if it favors investor, 1 if
it favors host)
15. Is there an existing regime to monitor compliance among contracting parties? (no=1, yes=0)
Proportionality
16. Are exports proportional among the two countries? (-1 if it favors the investing country, 0 if it
is proportional, 1 if it favors the host country)
Issue Linkages
17. What is the dyadic affinity score for the two countries? (least similar interests=-1, most similar
interests=1)

There are 17 questions in total, representing these five components of the vulnerability
index. The number of questions varies for each one of these components. Asset specificity is
represented by 10 questions, while switching costs have three questions, ratification and
compliance costs have two questions, proportionality has one question and issue linkages have
one question. The number of questions does not necessarily reflect the weight of these five
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components. Analytical Hierarchy Process is used for obtaining the weights for each of these 17
indicators, hence the weight of each of these five components.
These 17 questions will be applied to the 163 investment project cases in China’s top five
African trading partners, namely South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya respectively.
A vulnerability score for each one of these investment projects will be calculated. Then, the
scores of sectors and subsectors in China’s five top trading countries will be extrapolated to get
index scores for other African countries in which China had investments.
The content of this study is designed to start with presenting a background of China’s
relations with Africa: Why is China in Africa? What activities has it in the region? Which
policies have urged the Chinese companies to expand their existence in the continent? Why does
Africa need China? What level of military relationship does China have in Africa? What does
explain its military existence in the region the best? What are the popular myths regarding the
Sino-African relations and what are the truths? The answers of these questions are discussed in
the first chapter.
The second chapter will examine Keohane and Nye’s vulnerability interdependence
theory and its explanation power for the case of China’s relations with Africa, based on its
investments there. It will trace back the origins of Keohane and Nye’s vulnerability
interdependence. In this respect, this chapter will discuss Hirschman’s work on the effect of
foreign trade on exercising power and Wagner’s unexploited bargaining power concept. Another
related concept, Vernon’s obsolescing bargaining model, will also be discussed in this chapter.
The second chapter will further suggest five concepts –which are borrowed mostly from
the economics literature— considered to be good measures of vulnerability interdependence. The
concepts of asset specificity, switching costs, proportionality, costs of ratification and
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compliance, and issue linkages will be defined and discussed. This section that discusses these
five concepts will be a base for creating questions to measure vulnerability interdependence in
the next chapter.
A chapter on research design follows the theory chapter. In this third chapter, the
methodology will be introduced. It will describe the index and the 17 questions which are
considered to be good measures of vulnerability interdependence, present the choice criteria of
the selected dataset among others, explain how reliability and validity of the index is assessed,
justify case selections by explaining the rationale behind selecting four subsectors and three
countries, and discuss methods used to obtain weighted index scores from normalized data for
each one of indicators. This chapter will end with a section on making clear how to interpret
index scores in a correct way.
Two case study chapters trail after the research design chapter. The first case study
chapter will discuss four subsectors of Chinese investments in its five top African trading
partners. Steel subsector of the metals sector, rail subsector of the transport sector, shipping
subsector of the transport sector, and banking subsector of the finance sector are the subsectors
that will be analyzed in detail. They will analyzed in terms of asset specificity and switching
costs, since other three concepts –costs of ratification and compliance, proportionality and issue
linkages—are not the measures at the project level. They are, rather, measures at the country
level.
The second case study chapter will analyze three African countries. This chapter will
serve a showcase for the index findings for these three countries. These countries are selected
among China’s top five trading partners in Africa. Among these five countries, three of them are
chosen according to the level of vulnerability that create for China. Nigeria, Angola, and Kenya

9
will be examined in four sections, namely country profile, their bilateral trade with China,
Chinese investments in these countries, and an assessment of what findings in the first three
sections may indicate in terms of creating vulnerability.
Last, the dissertation will be concluded with a conclusion chapter. This chapter will wrap
up what the study developed as the measure of vulnerability interdependence, how it is used in
the case of Chinese investments in Africa, and what the findings are.

10
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND: CHINA IN AFRICA
This chapter aims at understanding the reasons why China might be interested in
investing in the African continent as well as rapid increase in its foreign operations. It introduces
and analyzes the Sino-African financial and military relationship, Africans’ perception of China
and popular myths regarding this relationship. This sets the stage for and contextualizes the
subsequent analysis. Chinese presence in the African continent has risen dramatically after the
start of new millennium, after the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation meeting was
convened in Beijing in 2000.1 The relationship has been far more than mere interconnectedness.
Both sides have become sensitively interdependent by having relationships in many fields that
have reciprocal costly effects in case of one party or the other breaking the relationship.
Some important characteristics of the Sino-Africa relationship were apparent even before
the dramatic rise of China’s engagement with the region started at the beginning of the 2000s.
Some of these have lasted till today. For instance, comparing a presidential-level visit of China
to African countries in 1996 and a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in
2018 give some insight about these lasting characteristics. The then-Chinese President Jiang
Zemin visited six African countries (Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe) in a
14-day visit in May 1996 and a declaration for the latest FOCAC summit was published on 5
September 2018. In both conventions, the parties agreed on some principles such as; treating
each other as equals, respect the choices of African people to solve their own problems in their
own ways, sticking to the principles of equality in economic cooperation and trade with each
other, supporting China’s position on the Taiwan question, and not interfering each other’s

1

“Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).”
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internal affairs.2
China’s financial activities in the African continent is the leading reason for its presence
there. As the following pages delve into the details, China’s financial activities have increased
with its “going global” strategy after the 1990s. A significant change in China’s outward foreign
direct investment toward the African continent has occurred after 2000, when the first Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation meetings was convened in Beijing. Infrastructure has been the leading
sector among others. Like its investments in other regions, China has mostly invested in
infrastructure projects in Africa.
China’s military presence in Africa has also started to increase in line with its financial
activities. As one of Africa’s leading financial investors in the last two decades, its military
presence aims at providing stability in the region since stability facilitates better financial
activities. The operations that China has conducted in Africa have been operations other than
war. It has contributed to the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa by participating under the
UN auspices. Arms sales have been another important military relationship subject between
China and Africa. Although the value of arms sold to Africa is not very high yet, it has a
potential of growth.
Understanding China’s financial and military relations in Africa, how the Africans
perceive Chinese existence in their continent, and some popular myths associated with China’s
existence in Africa give the background concerning why China has involved in the African
continent. Knowing the rationale behind China’s decision of taking a broader role in the African
finance and military is important for understanding which party is more vulnerably
interdependent in their bilateral relations. It helps to understand the relationship on the face of it;
2

“President Jiang Zemin’s Visit to Six African Countries”; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China, “Beijing Declaration.”
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meaning that it gives a hint about overall Sino-African relations in terms of vulnerability
interdependence. In this chapter, China’s increasing role in Africa is analyzed in two main areas;
financial and military relations Additionally, the sections on how the Africans perceive China
and myths about the bilateral relationship are also examined as complementary parts of the
overall Sino-African relations.

China’s Financial Activities in Africa: Going Global

“Going global” strategy is key to understand China’s financial activities in Africa. China
started to incentivize outward investments after this strategy while it previously restricted money
flows to foreign countries. This strategy was first developed in the first years of the 1990s, after a
visit of the Chinese President to a couple of African countries and has maturated till today. There
have been four important steps throughout the lifespan of this strategy: (1) setting up
international sales networks and engaging in low-value international trade, (2) hunting for oil and
natural gas and initiating overseas infrastructure investment projects, (3) engaging with the world
at a higher capacity by setting up factories abroad, employing local workers, and acquiring
foreign companies, and (4) rising in foreign markets by diversifying investments and growing
into the world-class innovators. In the current era of this “going global” strategy, China aims at
shifting from a “world factory” position to a “world market” position. This means that China
now needs countries or regions to take over its “world factory” role as well as being a “factory”
for Chinese manufacturers. Africa is one of the perfect candidates for this position.
Africa has two leading roles in China’s “going global” strategy. First, it is a testing
ground for Chinese companies’ outreach to overseas markets. They start their businesses abroad
by investing in Africa. Second, it is a good candidate for taking over China’s role as “world

13
factory” with its low-cost labor. Hence, China’s “going global” strategy is significant for
understanding China’s financial activities in Africa.
The “One Belt One Road” initiative is also important to understand China’s global
financial presence. It aims at reincarnating the historical silk road by updating it. It includes
many countries and regions but excludes the majority of the African continent. The reasons for
Africa’s exclusion are discussed below in One Belt, One Road Initiative: Why Is Africa
Excluded? section on page 19.
China’s outward foreign direct investment exceeded the inward foreign direct investment
the first time in 2016. This means that China’s role has transformed from being a host country
for other countries’ investments to an investor country. The change in its role is an indicator of
shifting investments from China to other countries. Africa is a good candidate for new
investments due to its cheap labor. Other countries that invest in China and China itself may lean
towards the African countries.
The pace of China’s investments in Africa has accelerated in the recent years in terms of
greenfield investments. China surpassed the U.S. and became the top greenfield investor in
Africa in 2016 and 2017. This signifies China’s appetite to invest especially in Africa’s
infrastructure, which is the top reason for greenfield investments.
Some Chinese companies tend to prefer locations that have abundant natural resources
while some companies seek new markets. Who owns the enterprise that makes outward
investment affects the location determination. State-owned companies tend to choose natural
resource-abundant locations. They also tend to invest in risky environments. Private companies,
on the other hand, are found to be more market seekers compared to state-owned ones.3
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This section will analyze the Chinese strategies that cause them to lean towards foreign
markets, the rise in presence of Chinese companies in the global financial market, China’s “One
Belt, One Road” initiative, and its outward foreign direct investments as well as Africa’s place in
all of these strategies.

“Going Global” Strategy of China

As Shambaugh states in his book, “[t]o understand China’s ODI, one must begin with the
origins of China’s “going out” (走出去) or “going global” (走向世界) policy”.4 In the first half
of the 1990s, the Chinese government mandated the Chinese companies “go out” or “go global”
and operate in foreign countries as well as continuing their domestic operations in China. The
beginning of this strategy marked a dramatic change in China’s outward investment policy; it
shifted from being “one of tightly restricting capital outflows to one of encouraging Chinese
enterprises to invest abroad”.5
The earliest indication of this strategy was in 19926, when the then president of China
Jiang Zemin mentioned it for the first time in a speech at the Fourteenth Party Congress in this
year.7 From 1993 to 1996, President Jiang’s policies aimed at directing Chinese companies
mostly to the developed world, rather than the developing countries. He encouraged the Chinese
companies to make outward FDI the first time explicitly when he returned from a state visit to
Africa in July 1996. President Jiang spoke going out strategy in various platforms after 1992. He
started to emphasize this strategy particularly for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1998. Africa,
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Central Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America were among the market destinations President
Jiang suggested to Chinese SOEs. The going out strategy was brought to the table at a Politburo
meeting by Jiang in January 2000.8
Following 2000, the suggestions of the head of state were formalized by the Chinese
Premier Zhu Rongji. He referred this strategy in the annual report that he gave to the National
People’s Congress. His speech is considered to be a landmark launching the going out strategy
officially.9 After this speech, the State Council formulated rules and regulations for Chinese
enterprises going out and making outward investments.
A group of state decrees were issued between 2000 and 2002 to regulate the activities of
outward FDI. Another objective of these decrees has been encouraging and supporting Chinese
enterprises to go global and invest abroad by facilitating the process, rather than restricting it.10
China’s regulatory framework (government policies, laws, and regulations) has been a
determinant of its dramatically increasing outward foreign direct investments.11 This framework
has two goals: to help Chinese companies become more competitive in the international arena
and to use these companies’ help to realize China’s development efforts.12
A requirement of these decrees was that the Chinese government should review and
approve all the proposed outward FDIs of the Chinese enterprises. The Ministry of Commerce
has been the authoritative organ to review all overseas investments of Chinese enterprises.
Another important requirement was that natural resource investments exceeding US$200 million
and non-resource investments exceeding US$50 million must be approved by the State Council’s
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National Development and Reform Commission.13
China’s five-year plans emphasize the importance of going global. The 12th Five-Year
Plan, that covered the years between 2011 and 2015, “emphasized the acceleration of the “go
global” strategy”.14 Regarding that plan, Chinese institutions –such as the Ministry of
Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Export-Import Bank of
China, the China Development Bank and China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation—
provided administrative, financial and commercial support to companies that went global.15 The
13th Five-Year Plan, which covered the years between 2016-2020, also stresses “going global” as
well as “bringing in” investment, technology and talents. It states that opening up is “vital for
China’s prosperity and development”.16 The last five-year plan assumes exporting Chinese
equipment, technology, standards, and services, particularly in some selected industries (making
them go global):
“We will encourage more of China’s equipment, technology, standards, and
services to go global by engaging in international cooperation on production
capacity and equipment manufacturing through overseas investment,
project contracting, technology cooperation, equipment exporting, and
other means, with a focus on industries such as steel, nonferrous metals,
building materials, railways, electric power, chemical engineering, textiles,
automobiles, communications, engineering machinery, aviation and
aerospace, shipbuilding, and ocean engineering.”17
The State Council of China distinguishes “going global” in four phases. In the first phase,
the “Go Global” era 1.0, Chinese enterprises just started to engage with the world by setting up
international sales network and engaging in low-value international trade. The first step of
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“going global” era was in the beginning of the 2000s. The “Go Global” era 2.0 was mainly the
Chinese state-owned companies’ search for some specific properties such as oil and natural gas,
and overseas infrastructure investment projects. In “Go Global” era 3.0, China’s private
enterprises started to engage with the world at a higher capacity. They started to invest overseas,
set up factories abroad, employ workers of host countries, and acquire foreign companies. The
“Go Global” era 4.0 entails the rise of China’s private enterprises in foreign markets. They will
increase share in foreign markets by diversifying investments and growing into world-class
innovators. According to the State Council, “China is witnessing two dramatic changes [in “Go
Global” era 4.0]: from a capital importing country to a capital exporting country; from “world
factory” to “world market””.18 The latest process, which continues in the second half of the
2010s, is a sign of China’s ongoing economic transformation and also a proactive part of China’s
“going global” policy.19
The trend of going global has become strong in China. Even infant Chinese start-ups aim
at going global although China’s large domestic market provides a good opportunity for rapid
growth. Analysts say that this move of Chinese start-ups will change the perception of “Made in
China”, which is associated with low quality and low cost in the world.20 In the current phase of
“going global”, China furthers its position in foreign markets from merely an exporter of capital
to exporter of both capital and innovation.21
The government strategy of “going global” also included having Chinese companies in
the premier league of international commerce in terms of reaching out to end-consumers.
Although Chinese enterprises have increased the amount of China’s outward FDI rapidly in the
18
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last decade, the strategy of having a growing share in the international consumer market is far
away from being successful. Yet, it has a potential of succeeding in the future.22
Although “going global” mostly associates with financial activities, it also enhances other
parts of China’s engagement in foreign countries. For example, a Chinese university opened a
large-scale branch in Malaysia,23 which can be considered both as a financial activity since it is
an investment and as a soft power component since it will attract many Malaysian and
international students.

“Going Global” in Sino-African Relations

What does China’s “going global” policy mean for the Sino-African financial relations?
The chief answer for this question would be that China sees Africa as a testing ground for its
“going global” policy. Africa is seen as a test ground by Chinese multinational companies
according to some experts on Sino-African relations.24 The Chinese companies that want to
extend their operations to overseas start with African countries and use their operations in these
countries as a testing ground for their first experience in a foreign country. Also, Chinese
peacekeeping operations in the region –discussed widely in the next section--, and construction
of infrastructure such as roads, railways, and ports are seen as a testing ground for Beijing’s
going global policy.25
The policy of “going global” has a different meaning for Chinese state-owned
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enterprises—abundant fossil fuel and valuable mineral resources. These existence reasons have
been widely discussed as China’s existence reasons in the continent. Oil resources in Angola,
Nigeria and Sudan, copper mines in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
uranium resources in Namibia, for example, attracted Chinese state-owned enterprises. They also
appeared to buy cobalt from Congo with multibillion dollar stake purchases in mines in this
country.26
This strategy also relates to finding an appropriate candidate to take over China’s role as
a “world factory” as it shifts from being “world factory” to “world market”. Africa is a good
candidate for both companies that invest in China and Chinese companies that look for places to
invest in. Especially Africa’s cheap labor attracts labor-intensive investments to the region.27
The Chinese policy of “going global” also means a marketplace in Africa. Ethiopia is a
good case for China’s interest in Africa’s marketplace. It is a resource-poor country with a 102
million population. It has been the sixth largest recipient of Chinese investment between 2004
and 2017, with an estimated total of $4 billion. What may attract China in this country is its
marketplace, strategic location and sustainable growth in the last 15 years. The amount that
China invested in this country is far more than oil-rich Sudan and mineral-rich Congo.28

One Belt, One Road Initiative: Why Is Africa Excluded?

The Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road project –or with its
short name “One Belt One Road (OBOR)” project—has been regarded as an important
projection of China’s evolving role in global financial activities. It was raised by the Chinese
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President Xi Jinping in 2013 and is simply a reincarnation of two historical trade routes that
connect China to the majority of old-world continents.29 In its updated form, the OBOR initiative
includes “65 countries covering 55 percent of the world’s GNP, 70 percent of the global
population and 75 percent of the proven energy reserves”.30
China gives importance to its financial relations with Africa. Although China’s “One Belt
One Road” initiative is a significant indicator of its global financial relations and Africa is an
important trading partner, the African countries are not on the roadmap of China’s “One Belt
One Road” Initiative. There might be two leading reasons for Africa’s exclusion from the OBOR
initiative. First, there might be historical reasons. Only a small portion of Africa was part of the
historical silk road. Second, there might be worries about its infrastructure. Although Africa has
received a significant number of infrastructure investments from China and other countries, its
infrastructure has not matured well enough to be a base for other large-scale investments.
Especially Africa’s transportation infrastructure needs to be developed.31 Still, it should be noted
that the OBOR initiative is not a fixed plan: “The Initiative is open for cooperation. It covers, but
is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road. It is open to all countries, and international
and regional organizations for engagement, so that the results of the concerted efforts will benefit
wider areas”.32 If interested, African countries can also take places in the OBOR initiative.
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Global Presence of Chinese Companies

Chinese companies started to occupy top places in the Fortune 500 companies list in
recent years. While there was not any Chinese company in 2004 in the top five Fortune 500
companies in banking, logistics, automobile, telecom, engineering and construction, petroleum
refining, mining and crude oil production, and metals sectors, they have shown up in 2015. The
sectors and the number of Chinese companies in the top five of Fortune 500 companies were as
follows: four companies in the banking sector; no company in the logistics sector, no company in
the automobile sector, one company in the telecom sector, five companies in the engineering and
construction sector, two companies in the petroleum refining sector, one company in the mining
and crude oil production sectors and one company in the metals sector.
Table 2: Comparison of Chinese Companies in Top Five of Fortune 500 Companies
in 2004 and 2015

Banking

Logistics

Automobile

Telecom

Engineering
Construction

Petroleum
Refining

Mining,
Crude Oil
Production

Metals

Top Five Fortune 500 Companies in 2004
1

Citigrou
p, Inc.

Valero
Energy
Corp

GM

Nippon
Telegraph

Bouygues SA

BP plc

Anglo
American
plc

Arcelor

2

Credit
Suisse

Deutsche
Bahn AG

Ford

Verizon

Vinci S.A.

Exxon
Mobil Corp

BHP Billiton
Ltd.

Nippon
Steel

3

HSBC

SNCF

Daimler
Chrysler

Deutsche
Telekom

Skanska AB

Royal
Dutch/Shell

RAG AG

Norsk
Hydro ASA

4

BNP
Paribas

East Japan
Railway

Toyota

Vodafone

Kajima
Corporation

Total

JFE
Holdings,
Inc.

5

Fortis

Lufthansa

Volkswagen

France
Telekom

Taisei
Corporation

Chevron
Texaco

Alcoa Inc.

(No Chinese company was present in the top five of any sector in 2004.)
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Banking

Logistics

Automobile

Telecom

Engineering
Construction

Petroleum
Refining

Mining,
Crude Oil
Production

Metals

Top Five Fortune 500 Companies in 2015
1

ICBC

Deutsche
Bahn AG

Volkwagen

AT&T

CSCEC

Sinopec
Group

Glencore

Arcelor
Mittal

2

CCB

MAERSK

Toyota

Verizon

CREC

Royal
Dutch/Shell

PEMEX

POSCO

3

AgBank

American
Airlines

Daimler
Chrysler

China
Mobile

CRCC

CNPC

CNOOC

THYSSENKR
UPP

4

BNP
Paribas

Delta
Airlines

Exor Group

Nippon
Telegraph

CPCG

Exxon
Mobil Corp

BHP Billiton
Ltd.

China
Minmetals

5

Bank of
China

Lufthansa

GM

Deutsche
Telekom

CCCC

BP

CONOCOP
HILLIPS

NSSMC

(Chinese companies are marked with grey background color.)

Source: Created by the Author with the Data Compiled from OECD, Business Insights on
Emerging Markets 201733

The rise of Chinese multinational companies in some sectors is remarkable. In the sectors
of banking, engineering and construction, they occupied almost all of the top five places. One
Chinese company occupied the top place in petroleum refining and another occupied the third
place in the same sector. Their existence and relative ranking in these sectors is also an indicator
of their existence in the world as foreign investors.
The total number of Chinese companies in the Fortune 500 list also showed growth at an
impressive pace. They increased more than six-fold, from 16 in 2004 to 98 in 2015.34 One-fifth
of top 500 companies were Chinese companies in 2015. Their number accelerated especially
after the global financial crisis in 2008-2009.35 Compared to U.S. companies that are often more
than 100 years old, Chinese companies in the Fortune 500 list are very young. Most of them
33

OECD, “Business Insights on Emerging Markets 2017,” 24.
OECD, 22.
35
OECD, 22.
34

23
were founded after 1950 and some after 1980. Three of them are even less than 20 years old.36
The internationalization rate of the Chinese companies, however, is far away from other
countries (e.g. the U.S. and Japan). The number of countries that a company operates in is a good
indicator for understanding the internationalization level of companies. On average, U.S.
companies in Fortune Global 500 list operate in 28 countries including their home country, while
the number is 26 for Japanese companies. Chinese companies operate abroad much less
compared to the U.S. and Japan: the number of countries that Chinese companies operate in is
only 10 on average; roughly one-third of U.S. companies’ average.37 This shows that Chinese
companies are concentrated in a limited number of countries whereas U.S. and Japanese
companies distribute their investments widely in the world.
The growth in the number of Chinese companies in the Fortune 500, obviously, is not a
direct indicator of Chinese companies’ operations in Africa. It is, though, associated with
China’s outward FDI values, which affects China’s role in Africa as an investor. The next
section will show how Chinese outward FDI has increased in the last decade. The rise of top
Chinese companies has a correlation with the increase in China’s outward FDI.

China’s Outward FDI

China’s outward FDI value exceeded its inward FDI value the first time in 2016, which
made China a net outward direct investor for the first time.38
Figure 1 compares China to the largest outward financial direct investor of the world—
the U.S.. In this chart, the U.S. FDI stocks are much higher compared to China’s FDI stocks. The
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FDI flows of China, however, almost catch the U.S. FDI flow value.
Figure 1: Outward FDI Flows and Stocks of China and the U.S. Between 2000 and 2016
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Chinese outward FDI flows –and accordingly its outward FDI stocks—can be expected to
grow further as it has plans for going global. Double-digit growth rates can be expected in
Chinese outward FDI flows in the upcoming years as Chinese enterprises rapidly increase their
global existence by making overseas investments and China supports them in the ways that a
state can by easing processes, creating incentives, etc.40 The One Belt One Road initiative, the

39
40

UNCTAD STAT, “FDI Flows and Stocks Data.”
Lee, “China’s Start-Ups Usher in New Phase of ‘Going Out’ Movement.”

25
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank of BRICS, and the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation are indicators of China’s intent to extend its financial footprint all
around the world.

China’s Outward FDI in Africa

Outward foreign direct investment data is an indicator of China’s financial footprint in
Africa. As discussed above concerning Africa’s role in China’s “going global” policy, China’s
outward FDI has been increasing recently.
Figure 2: Greenfield Outward FDI of China and the U.S. into Africa (2004-2017)

Source: Pilling, 2017, Chinese Investment in Africa41

A greenfield investment shows what an investor party does in a host country from the
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ground up by constructing new operational facilities. The opposite of this type of investment is
brown field investment, where an investor party uses or leases an existing production facility to
operate a production activity. Greenfield investments require more expenses compared to brown
field investments. It, therefore, indicates a longer term strategic approach of the investor toward
the host party.
China’s investments in Africa has increased in the last decade. Comparing it to its rival
investor in Africa – the U.S.—China’s interest in long-term investments has increased in the last
half decade. Figure 2 compares greenfield outward FDIs of China and the U.S. China has a trend
of rapid rise since 2013. While the average greenfield investments have valued around $10
billion for the U.S., China’s greenfield investments exceeded $25 billion in 2017. China
surpassed the U.S. only in 2016 and 2017.
Figure 3: Infrastructure Financers of Africa (2015)

Source: Sun, Jayaram, and Kassiri, 2017, “Dance of the Lions and Dragons”, p.2042

Infrastructure investments take a large part in greenfield investments. As Figure 3
illustrates, China invested in Africa’s infrastructure far more than other leading infrastructure
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investors in 2015. Its investment in infrastructure sector was $21 billion, seven-fold of the
second country’s infrastructure investment. France, Japan, Germany, and India followed China
as other top infrastructure investors.

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Table 3: Chinese Investment Projects in Sub-Saharan African Countries
by Sector and by Year*

TOTAL

Agriculture

0

0

1

0

0

1

2

4

2

5

1

2

1

19

19

Chemicals

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

2

0

4

4

Energy

0

2

0

0

1

1

1

5

6

3

8

7

4

38

Sector

Subsector

Energy

Alternative

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

1

2

5

3

4

17

Energy

Coal

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

1

0

3

0

1

7

Energy

Gas

0

0

1

1

1

0

3

1

2

2

1

4

1

17

Energy

Hydro

0

0

2

2

10

5

6

3

6

6

6

4

4

54

Energy

Oil

0

1

1

1

1

0

3

2

4

1

2

2

2

20

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

5

Entertainment

153

5

Finance

Banking

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Finance

Investment

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

Health

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

3

3

Logistics

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

2

0

0

4

4

Metals

0

1

1

1

0

1

5

1

2

3

1

0

0

16

Metals

Aluminum

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

2

Metals

Copper

0

1

0

2

1

0

2

3

1

1

2

3

1

17

Metals

Steel

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

12

Other

Education

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

2

0

0

0

0

3

Other

Industry

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

4

5

Other

Medical

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

2

47

11

Sector

Subsector

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

28

TOTAL

Other

Textiles

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

2

Real estate

Construction

0

1

1

3

3

3

9

2

6

5

13

4

6

56

Real estate

Property

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

2

2

2

1

1

11

Technology

Telecom

0

1

0

0

0

2

2

0

3

0

3

0

0

11

11

Tourism

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

3

3

Transport

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

2

67

Transport

Autos

1

1

3

5

4

3

5

14

6

8

4

12

12

78

Transport

Aviation

0

1

0

0

0

1

3

1

3

1

3

2

1

16

Transport

Rail

1

1

1

0

1

0

3

6

1

1

4

6

3

28

Transport

Shipping

0

0

0

1

2

1

0

4

3

5

4

6

1

27

0

1

0

1

1

3

1

4

4

3

1

4

4

27

27

2

12

14

19

26

25

51

55

62

53

68

68

52

507

507

Utilities
TOTAL

151

* Blank cell for subsectors indicates “Other” category, which is for investment projects that fit
into the main sector but does not fit into any of subsectors.
Source: Compiled by the Author with the Data Drawn from CGIT Dataset43

Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan African countries are shown in Table 3 by year and
sector. This table clearly shows that China started its investments in Africa by investing in
infrastructure-related sectors. The subsector that Chinese companies had the highest number of
investments in is the autos subsector of the transport sector, which mostly includes highway
building or highway rehabilitation investments. Similarly, the rail subsector of the transport
sector has investments in many years. This sector is also easing transportation by investing in
railway infrastructure. The total number of investments in shipping and aviation indicates that
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transportation has been one of the most important sectors for China within its African
investments.
Energy is another notable sector. In its hydro subsector, China has always had
investments after 2007. The number of Chinese investments in this subsector is 54 from 2007 to
2017, which makes this subsector ranked second together with the construction subsector. This
subsector mostly consists of hydropower projects, which aims at electrification of Sub-Saharan
African countries. A portion of investments in this subsector are about building dams for
supplying drinking water. The gas subsector is also mostly about electrification. It consists of
many gas-fired power plants. It also includes natural gas pipelines.
Real estate’s construction subsector is another noteworthy subsector with the number of
investments it had from 2006 to 2017. In total, Chinese companies invested in 56 investment
projects in this subsector. In this subsector, two groups of investment are clustered; cement plant
construction and house building. Almost half of investments consist of cement plant
construction. Slightly more than half of them include building houses, mostly as large-scale
social housing projects.
The utilities sector is also one of the most prominent sectors. It ranks as the fourth mostly
invested subsector after investments in transportation and energy’s subsectors. This sector’s
investments are mostly electrification (mostly transmission lines) and drinking water supply. 44
Be it transportation sector, many subsectors of the energy sector, the construction
subsector or utilities subsector, the sector with the highest number of investment projects are
generally about expanding the infrastructure capacity of the African countries. The discussion
44
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about the importance of the infrastructure sector continues in the following section, which
includes a detailed analysis of what China might be aiming at with strengthening Africa’s
infrastructure.

Why Does Africa Need China Financially?

It is also important to ask the question “Why do the African nations need China?”. The
main reason is the economic ties between China and Africa. Bilateral trade between China and
Africa was already higher than $200 billion in 2015. It was much higher than Africa’s commerce
with the U.S. or the European Union.45
African nations have an opportunity by China’s rapprochement to their continent, which
they may not get from somewhere else. Although China was mostly associated with investing in
countries which have natural resources or valuable minerals in the period of its first investments,
it has touched upon the lands of almost all African countries—whether they have natural
resources or not. One of the most widely observable investment sectors has been infrastructure.
China made infrastructure investments all around the region. These infrastructure investments
include transportation infrastructure; such as roads, railways, and ports.
Infrastructure is critical for developing countries. If a country has strong infrastructure, it
is then able to have sustainable development in many other areas as it provides a base for other
investments. The role of infrastructure in Africa’s economic transformation is critical as well
since the continent has a lot of developing countries. Infrastructure helps “facilitate human
activity, in particular by lowering the cost of various economic activities and by improving their
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quality”46 in Africa. Industrialization and agricultural modernization will come with
infrastructural development and industrial collaboration of African nations with investor
countries.47
Most of African countries are unable to make their own infrastructure investments. “The
annual investment that Africa needs to fill the infrastructure gap over the next few years is
estimated to be over 100 billion US$”, which cannot be provided with the African countries’
own budgets.48 China can contribute the infrastructure development as an investor known with
its infrastructure investments. Its main difference compared to traditional donors (e.g. Western
countries) is that it makes large investments with “long pay-back terms that traditional donors are
reluctant to provide”49. This is one of the leading reasons why Africa needs China financially.
Africa is at a critical juncture in terms of having opportunity with its demographics. If the
African countries can use this dynamic effectively, they can accelerate their development pace in
many areas, led by economic development. Its population is expected to grow from one billion to
two billions by 2050. The rapid growth in population means a rapid increase in the number of
young, working-age people. They are expected to predominate over the older and younger
unproductive dependents.50
It depends on governments whether they match their dynamics with China’s interest in
the region. If they can use Chinese investments in the right direction, they can have sustainable
development.
So, the question –why does Africa need China?—has an obvious answer:
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“[T]he continent’s “rediscovery” by China will mirror the lucky timing of
China itself a generation ago, when it began its historic opening. Strong new
demand and plentiful investment from this big and hungry new partner will
fuel growth and dramatically expand opportunities.”51

As the least developed continent, it can use this unprecedented Chinese rapprochement
in favor of providing sustainable development by converting its growth into development. By
doing so, African countries can jump to the league of middle-income countries.

China’s Increasing Military Presence in Africa

China’s military activities in the African continent have risen in the last two decades.
Parallel to its financial relations in the continent, China’s military involvement aimed at
providing stability. In this respect, China had military operations other than war in the region.
The peacekeeping operations under the UN auspices are the most visible Chinese military
footprints in Africa. Arms trade has been another dimension of its existence in the continent.
Although the value of arms sold to African countries are low, the number of African countries
that buy Chinese arms consist of almost half of the total. It shows that the African countries
possess a much larger potential for China’s arms sales in the future.
China started to play a role in global security, mostly under UN auspices, after having a
policy of non-intervention for years. Its military footprints in Africa have been in the context of
the UN operations. In order to better understand China’s military presence in Africa, this part
will first examine China’s global military presence.
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China Is the Second Largest Military Spender

China had the second largest military expenditure in 2016, leading Russia and trailing the
U.S. Its military expenditures have risen 5.2-fold from 2000 to 2016. In the same interval, the
U.S. –the largest military spender of the world- has an upwards trend until 2010 and then has a
downwards trend. The increase in the U.S. military expenditure was 1.5-fold between 2000 and
2016. Russia –the third-biggest military spender- has also an upwards trend for all years from
2000 to 2016. Its military spending has risen 3.4-fold in the same interval. Although both China
and Russia have larger increase rates, their military spending value is still far less than what the
U.S. spends.
Figure 4: Military Expenditures of the U.S., China and Russia between 2000 and 2016
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What explains the rise in military expenditures of China is the growth in its GDP.53 Its
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military spending as a percent of GDP has been around 2% from 2000 to 2016, while it is 4% on
average for Russia54 and 3.8% on average for the U.S.55 “[H]igh-profile procurement programs,
military reforms, and doctrinal and strategic shifts within the PLA” account for the increase in its
military spending.56
China’s rising military spending gives a profile about its engagement with the world
militarily. As its military expenditure increases, it will join the league of superpowers like the
U.S. and Russia in military cooperation matters. This will also affect its military-related role in
African countries.

Military Modernization Efforts of China

Since the late 1990s, China aims to modernize and upgrade its military capabilities. A
landmark year for the Chinese military can be marked as 1997. As of this year, China’s military
spending had a trend of having a double-digit annual growth. Also, in 1997, the Chinese
government made a decision that the military would concentrate its core functions –deterrence,
compellence, and war-fighting- rather than solely conducting some military-related business
operations. The third important decision made that year was to reform state-owned enterprises.
This attempt has actually been a starting point for restructuring and upgrading the Chinese
defense industry. The fourth important point of military modernization was the People’s
Liberation Army’s (PLA) adoption of a new strategic concept of fighting “limited local wars
under high-technology conditions”.57
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Military equipment acquisitions, R&D activities in defense industry, and training and
professionalism of its personnel have been the major fields of modernization in the PLA.58 The
modernization of the PLA has changed the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region: “With
the exception of the United States, China now has the region’s largest navy and air force, by far
the largest ballistic missile arsenal, the largest standing army, and the most sophisticated spacebased communication and reconnaissance system”59.
There are several objectives of military modernization: China aims to (1) be a global
power eventually by increasing its hard-power capabilities (although it currently does not bring
its development of hard-power capabilities in the foreground to be perceived as a country rising
peacefully), (2) have an ability of defending and promoting its regional interests such as its
interests in the South China Sea, (3) have a pressure on Taiwan militarily in order to keep it
away from declaring independence and eventually participating to the mainland (4) become a
regional power by mitigating the U.S. military existence in the Asia-Pacific, and (5) increase its
capacity for military operations other than war to be able to defend its growing interests in the
world.60 Parenthesis
The first four objectives are all conflict-related objectives of its military modernization as
they reflect somehow its use of hard-power capabilities. However, the latest objective is based on
cooperation, which reflects its military’s soft-power dimension. In this respect, it relates to its
existence in the African continent. China has participated many peacekeeping operations under
the auspices of the UN in Africa in the last two decades.
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China Is the Second Largest Financial Contributor of the UN Peacekeeping Operations

China does not maintain a global military presence in the world and is not expected to
maintain one in the near future. Though, it participates in UN peacekeeping operations in some
third-world countries and plays an important role in its near abroad as a robust military actor in
its region:
China’s global security presence to date is not evolving in the “traditional”
great power manner of establishing alliances, acquiring bases and
dispatching troops abroad, building global power projection capabilities,
sailing its navy around the world, coercing others, or fighting in conflicts
directly or via surrogates. Instead, the People’s Republic is expanding its
capabilities, but thus far limiting deployments to China’s own sovereign
territory, Asian maritime littoral, or under UN-mandated peacekeeping
missions in third nations. … At the same time, the regional military posture
is becoming more and more robust and will continue to impact the balance
of power in Asia.”61
In terms of its military presence in the world, China will, most likely, follow the same
trend with the previous decade: it will have a steadily modernizing military with progressively
evolving capabilities; it will participate in solving international crises by ways of diplomacy or
by using low-cost security precautions; it will be in a dilemma of being reluctant to involve in
global governance and expanding its global security footprints via expanding its military in the
world.62
China has been traditionally reluctant to intervene in other countries’ internal affairs. UN
peacekeeping operations have been an important indicator of this. It previously rejected the idea
of peacekeeping completely since the UN peacekeeping operations were manipulated by the
great powers from the Beijing’s perspective. The fact that China had been the first target of a
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US-led enforcement target authorized by the United Nations in 1951 during the Korean War,
initiated China’s opposition. This trend of rejection continued even after China joined the United
Nations in 1971. It continued doing so by rejecting to vote in UN peacekeeping operations. Then,
it started to warm itself gradually toward the idea of peacekeeping operations as of the 1980s.63
Finally, China publicly recognized its shifted view toward using military force in peace support
operations in a UN Security Council meeting in 2004: “in conflict management, the roles of
military action and that of the civilian elements are closely interrelated and predicated on one
another. There can be no reconstruction without peace and no stability without reconstruction.
Military success guarantees the presence of a civilian role, which is an essential and
indispensable element in any post-conflict reconstruction”.64
Although traditionally reluctant to participate in foreign military operations, China has
become one of the major contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. It has been the largest
contributor of troops among the permanent members of the UN Security Council65 and the
second-largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations among all members66. It
started to take a position “in favour of every newly established UN peacekeeping operation since
the beginning of the new millennium”67 by voting for them in the UN and taking roles in these
operations. Its contribution has risen to a level that is more than any other permanent members of
UN Security Council on average.68
There are various arguments for the increasing engagement of China in UN peacekeeping
operations. Stähle argues that the change in China’s voting behavior is caused by its
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reinterpretation of its previous understanding toward these operations and the change in the
nature of UN peacekeeping operations “in such a way that full participation became more
acceptable to Beijing”.69 Fung argues that identity-related concerns are the main driver of
Chinese involvement. 70 She states that China claims to be the only UN Security Council
permanent member with dual identities; a great power and a Global South state. China’s
opportunity of training and modernizing its military through peacekeeping operations,71 having a
positive image in the international arena, and benefiting from the UN as a means of exerting
global influence can be listed as other arguments for China’s participation on UN peacekeeping
operations.72
China’s contribution to the peacekeeping operations is evaluated positively in terms of
personnel quality and integrity. Most Chinese troops that have taken places in the UN
peacekeeping operations are deployed in African countries, including Liberia, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, South Sudan, Darfur region and Mali.73 The number on
deployment in Congo, Liberia, Mali, Sudan and South Sudan has been more than 2000 troops
including around 750 in South Sudan as of 2017.74
In sum, China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations benefits China, the UN, and
the recipient countries. As African countries are the major beneficiary of China’s involvement in
this field, it contributed a lot to the Sino-African relationship.
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China Increases Its Weapon Sales

While China was the 11th largest arms exporter in 2007, it became the 5th largest arms
exporter in 2016 (coming after the U.S., Russia, Germany, and France). It might be expected to
surpass Germany and France in the near future, but it is difficult for it to sell more arms than the
world’s two leading arms exporters in the short term.
Table 4: The Top 15 Arms Exporters with Their Ranks in 2007 and 2016
Countries
United States
Russia
Germany (FRG)
France
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Italy
Ukraine
Spain
Israel
China
Sweden
Canada
Switzerland
South Korea

Rank in

SIPRI Trend Indicator

Rank in

SIPRI Trend Indicator

2007

Value (2007)

2016

Value (2016)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

7892
5568
3310
2410
1209
974
725
626
601
544
505
336
333
300
279

1
2
3
4
12
6
8
10
11
7
5
14
19
15
9

9894
6432
2813
2226
466
1393
802
528
483
1260
2123
249
127
186
534

Source: Created by the Author with the Data Drawn from the SIPRI Database75

The values of both the U.S. and Russia are far more than what China had in 2016. Given
that the two leading arms exporters created their own markets in a very long term in the Middle
East, South and East Asia, Latin America, and some other developing countries, China might
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have difficulty in entering these markets. On the other hand, its arms sales can be expected to
increase in developing countries, where it has strong trade relationships.76
Although having a volatile trend, the African countries are among the top arms buyers.
The reason of China selling so much to developing countries in Africa and South Asia is the
relative price of Chinese arms. These customers prefer China as its prices are relatively cheap.77
Table 5: China's Arms Exports by Countries
(Values show SIPRI Trend Indicator Values)
Countries
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Myanmar
Algeria

Annual Average
556
175
120
83

Venezuela
Tanzania
Iran
Morocco
Indonesia
Nigeria
Turkmenistan
Turkey
Sudan
Cameroon
Thailand
Egypt
Namibia
Ghana
Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Zambia
76
77
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35
31
29
29
27
23
21
20
20
14
14
13
12
11
11
8

Trend (2007-2016)
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Countries
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Chad
Ethiopia
Kenya
Bolivia
Laos
Equatorial Guinea
Mauritania

Annual Average
8
8
6
5
5
5
4
3
3

Trend (2007-2016)

Source: Created by the Author with the Data Drawn from the SIPRI Database78

China is known to sell its arms to countries where some other countries implement arms
exporting bans under international embargo or sanction. Iran, Libya and Myanmar have been
among its customers in the last decade. Although China does not comply with individual
embargos or sanctions of various countries, it respects the UN decisions when the UN bans some
countries from acquiring weapons. For example, once Iran was a major buyer of Chinese arms
and beneficiary of Chinese military industry’s supports, but China neither supported its industry
nor sold arms to Iran after the UN Security Council implemented a resolution on banning arms
exports to Iran in 2010.79 That said, there have been some cases where there were signs that
banned countries got support from some Chinese arms trading companies even though China had
complied with the UN sanctions according to statements of government officials.80
The number of countries that China had arms trade with was 58 between 2007 and 2016.
The Sub-Saharan African countries were almost half of all buyers of Chinese arms although their
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value was lower compared to China’s arms sales to other regions. There were 25 Sub-Saharan
African countries that China sold arms to between 2006 and 2017. The number of Sub-Saharan
African countries consisted of 43% of the total whereas their average arms trading value
consisted of 12% of China’s total arms sales.81 What these numbers indicate is that China has
these countries as its customers. Even though the value of Chinese arms exports to these
countries has been low, it has a potential of rising as these countries develop.

Sino-African Security Cooperation Diplomacy

Security cooperation started to take place in the Sino-African relations in the last half
decade. Accordingly, it started to be discussed widely in the academic literature.82 In 2012,
security cooperation between China and Africa has appeared for the first time in a programmatic
document. At the 5th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in July
2012, security cooperation took its place among five major cooperation areas. The others were
investment and financing, assistance and people’s livelihood, African integration, and people-topeople exchanges.83
Security cooperation took its place again in the Chinese Premier’s visit to four African
countries in May 2014. It has been one of six major cooperation areas that was stated by the
Chinese Premier in his speech, together with industrial cooperation, financial cooperation,
poverty reduction, ecological and environmental protection, and cultural and people-to-people
exchanges. The Chinese Premier stated that security and cooperation is an important pillar of
African development: “Without a peaceful and stable environment, development will be out of
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the question. China firmly supports Africa in its efforts to resolve African issues in African
ways”.84
The Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has also declared
the importance of security cooperation in its convention in December 2015. The declaration of
the summit states that China will support Africa to solve African problems in African ways. It
also states that some other security-related measures will also be taken:
“China supports Africa in its efforts to solve African problems through
African solutions; Implement the "Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative
Partnership for Peace and Security", support the building of the collective
security mechanism in Africa, and jointly manage non-traditional security
issues and global challenges such as, but not limited to, food security,
energy security, cyber security, climate change, biodiversity conservation,
major communicable diseases and transnational crimes”.85

Other Chinese Military Activities in Africa

Apart from joining UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and stressing the importance of
supporting Africa in solving its own security problems in its own ways, China also started to
expand its own presence in the region. Its first overseas military base, for example, started its
operations in Djibouti in July 2017.86 This has been a historical landmark for Chinese foreign
policy as well because that military base has been the first that China had in a foreign country.
Although China states that the base will be used for logistical purposes to support its
peacekeeping operations, providing humanitarian aid in Africa and East Asia, some observers
see it as a tool for China to expand its global outreach by using military ways.87
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Conclusion

China increases its military spending accordingly with the increase in its GDP. Despite
this increase, China still neither has the capacity to become a military superpower in the world
nor does it seem to desire to be in the near future. Contrary to what many expect from China as a
rising great power, it does not tend to establish alliances, increase the number of its bases abroad,
dispatch troops in other regions, have a navy all around the world, coerce others, or fight with
others directly or by using proxies. It expands its military capabilities, but has not used it except
its own territories, near abroad, or some UN peacekeeping operations in the third world
countries.
Parallel to its defense industry, China increased its arms sales to other countries. There
has been a rapid increase in China’s position as the arms exporter; its global rank has risen from
11 in 2007 to 5 in 2016. There were 25 African countries out of total 58 countries, where
Chinese arms exports are reached in the last decade. The total value of African arms imports was
low, however. Despite their current values, these countries hold a potential growth in their arms
imports accordingly with their economic development in the future.
China is increasing its military presence in Africa. Its military presence is not perceived
as a sign of being hegemon in the region, rather it protects its investments by providing peace
and stability, what works perfectly for both the Chinese government and the African countries.
Furthermore, peace and stability in Africa serves all countries that invest in Africa as well as
contributing to global peace, security, and stability.

How Do the Africans Perceive China?

Some argue that China is associated with negative images in Africa, being accused of
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focusing solely on resources88, making cheap-labor and low-quality investments89, not
employing local people90, harming local industries91, smuggling ivory92, disobeying local rules
and regulations93, and bribing94. Even the Nigerian Central Bank Governor criticized China
publicly in an op-ed in the Financial Times, alleging that it sells consumer goods –that are
supposed to be produced in local markets—in return of buying Nigerian crude oil. He added that
Chinese infrastructure projects are built by Chinese labor using the equipment brought from
home, which prevents local development and skills transfer to Africa.95
China had a negative image in other regions of the world, as well. In order to change its
perception in other countries, it has spent a significant amount of money and effort. The concept
of “soft power” is widely discussed among Chinese academics and applied well by politicians.
As the title of an Economist article successfully illustrates, “China is spending billions to make
the world love it”96. The ways China uses to influence others are opening Confucius Institutes,
making some elements of Chinese culture dominant in foreign cultures (for example, China aims
at making Chinese New Year as popular as Christmas), convincing other countries that China’s
rise will be peaceful, investing in its foreign-language media, encouraging private companies to
acquire well-operating systems that may work for promoting good image (Alibaba –the biggest
Chinese e-commerce company—bought a newspaper in Hong Kong that was critical of China,
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for example. Also, the richest Chinese man aims at buying Hollywood film studios and
production companies.), and advertising itself in some large places (it used, for example,
billboards of the Time Square many times to advertise itself).97
Although its image is described as negative in some media outlets and op-eds, the
African people perceive China to be one of the best countries. It ranked the second both as a
development model for African countries and as greatest external influence in Round 6 surveys
of Afrobarometer.98 The survey has been conducted in 2014 and 2015 by interviewing 54,000
people from 36 African countries99 –that represents more than three fourth of the continent’s
population—in the language that they prefer.
China has been ranked the second in terms of the most popular development model for
national development of African nations. The respondents were asked “In your opinion, which of
the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of our
country: United States? China? [Former colonial power]? India? South Africa? Another
country?”.100 China has been cited by 24 percent of the respondents. It came after the U.S.,
which is preferred to be the most popular development model by 30 percent of the respondents.
The third choice was the former colonial power, which was preferred by 13 percent. South
Africa has been ranked the fourth after the former colonial power, cited by 11 percent of the
respondents.101 Compared to the U.S., China has been ranked the first (35 percent vs 24 percent)
in Central African countries (Cameroon, Gabon, São Tomé and Principe), and was equal to the
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U.S. (24 percent) in North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia). It was
just one percent lower (23 percent vs 24 percent) in Southern African nations (Botswana,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland,
Zambia, Zimbabwe).
The greatest external influence is another important dimension that the Afrobarometer
Round 6 survey measures. The same respondents from the same countries are asked “Which of
the following do you think has the most influence in your country, or haven’t you heard enough
to say? United States? China? [Former colonial power]? India? South Africa? International
organisations like the United Nations or the World Bank?”.102 China has perceived to have the
second greatest external influence. Different than the “best model for national development”
question, former colonial powers ranked the first –before China—and the U.S. ranked the third –
after China—. The percentages of former colonial powers, China and the U.S. are 28%, 23% and
22%, respectively. The fourth and fifth greatest external influences are perceived to come from
South Africa and international organizations, both cited by 6% of the respondents. The countries
that see former colonial powers as the greatest external influence are mostly French colonies.
The top 14 countries that cite the former colonial powers are all former French colonies. Former
British colonies mostly cite the U.S. or China as the greatest external influence.103
Some China-specific questions show perception of China’s performance alone in African
countries. For example, the vast majority of respondents think that China’s economic activities
had a lot influence in their countries. They are asked “How much influence do you think China’s
economic activities in your country have on your economy, or haven’t you heard enough to
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say?”.104 On average, 69% of respondents from 36 African countries found China’s economic
activities to have a lot influence in their countries. However, the percentage decreases to 56% on
average when it comes to the question “In your opinion, does China’s economic development
assistance to your country do a good job or a bad job of meeting the country’s needs, or haven’t
you heard enough to say?”.105 On average, 56% of respondents think that China’s economic
development assistance do somewhat/very good job, 19% think it does somewhat/very bad job
and 8% think that it does neither good nor bad job.106
A question is asked about factors that influence China’s image positively or negatively.
This question is important to understand a detailed view of China’s perception in African
countries. Factors that contribute to both China’s positive or negative image are mostly economic
factors.
Table 6: Factors Contributing Most to Positive and Negative Images of China
Factors for Positive Image

104

1. China’s investment in
infrastructure or other development

32%

Quality of Chinese products

35%

2. Cost of Chinese products

23%

Taking jobs or business from
locals

14%

3. China’s business investment

16%

China’s extraction of resources
from Africa

10%

4. China’s support for the country in
international affairs

6%

Land grabbing by Chinese
individuals or businesses

7%

5. Non-interference in the internal
affairs of African countries

5%

Behavior of Chinese citizens in
the country

6%
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Factors for Negative Image
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Factors for Positive Image
6. Appreciation of the Chinese
people, culture, and language

Factors for Negative Image
2%

China’s willingness to cooperate
with undemocratic rulers

4%

Source: Afrobarometer Round 6 Surveys107

All of the factors that contribute to a negative image of China in these 36 African
countries are almost the same factors that were cited from news pieces in the beginning of this
part. Although many news pieces talk about negative part of Chinese image in Africa, African
people perceive China to be more beneficial rather than harming their countries.
In conclusion, contrary to hard criticisms in news pieces, China is not perceived to be a
bad actor in the African continent. Africans perceive China to be the second-best national
development model for their countries. A vast majority of them, 63%, consider China to be a
somewhat or positive influence for their countries.

Popular Myths in the Sino-African Relations

The relationship between China and Africa is associated with many unrealistic claims.
They are mostly caused by lack of transparency in this relationship. Neither China nor African
countries provide enough information or data for the public to help better understand some
aspects of the relationship.
Some myths circulate even within African people. Some are worries of people while
some reflects partial truth. For example, the African people think that China sends its prisoners
to work in Chinese projects in Africa. They especially think that they work in large infrastructure
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projects.108 This section shows that this is how people assume these workers to be although the
situation is not like how they assume.
This section clarifies four myths: China is in Africa only for natural resources, China
does not employ local people, China is Africa’s largest investor/donor, and China sends
prisoners to work in Chinese projects in Africa. It delves into the issue areas that these myths
entail.

Myth 1: China is in Africa Only for Natural Resources

It is true that China seeks new resources for its growing energy demand. And it is true
that China has an interest in Africa’s natural resources. But its natural resources hunt does not
explain the whole story. There are other important reasons as well, that explain China’s existence
in the region. Some other incentives that draw China into the region are the rising level of
bilateral trade, investment opportunities of Africa and Africa’s place as a testing ground for
China in its first experiences in going global policy.
The figure of share of China’s investments is an indication of the reality. Figure 5 shows
the number of Chinese investment projects in Africa between 1998 and 2012. There were only
45 mining projects while the number of agricultural, manufacturing and service projects were
much higher than mining projects.
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Figure 5: Number of Chinese Investment Projects in Africa by Sector (1998-2012)

Number of Chinese Investments in Africa (1998‐2012)
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Source: Created by the Author with the Data Drawn From Chen, Dollar and Tang, 2016, “Why is
China Investing in Africa”, p.15109

Service sector has the highest number of investment projects. There have been 2,771
service sector investments in Africa by Chinese companies. The total of agricultural and
manufacturing project numbers is 1,173, less than half of the number of investment projects in
service sector.
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Figure 6: Chinese Investments and Contracts in Africa by Sector (in US$)

Source: The Economist, 2017, “China Goes to Africa”110

The latest available data on Chinese investment and contracts is illustrated in Figure 6. It
shows that the share of the energy sector’s investment value has not been high within its total
investment value. The last five year’s data indicate that China’s interest in the energy sector was
not very large except in 2013. It has always been less than one-third with one exception. The
latest available annual data belongs to 2016. In this year, the percentage of the energy sector was
around a quarter of total Chinese investment and contract values.
Both the number of investment projects by sector and investment values from 2005 to
2017 indicate that China’s existence in Africa cannot be explained solely by a resource hunt.
Investing in service, agricultural and manufacturing sectors shows that Chinese companies have
financial motivations to invest in Africa.
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This claim –that center around the view that China is in Africa for its natural resourcesis also associated with Marxist discourses. Neo-colonialism is, for example, one of the leading
Marxist discourses used for the relationship.111 China is sensitive about neocolonialism claims.
Some Chinese media sources, that reflect the official opinion, try hard to refute it.112 Also,
Chinese officials declared that “China will not take the path of Western colonists in Africa”.113
The key question to determine whether a relationship is based on neocolonialist bases is
whether former colonial powers or developed countries “block growth in developing countries
and retain them as sources of cheap raw materials and cheap labour”.114 In this relationship,
China does not block growth in African countries, does not use cheap labor for its own benefit
but uses the continent’s raw materials to some extent. Chinese investments include many
infrastructure investments, which indicates that China aims at having sustainable development in
countries where it invests. Second, it has abundant cheap labor at home, which shows that it does
not need cheap African labor. As the answer of this question’s third dimension; China does use
Africa’s raw materials. A majority of African exports to China consists of raw natural resources.
Hence, it can be concluded that China’s rapprochement toward African countries is not a new
version of colonialism. It is, rather, a collaboration between the two parties.

Myth 2: China Does Not Employ Local People

China is mostly blamed for bringing its own workforce from China rather than employing
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local Africans.115 Even some political leaders think that this myth is true. US President Barack
Obama advised African leaders “to make sure that if, in fact, China is putting in roads and
bridges, number one, that they’re hiring African workers”.116
This claim has an important point, indicating China does not care about the local
development in countries, where it invests or incentivizes Chinese companies to invest. It has a
partial truth. The claim is true for workers at the managerial level, but not accurate for the overall
number of workers that work at Chinese investment projects. According to a report, which was
conducted in eight African countries (Angola, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania,
South Africa, and Zambia) that make up almost two-thirds of African GDP at more than 1,000
Chinese firms in Africa, Chinese companies prefer Chinese workers for managerial positions.
African people, however, occupy far more places than Chinese employees when it comes to the
overall number of workers in Chinese investments.117 The reason for employing locals is the
lower cost of these employees. “Although China rose to global manufacturing prominence on a
large, low-cost labor pool, its payroll costs have been rising and its labor is becoming less price
competitive with Africa”118. Also, most recent contracts of Chinese investment projects in Africa
include large quotas for local workers and training programs.119
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Figure 7: Percentages of African Workers in Chinese Investments in Africa

Source: Sun, Jayaram, and Kassiri, 2017, “Dance of the Lions and Dragons”, 2017, p.41120

As Figure 7 indicates, 89 percent of employees in Chinese investments in Africa is local
people. Private companies tend to employ more African people, while state-owned enterprises
prefer less locals. By sector, manufacturing has the largest share of local employees. In the
manufacturing sector, 95 out of 100 employees are African people. The construction, real estate
and service sectors prefer slightly less local employees compared to the manufacturing sector. In
these sectors, 85 out of 100 workers employed are locals. The trade sector has the smallest share
of African people with 82 percent.
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Figure 8: Percentages of African Workers in Chinese Investments in Africa at the
Managerial Level

Source: Sun, Jayaram, and Kassiri, 2017, “Dance of the Lions and Dragons”, 2017, p.43121

At managerial positions, Chinese companies tend to employ less locals. On average, 44
percent of managers are from African countries. Shares of managerial-level employees have the
same trend with overall local employee percentages by investment ownership and by sector.
Private companies prefer employing more local people at managerial positions compared to
state-owned investor enterprises. While private investors prefer 47 local managers out of 100
managers, state-owned enterprises employ 35 local managers out of 100 managers.
China also employs local people for training them in some expertise areas. An example to
this is a state-owned company, that operates in Kenya and is among the major construction
contractors and heavy machinery providers of that country. This company made major
investments in order to train Kenyan people.122 In this example, the skills-transfer program has
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both social and business concerns because the company wants to train people that use its
machineries in how to use them.
Figure 9: Percentages of Training Programs Offered by Chinese Companies in Africa to
Their Employees

Source: Sun, Jayaram, and Kassiri, 2017, “Dance of the Lions and Dragons”, p.41123

Overall numbers indicate that Chinese companies train local employees. In total, twothirds (64 percent) of them train their employees. One-fifth (21 percent) of Chinese companies
provide professional training and/or apprenticeship to their employees. Almost half (43 percent)
of them provide only apprenticeship for training their employees. Slightly more than one-third
(36 percent) of Chinese companies provide no training for their employees.124
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Myth 3: China is Africa’s Largest Investor/Donor

China’s financial position in the continent is often misunderstood. It is true that Africa’s
largest trade partner is China. But it is not true to say that China is Africa’s largest investor or the
largest donor.
Figure 10: China's Financial Position in Africa

Source: Sun, Jayaram, and Kassiri, 2017, “Dance of the Lions and Dragons”, p.20125

As Figure 10 presents, China is the largest trading partner of Africa, with a trade volume
of $188 billion. It is more than three times India’s trade volume, the second trading partner of
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Africa. The gap between the remaining four countries in Africa’s top five trading partners list is
not as wide as the gap between China and India. India ranks the second with $59 billion and
followed by France, the United States, and Germany with $57 billion, $53 billion, and $46
billion, respectively.
In terms of investments in Africa, China does not have as much investment as how it is
perceived. Among countries that sunk money in African investments, China ranks the fourth,
coming after the United States, United Kingdom and France. South Africa is the fifth largest
investor, comes after China. China’s investment amount is less than half of each of the U.S.,
U.K. and France. China sunk into African investments $32 billion, while the top three countries
invested $79 billion, $71 billion, and $70 billion, respectively. Also, Chart 1 showed on page 25,
China’s position as an outward foreign direct investor in the world by comparing it to the United
States, the top investor in the world. Although China has a higher growth rate in outward FDI
stocks, Chart 1 showed that its outward FDI value is much lower than the value of the United
States.
However, China comes first if countries are listed in terms of FDI growth rate. Between
2010 and 2014, growth in China’s outward FDI toward Africa has been higher than any other
country that invested into the region. China’s FDI growth rate was almost twice South Africa’s
FDI growth rate, which comes second after China. The top two FDI investors in Africa –the U.S.
and U.K.—had a growth rate of 10 percent and 11 percent, respectively, while China had 25
percent.
It is also not true to say that China is the largest donor of Africa. China’s aid is
unconditional and it has non-interference policy toward the countries which it donates aid to.
This differs China from other leading donor countries, like the U.S., U.K., France, and Germany.
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The misunderstanding arises from this point. Providing unconditional aid does not make China
the leading donor in Africa. It ranks third among top donors of Africa with $6 billion aid. The
U.S. is the top donor with $10 billion, followed by United Arab Emirates with $7 billion aid. The
United Kingdom and Germany rank as the fourth and fifth donors with $6 billion and $4 billion
aid, trailing after China.
To sum up, China is neither the largest outward foreign direct investor nor the largest
donor of Africa even though it has the largest volume of bilateral trade and highest growth rate
of FDI.

Myth 4: China Sends Prisoners to Work in Chinese Projects in Africa

Before reemerging in the 2010s, this myth first appeared two decades ago, in 1991.
Roberto Cohen, then a trustee of the International League for Human Rights wrote in the New
York Times’ op-ed section that “[t]he Chinese not only export goods made by prison labor, but
they export prison workers too”.126 She claimed that each year thousands of Chinese workers are
sent to Africa and other third-world countries to work in construction and some other
infrastructure investment projects. The Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C. refuted this claim
in the same newspaper.127 The press counselor of the Chinese embassy said that her claims were
based on hearsay and not true.
In the beginning of the 2010s, the same claims have appeared in various newspapers,
reiterating the claims that Chinese companies employ prisoners in their overseas investments
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including African countries.128 Most of these stories originated from the same author in op-ed
pieces in various newspapers. The author does not back his claims by concrete evidences,
sources, or specifics. According to a friend of his, he is known to be an ultranationalist, living in
New Delhi, India. His friend said: “He is a bit of an ultranationalist ... I read this story. I don't
believe it. Brahma tends to fly off the deep end sometimes while he is China bashing...”, quoted
in a blog post.129
As for the case after allegations of employing Chinese convicts in 1991, Chinese officials
publicly refuted these claims in 2010 too.130 They argued that the allegations of the author are
“unfounded and totally untrue”.131
Claims of employing Chinese convicts in Chinese investments in Africa might be arising
from local people’s assumptions. Locals assume that “the highly disciplined Chinese workers in
identical boiler suits they see toiling day and night must be doing so under duress”.132 Their
living conditions look like they are living in a prison. They live in extremely basic conditions in
compounds. The construction sites are also surrounded by fences, which is to secure the
construction site, not to keep workers locked in a zone.133 Dr. Deborah Brautigam, a SinoAfrican relationship expert, thinks that China is highly unlikely to export prisoner workers to the
African construction sites as a government policy. She adds that there might be some exceptional
situations, in which a contractor might bring a small number of prison workers to Africa by
bribing the local prison officials in China. According to her, “exporting large contingents of
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prison labor as official policy would be politically very risky. If it has happened, it is almost
certainly uncommon and ad hoc”.134 Dr. Aubrey Hruby, another Sino-African relations expert,
agree with Dr. Brautigam: “those early stories of the Chinese bringing prison labor to build
different projects, I don’t think any of that is true these days. Almost all of the projects that I
have seen firsthand and know about may have Chinese foremen on the job, but they certainly
have local workers building things. So it’s not a case of all Chinese labor”.135

Conclusion

This chapter presented the background of China’s existence in the African continent. It
analyzed the bilateral relationship in two aspects as financial and military relationships. China’s
financial outreach to the African continent is directed by its “going global” strategy. The origins
of this strategy go back to the beginning of the 1990s. It simply aims at incentivizing Chinese
companies to operate in foreign countries. Africa has been one of regions that Chinese
companies focus on. The region has mostly been a testing ground for companies that start
operating in foreign countries.
The “One Belt, One Road” strategy has been an important strategy of China’s global
financial outreach. It includes 65 countries that are responsible for 55 percent of the world’s
GNP, 70 percent of the global population and 75 percent of the proven energy reserves. African
countries, however, are not included in the first draft of the “One Belt, One Road” project.
Infrastructure may be a leading reason for exclusion of the region; its infrastructure is not at a
level that will ease financial relationship. Excluding one region does not necessarily mean that it

134
135

Brautigam.
The Cipher Brief, “Dispelling Myths About Chinese Investment in Africa.”

63
will be out of this strategy in its future versions. Africa may take its place in China’s “One Belt,
One Road” strategy in the future.
The military relationship between China and Africa goes hand in hand with bilateral
financial relationship. In a sense, China’s military existence backs its financial existence by
aiming at providing stability in the continent. For instance, China does not take side with a
conflicting party. It, rather, aims at alleviating conflicts. In this respect, China contributes in UN
peacekeeping operations in Africa. Its contribution to these operations has risen recently.
Another important aspect of military relationships is China’s arms sales to African countries.
Although the value of arms sold is not very high yet, the sales are expected to increase as
Africa’s demand increases as a result of its economic expansion.
Many news pieces have hard criticisms for China’s involvement. The question of “how
do the Africans perceive Chinese existence in Africa?” is widely discussed in Sino-African
relations due to these hard criticisms. China is not perceived to be a bad actor by African people
despite its negative coverage in the media. China is seen by the African people as the secondbest national development model for their countries. Almost two-thirds of the Africans consider
China to be a somewhat or positive influence for their countries.
Negative media coverage leads also to myths about the Sino-African relations. A section
in this chapter lists four of the most popular myths in the bilateral relationship and refutes them
by giving the truths. These myths include that China is in Africa only for natural resources,
China does not employ local people in its investments in Africa, China is the largest investor and
donor of Africa, and China sends prisoners to work in Chinese investment projects in African
countries. The section about these myths refutes these four popular myths by analyzing truths
regarding them: (1) Natural resources are not the only motivation of Chinese existence in Africa,

64
there are other reasons as well, (2) the overall share of local workers in Chinese investments in
Africa is 89 percent, though it is lower at managerial positions with 44 percent, (3) although
China is the largest trading partner and infrastructure financer of Africa, and the growth rate of
its FDI in Africa was higher than other countries between 2010 and 2014, it was the fourth
largest country in terms of FDI stocks and the third in terms of aid.
This chapter shows that the relationship between China and Africa is more than
interconnectedness. There is asymmetrical interdependence between the two parties.136 Although
natural resources are not the only reason for Chinese existence in Africa, the supply of resources
is critical for China, which is getting thirstier for natural resources as its economy grows. Also,
Africa is an important region for Chinese investments. There is a wide gap for investments in
Africa until it comes to its saturation level. African countries’ need for investment drove many
investor countries to the continent. Africa is seen by Chinese investors as a testing ground. Many
Chinese investors start their overseas operations in Africa before outreach to other countries.
Some Chinese investments are linked to its thirst for natural resources. These investments and
some other investments like infrastructure investments link China to the continent as they are
difficult to transfer, move or use for other purposes.
The next chapter will examine different perspectives that may help to understand the
structure of the Sino-African relations. It also includes a preliminary index design for calculating
vulnerability interdependence by analyzing five concepts that are considered to be useful for
understanding a country’s vulnerability against another country.
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CHAPTER III
THEORY OF VULNERABILITY INTERDEPENDENCE
Many international relations theories intrinsically argue that interstate politics have been
the arena for exercising power of one state over other(s). Even though they argue about the same
dependent variable, their independent variable varies. They agree that states exercise their power
over others but argue different reasons as its causes. Among them, Keohane and Nye’s
asymmetrical interdependence theory has been one of the most well-regarded theories in this
arena. Their theory simply argues that asymmetrical interdependencies are sources of power
among actors: “Power comes not simply out of the barrel of gun, but from asymmetries in
vulnerability interdependence.”1
The origins of Keohane and Nye’s theory can be traced back to Albert Hirschman’s
work2 on the effect of foreign trade on exercising power. In his own words, the object of his
study is “the politics of foreign trade, the possibility of using trade as a means of political
pressure and leverage”.3 He argues that there is a relationship between foreign policy and
economics. According to Hirschman, foreign trade has two main effects upon the power position
of a country. 4 The first one, he calls, the supply effect of foreign trade, which is mainly
enhancing the potential military force of a country by using trade. The supply effect is not a
direct effect of foreign trade on power. It may affect the power position of a country by
providing more of plentiful goods or increasing the amount of goods wanted more by replacing
them with the goods wanted less, for example. The second effect is the influence effect of foreign
trade. Different than the first one, this is a direct effect of foreign trade on power. He uses an
1
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example with a few countries to illustrate this effect; country A that trades with countries B, C,
D, etc. and country A has a much larger share in other countries’ foreign trade. In this case,
countries B, C, D, etc. would grant country A some advantages –military, political, economic- in
order to keep the same level of trade with country A. This effect has an assumption that countries
B, C, D, etc. cannot get supplied goods from each other or any other third country and country A
is free to sell its good to whatever country it desires.
Wagner makes a good point about the essence of Hirschman’s analysis by comparing it to
the theory of international trade:
Hirschman’s analysis is based mainly on reversing the story illustrating the
gains from trade in standard accounts of the theory of international trade.
Instead of discussing the effects of two formerly autarkic countries’ opening
up trade with each other, Hirschman asks the reader to consider countries
already engaged in trade that are suddenly faced with the necessity of doing
without it. Then the gains from trade in the standard account become the
losses resulting from the interruption of trade. Since both gain from trade,
both suffer losses; what Hirschman adds to the classical theory of
international trade is the commonsense notion that if they do not value the
gains from trade equally, then the one that values them more will be in a
weak bargaining position.5
More simply, Hirschman’s point argues the interruption of trade matters more for one
side due to asymmetrical dependence6 on this trade relationship. He adds that “[t]he greater the
percentage of exports and imports involved in a dominant market, the more difficult it will be to
provide substitute markets and source of supply”.7
Wagner argues that Hirschman’s argument is not successful in explaining exercising
political influence of one actor over another. In other words, it is not good at explaining
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exploitation in bilateral trade. He applies modern bargaining theory as he thinks that the case of
exercising economic power is about bargaining. In bilateral trade relations, if one side still has
unexploited bargaining power8 after they bargained for the trade of something, then this country
uses it to gain political leverage from the counter party. In his very simplified example, Wagner
assumes that OPEC consists only of Arab states, the U.S. produces no domestic oil, and there is
no other supplier for the U.S. other than OPEC members. In this illustration, the members of
OPEC have the opportunity of using unexploited bargaining power in their oil trade with the
U.S. in exchange for a political concession. This has been the case in the 1970s, when Arab
OPEC members implemented sanctions by reducing oil supply to Western powers in order to
reduce the level of their support towards Israel.
In Wagner’s argumentation, the “unexploited bargaining power” concept is important.
According to him, modern bargaining theory, rather than the theory of asymmetrical
interdependence, explains this relationship as it is based on using “unexploited” bargaining
power in an interstate trade relationship.
Hirschman and Wagner think about the same basic trade relationship and how it enhances
power of states. Hirschman considers every traded good equal and only focuses on the volume of
foreign trade, not what the traded good is. An important distinction of Wagner is that his
approach also covers the type of traded good. The traded good itself may put the supplier country
in a more powerful position. Exporting potatoes and fossil fuels do not create the same power
position for a supplier country. Fossil fuels –as they have the problem of fewness- puts the
supplier in a better bargaining position, which it can use as a leverage against the counter trading
8
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party. Considering the year Hirschman’s book was first published, it is normal that his approach
did not catch this point about the type of traded commodity. Goods that have problem of fewness
did not have a large share in international trade in these years. Their power was widely
understood after the 1970s when the Arab members of OPEC used their oil supplies as a tool to
get political concessions from the Western countries. Wagner’s article was published in 1988,
which is more than a decade after the OPEC oil crisis.
In the second edition of his book in 1980, Hirschman acknowledges that there are some
changes in the international economics system. Foreign aid, for example, started to take a larger
role. Hirschman’s approach does not catch this type of transaction that may create power for one
country, with which this country can get some political concessions. Wagner’s approach,
however, can also cover it since foreign aid may create bargaining power. If this bargaining
power is unexploited, it can be used by donor country as a tool of power at some point.
Keohane and Nye matured the concept of asymmetrical interdependence in their book,
Power and Interdependence, which is mostly associated with complex interdependence theory.9
Their definition of asymmetrical interdependence integrates the realist and liberal traditions of
international relations theory. They consider “asymmetrical interdependencies as sources of
power among actors”,10 which brings together the essence of realist thought and the essence of
liberal thought: power and interdependence.
Keohane and Nye answer two major questions about how world politics evolved: (1)
“What are the major features of world politics when interdependence, particularly, economic
interdependence is extensive?” and (2) “How and why do international regimes change?”11 They
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use the concept of asymmetrical interdependence in order to provide an explanation for these
questions. As aforementioned, they consider asymmetrical interdependencies as sources of
power among actors. This approach extends the extent of power concept beyond its classical
borders, which was mostly considered to be solely military power when they put forward this
approach in 1977. According to this definition, power includes economic power as well. They
agree on that asymmetries in military power is still more significant than economic means in
world politics: “Military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic means
alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military force”.12 However, they argue
that the rising cost of military power usage makes it less effective compared to getting the
desired outcomes by using economic means.13
In the context of Keohane and Nye’s thinking, asymmetrical interdependences are means
of exercising power. Their study, however, mostly describes and discusses complex
interdependence, which they argue to be the ideal status of international relations. To better
understand what asymmetrical interdependence is, one should first understand the characteristics
of complex interdependence because (1) they build their theory on the main assumptions of the
realist school14 and the core of realist thinking is power and (2) complex interdependence
describes how the international relations are in their arguments in general and asymmetrical
interdependence is one of their arguments. Complex interdependence challenges three main
assumptions of realism, which can be listed as: (1) states are the main actors in international
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relations, (2) there is a hierarchy in international relations, and (3) military power is an effective
instrument of policy.
Three main characteristics of complex interdependence are:
1. Multiple channels connect societies, varying from formal state-to-state relations to
informal ties among non-governmental elites. The actors in international relations can
be states, transgovernmental actors, and transnational actors. This assumption simply
challenges the first realist assumption, which consider states as the fundamental
actors.
2. There is no hierarchy in international relations due to the presence of multiple issues
in the agenda. Domestic politics are not distinct from foreign politics and therefore
several government departments at different levels (not just foreign departments)
might have relations in the international level. This assumption challenges the notion
that there is hierarchy in international relations and that military power dominates the
agenda.
3. Military force may not always be an effective instrument of politics. For example,
economic and ecological welfare goals cannot be accomplished by using military
force. Instead, states should cooperate to achieve this type of goal. Keohane and Nye
do not fully reject the necessity of using military force. They use examples where
complex interdependence is unable to explain the case. As indicated in the previous
footnote, they see realism and complex interdependence as two extremes, which
international events fall within. The necessity of using military force depends on
where an international event fall within this scale.15
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Asymmetrical interdependence is the source of power in the theory of complex
interdependence. Considering it within the main characteristics of complex interdependence, this
power can arise among any actors including transgovernmental organizations, elites,
transnational actors, and states. Second, it may arise due to the relations at different levels. These
different levels may be intra-state or inter-states. For example, two ministries of economy may
be source of power due to the complex interdependence among these two agencies. Last, the
power arisen in an asymmetrical interdependent relationship may be used as an instrument in the
international arena. This power is mostly considered as economic power. The use of this power
may be exercised by using it as a bargaining tool: “Less dependent actors can often use the
independent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect
other issues.”16
Sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence are two dimensions of
interdependence, Keohane and Nye distinguish to understand the role of power in
interdependence. The following part will define and discuss these two dimensions and elaborate
more on vulnerability interdependence, which this study focuses on. Then, some concepts, which
aim to measure the level of vulnerability interdependence will be introduced. A literature review
on these concepts will follow it.

Sensitivity Interdependence and Vulnerability Interdependence

In order to understand vulnerability interdependence, one should first understand
sensitivity interdependence because vulnerability is one step further from sensitivity and
sensitivity is further from interconnectedness. The level that a country is affected by a change of
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a counter party is defined as sensitivity interdependence. It is a measure of effects of costly
changes by a country toward another one: “how quickly do changes in one country bring costly
changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?”17 It can be thought as a momentarily
shock that a country has in case of disruption of a constantly continuing process.
Interdependence is more than interconnectedness. In their definition of interdependence,
Keohane and Nye warn that it “is not the same thing as mere interconnectedness”18 and define
interdependence “in terms of reciprocal costly effects”19 with declaring that “where interactions
do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness”20. Examples of
interconnectedness can be the spread of internet in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s or
the increase in the number of airports and airplanes. People, and therefore countries, are
connected to each other more than before with the rise of globalism. There is no significant
costly effect in these examples. Hence, they are merely interconnectedness.
Carbon dioxide emissions provide an example of interdependence. Any country may emit
carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Since one country’s emissions cause significant costly effects
on other countries’ atmosphere –although the emitting country does not direct its carbon dioxide
to a particular country- this is more than interconnectedness and an example of interdependence.
This is an example of environmental sensitivity. A sensitivity against the diffusion of
information, ideas, and images is social sensitivity. An Islamic country that aims to preserve the
life that its people live is an example of this type of sensitivity. Military sensitivity is the
awareness of countries against possible threats that may be directed to themselves. The
development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, for example, made the United States more
17
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sensitive militarily against threats from the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The United States was
not as sensitive to Soviet military power previously due to the advantage of being surrounded by
oceans in its Western and Eastern borders and having peaceful neighbors on its Northern and
Southern borders. Trade and financial markets create economic sensitivity as almost every
country that has economic relationships with foreign countries, and these links can lead to
financial and economic consequences. It has increased with the rise of economic globalism.
The costly effects that an interdependent relationship has might be any costs that people
care about, not merely economic costs. Other costs of a vulnerably interdependence may include
“moral standards, aesthetic tastes, personal security, or ecological integrity”,21 which concern
people and consequently politics.
Table 7: Comparison of Sensitivity Interdependence and Vulnerability Interdependence
Sensitivity Interdependence (SI)
Costs imposed by outside actors

Current cost without a policy change

Vulnerability Interdependence (VI)
Costs imposed by outside actors
Current cost after a policy change
(if there are available policy options to encounter)

The level of SI only changes depending on
automatic reactions

The level of VI changes with implementing
effective policy options

(e.g. oil supply disruption -> decrease in domestic
production -> decrease in foreign oil dependency)

(e.g. oil supply disruption -> shifting towards the
domestic energy resources as substitute for oil imports)

Focuses on how the rules are set

Focuses on which actors can set the rules
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Sensitivity Interdependence (SI)

Vulnerability Interdependence (VI)

“One step more than interconnectedness”22
(interconnectedness + costly effects)

One step more than SI (interconnectedness +
costly effects + adjusting by changing policy)

Shortly: Losses caused by disruption of a
relationship

Shortly: Total costs of disrupting a
relationship including costs of adjusting to
new situation

Source: Compiled by the Author with the Information Drawn from Keohane and Nye 23

According to Keohane and Nye’s definition, “sensitivity refers to the costly effects of
cross-border flows on societies and governments, within an unchanged framework of basic
policies”.24 The source of sensitivity can be real flows or perceptions of potential flows. For
example, some financial crises are caused by responses of stock markets in one state to events
moving in another stock market. This is an example of sensitivity to perceptions of potential
flows within economic sensitivity. An example to economic sensitivity caused by real flows can
be the decrease in global oil prices in the mid-2010s. Oil exporter countries were affected by this
decrease, but their level of sensitivity to low oil prices determined the extent to which they were
affected by it. Venezuela, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, for example, were affected more compared
to Canada because they were more sensitive due to meeting a high percentage of their
government revenue by oil exports.
Vulnerability is a step further from sensitivity. It was first put forth by Kenneth N. Waltz
in his piece “The Myth of Interdependence” in Kindleberger’s25 book The International
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Corporation26, later developed by Keohane and Nye in their study, Power and
Interdependence27. Vulnerability interdependence is defined by Keohane and Nye as “relative
availability and costliness of alternatives”28 in case of having a disruption in an interdependent
relationship. In vulnerability interdependence, there has to be an actor or an agent that reacts to a
set of flows. This actor or agent finds an alternative choice for itself within the constraints of
interdependence.29
The costs associated with vulnerability interdependence are more than sensitivity
interdependence. Sensitivity interdependence has the immediate costs of disruption of a
relationship. This is the loss of parties in a relationship. They lose the gains that they get with
this relationship. Vulnerability interdependence includes more costs. It entails the costs
associated with sensitivity interdependence. Furthermore, any additional cost that a party may
need to pay in order to compensate the losses that it has with the disruption is part of
vulnerability interdependence. The measure of vulnerability interdependence would be, as
Keohane and Nye state, “the extent of these costs and the political willingness to bear them”.30
In an example of a disruption in oil supply, sensitivity would be costs associated with
immediate reaction of a country against the disruption whereas vulnerability would be costs after
this country adjusts itself to the new framework of policies, meaning that finding alternative
resources to meet its domestic oil demand. To make this example more concrete, suppose two
countries importing the same amount of oil from foreign resources (the resources that they do not
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have control of) but having different amount of domestic energy reserves (whether being oil or
other substitute energy types).31 And suppose these countries have the same amount of oil
imports disruption. Their level of sensitivity is the immediate shock that they have in this
disruption. In such a case, both countries will have the same level of sensitivity as both importing
the same amount of oil from foreign resources and having the same amount of disruption.
However, their level of vulnerability to the oil supply shock would depend on their ability to
adjust themselves to the oil supply disruption. In the case illustrated above, one country is more
vulnerable due to not having enough domestic energy resources to substitute the amount of oil
disrupted and the other one is less vulnerable as it can meet the disrupted oil supply from
domestic energy reserves.32
Raymond Vernon’s obsolescing bargaining model helps to clarify the path of an investor
party towards becoming vulnerable after making investment in a country.33 Vernon’s model
examines changing bargaining conditions in a relationship between a multinational enterprise –
be it a private multinational enterprise or a government-owned multinational enterprise—and a
host country’s government from the perspective of bargaining. The model argues that after an
investor (a multinational enterprise, Vernon says) invests in a country, the host country’s relative
bargaining power increases as the bargaining positions change over time. The original bargaining
therefore obsolesces.
In Vernon’s obsolescing bargaining model, there are two main actors –multinational
enterprises and host country governments—whose goals conflict. Despite conflicting interests,
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the obsolescing bargain model argues that bargaining is a positive sum game in which both
parties achieve some absolute gains. In the initial bargain, actors care about how close they come
to achieving their first best goals (their absolute gains) rather than their relative gains, which
depend upon their relative bargaining power. This means that they voluntarily cooperate as long
as they achieve some absolute gains even if an actor’s relative gains are lower compared to the
other actor.
Initial conditions favor the relative bargaining power of the investor party rather than the
host country’s government in Vernon’s model. The reason is that “the MNE [multinational
enterprise; the investor party] can invest in several locations (has other alternatives) and is
therefore highly mobile or has capabilities and resources to extract raw materials that the host
country does not have, the HC [host country] has to offer locational incentives to attract inward
FDI”.34 However, relative bargaining power shifts to the host country over time and the invested
assets starts to become held hostage in the hands of the host country’s government in iterated
bargains. As the relative bargaining power shifts to host country, it may start to implement
higher taxes or even expropriate the investment. Vernon applied this model to expropriation and
nationalization of natural-resources companies invested in developing countries in the 1970s.35
This model’s mechanism tends to work more in non-democratic host countries since
democracies, compared to autocracies, “provide firmer institutional barriers against policy
arbitrariness”.36
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Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence

Although defined and used in various studies, vulnerability interdependence does not
have a well-defined measurement method. Keohane and Nye suggest a way to measure it but do
not operationalize it in a way that would help to chart the level of vulnerability interdependence
in an interstate relationship. They suggest that “vulnerability interdependence can be measured
only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of
time”.37
The literature has only one study that operationalizes vulnerability interdependence to
measure it. Blanchard and Ripsman38 suggests a method in their study “Measuring Economic
Interdependence”, in which they examine the level of vulnerability interdependence of Germany
and Britain on critical minerals before the outbreak of the World War I. They suggest a four-step
test: (1) determining the vital goods for national defense and economic well-being, (2) consulting
to the international trade data to understand the extent to which a particular state secures these
goods through trade and investment, (3) assessing the level of disruption in the supply of these
goods in case of the outbreak of a war, and (4) evaluating whether the supply disruption can be
satisfied from alternative suppliers, domestic production, substitutes, national conservation
programs or stockpiles.
This study will offer a five-step method to measure vulnerability interdependence. The
method will be elaborated in the next section, which entails the research design of this study. In
this section, the literature about these concepts will be reviewed. The steps are meant to
comprehend any vulnerably interdependence at the interstate level and are different than what
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Blanchard and Ripsman39 offered. Five components of the vulnerability interdependence index
are (1) costs of asset specificity, (2) switching costs, (3) proportionality, (4) costs of ratification
and compliance, and (5) issue linkage.

1. Asset Specificity

Asset specificity is a term originated from the economics literature and put forward in an
organized way by Williamson in his transaction cost economics theory. In Williamson’s own
words, asset specificity refers to “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative
uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value”.40 There are, of course, other
definitions of this term.41
Specific assets increase the investor party’s vulnerability by making its relative
bargaining power weaker. The government of the host country, on the other hand, has more
relative bargaining power if the investor invests specific assets. As the obsolescing bargaining
model indicates, an opportunistic host country government take advantage of the investor after
the investment made and it is difficult for the investor to move its invested assets. In this regard,
specific assets make the investor vulnerable as the initial bargaining obsolesces and host country
might aim at bargaining again as its relative bargaining power goes up.
Williamson distinguishes four types of asset specificity: (1) site specificity42, which refers
to the close proximity of production stages of an asset (2) physical asset specificity that refers to
the assets that are produced for a particular buyer and cannot be sold to another one, (3) human
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asset specificity that is the skills of individuals that are gained for the purposes of a specific area
of interest, and (4) dedicated asset specificity43, which is a general asset but produced for a
specific buyer by increasing the production capacity.
Physical asset specificity and dedicated assets contradict with each other. Whereas a
specific asset is produced for a particular buyer in physical asset specificity, dedicated assets
entail products that are suitable for selling to other buyers but no other buyer can buy it due to
being produced in excessive amount. Williamson uses dies to exemplify physical asset
specificity.44 In automobile sector, production of dies requires a substantial investment and
cannot be sold to other automobile companies since it is a customer-specific production. A
product that is produced by a company in defense industry to sell to a particular country’s
defense ministry can be an example of dedicated asset specificity. It can be sold to other
countries but cannot be sold easily due to being produced for the needs of a particular country.
Location factors are key to understand site specificity. The questions about mobility of
assets, cost-efficiency of transportation for decentralized production, the transportation value of
the produced good, and the necessity of close proximity of production stages can be used to
understand how vulnerable a country is in an interdependent relationship from the perspective of
site specificity.
Physical asset specificity is about the costs associated with investment in productive
equipment. Whether the productive equipment is specialized (single-purpose) and whether fixed
production costs are high compared to total production costs can be used to understand the extent
to which countries are vulnerable. A good example can be a nuclear energy generation facility
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that was constructed by a state in another one. When a country makes such a large-scale
investment in another country, the investor country cannot liquidate its investment or move it to
another country.
Human asset specificity can be measured by looking at whether the production requires a
high-skilled workforce and whether the workforce is mobile. Some investments require expertise
that may be provided by the investor party. The investor may bring its high-skilled workforce for
the investment project. In most cases, the workforce –whether it is high-skilled or low-skilled
workforce- is mobile.
Last, dedicated asset specificity can be measured by understanding whether the physical
plant is dedicated for the productive purpose. If the investor cannot liquidate an asset of its
investment or cannot move it, then it makes the investor more vulnerable.

2. Switching costs

Switching cost45 is a term borrowed from the economics literature like asset specificity. A
good definition is put forth by Burnham et al who define switching costs as “onetime costs that
customers associate with the process of switching from one provider to another”.46 To put it in a
broader context for the international relations literature, switching costs can be defined as the
costs associated with shifting to a different counterparty. The costs can be more than solely
economic costs. Fornell lists some other costs associated with switching costs as “search costs,
transaction costs, learning costs, loyal customer discounts, customer habit, emotional cost,
cognitive effort, coupled with financial, social, and psychological risks on the part of the
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buyer”.47 Though, many of them are specific to business-to-customer or business-to-business
relations. The aim is to understand switching cost in these types of relations and cannot therefore
be attributed to the relations at the interstate level.
Switching costs have a close relationship with asset specificity. They go hand in hand
although they are distinct indicators of vulnerability in an interdependent relationship. If an
investment is asset specific, then switching costs become high except for human asset specificity.
For instance, a location asset specific investment –either due to its mobility or transportation cost
or necessity to co-locate with other productive activities- would create high switching costs for
the investor if either one of the parties wants to break the investment relationship. Similarly, a
plant asset specific investment creates high switching cost because it is dedicated to a productive
purpose and cannot be repurposed. An investor cannot easily switch to a different counterparty.
Human asset specificity, however, may not create high switching costs if the workforce is
mobile. The reason of this is that the investor can move its workforce to another location that
belongs to a different counterparty in case it has mobile workforce.
Switching costs are related to obsolescing bargaining model of Raymond Vernon.48 As in
the case for specific assets, higher switching costs make the host country’s government more
powerful in terms of relative bargaining power while decreasing the investor’s relative
bargaining power, increasing vulnerability for the investor. In this respect, switching costs can be
used by host country’s government as a bargaining tool in iterated bargains as described in
Vernon’s obsolescing bargain model. Higher switching costs decrease investor’s mobility after it
sinks an investment with high switching costs into a country.
In a vulnerably interdependent relationship at the country level, switching costs can either
47
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be associated with switching to alternative suppliers or switching to alternative products. The
type of transaction is important to examine the cost of switching to alternative buyers or
alternative products. If a product or service is abundant and can be supplied by other countries,
then it does not create vulnerability in an interdependent relationship. For instance, agricultural
goods are widely available in the world. If a country faces disruption in the supply of agricultural
goods, it can either prefer switching to substitute agricultural goods or switching to alternative
suppliers. By contrast, energy products have the problem of fewness. A country would not have
much choice in case of having a disruption in an important amount of energy products supply. If
domestic alternatives to substitute imported energy products are not enough to satisfy domestic
demand, then this country would be highly vulnerable in terms of either switching to another
supplier or losing its supplier.
Oil’s problem of fewness creates oligopoly in its market. A relationship that is based on
oil trade can be illustrated by using the interdependent relationship between China and Angola,
the second-largest supplier of China’s imported oil. China meets a substantial amount of its
domestic oil demand from Angola. In case of having a disruption in this trade relationship,
China’s options might be switching to other suppliers or meeting its energy demand from other
substitute products. These substitute products may be supplied from domestic energy resources
(e.g. using more domestic coal reserves instead of importing oil from Angola) or from foreign
energy resources (e.g. importing Russian natural gas instead of Angolan oil) 49. However,
substitute products can help China to meet its energy demand to only some extent. The country
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cannot fully satisfy the demand by these substitute products. It has to switch to other suppliers to
meet the remaining energy demand after increasing the share of substitute oil products. However,
switching to other suppliers in oil supply is not easy due to the problem of fewness. There are a
limited number of oil exporters and almost all of them currently has customers for their products.
China may not be able to provide the flow of oil for the same price if it switches to other oil
suppliers or loses Angola as the oil supplier.

3. Proportionality

In any interconnectedness, there is a level of trade between countries. International trade
is directly related with the size of trading countries. If we think about one low-populated country
and one high-populated country, the share of the former’s total exports might comprise a small
percentage in the latter one’s imports while it may have a very high percentage for the lowpopulated countries’ exports. For example, the total export value of Angola to China was $27.7
billion in 2014. This absolute value had different relative values for each country. Among the
total imports of China, Angola’s share was only 1.8% while China had 51% within the total
exports of Angola in 2014.50 To make a decision about how vulnerable the investor country in a
bilateral trade relations, one should look at the type of commodity that they are trading. For
example, if trade between China and Angola comprises from the agricultural products, then these
numbers mean that Angola has more vulnerability in this bilateral trade compared to China.
The volume of energy assets’ trade indicates a different meaning than other common
products (e.g. agricultural products). They have the same proportionality problem but may
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indicate an opposite meaning. Their absolute values might have different relative values,
depending on the total economic size of countries. If we use the example of the same countries,
Angola exported almost $26.6 billion worth of crude petroleum to China in 2014; it was half of
Angola’s total crude petroleum exports while it only took 13% of China’s total crude oil imports
in 2014.51
Proportionality ignites both supplier and buyer to think about switching costs. Although
switching cost is mostly associated with buyers in the economics literature, it also has value for
the supplier side. If a trade relationship is broken by a party, both parties will need to switch to
other trading partners. A buyer will need to find a supplier and a supplier will need to find a
buyer. In the case illustrated above, China will need to think about what it will cost for it to find
13% of its total crude oil imports from other sources except Angola. Angola will need to
consider the costs of selling half of its total crude oil exports to other countries except China. The
cost seems to be higher for China due the problem of fewness for the commodity they trade. It
has a limited amount of supply while the global demand for oil is increasing steadily.

4. Costs of Ratification and Compliance

Costs of compliance and ratification are related to signing international treaties. Costs of
ratification are the costs that are required to ratify a treaty. It is basically the answer of “What is
it going to cost politically to get an agreement ratified?” for policy makers. Costs of compliance
are the costs that come after starting to implement a ratified treaty. These costs make
governments signal their intentions in a particular direction by making commitments that are
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hard to break after a treaty is signed.52
Investments are not done by countries. Though, they are regarded to be strategized by the
investor companies’ country. They do it by using any means to direct companies’ attention to a
particular country or to a particular region. China, for example, holds Forum on China and Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) together with the African countries every three years. In these summits,
China commits giving financial support either by grants, interest-free loans, concessional loans
or credit lines.53 By doing so, it incentivizes companies to invest there. This concept –
compliance and ratification costs—is about what it may cost for China to ratify these financial
plans in its legislative bodies and whether it can comply with the agreements in these summits.
Compliance and ratification costs are conceptually distinct but related at the same time.
High compliance costs lead to high ratification costs. It might be difficult to comply with the
requirements of a treaty. In this case, the approval body of a state will know this high compliance
cost and make its ratification decision according to the compliance cost. For example, the U.S.
did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol due to its high cost of compliance for the country.54
Costs of ratification are not always, but generally, political costs from the point of view
of this study as vulnerability interdependence is measured from the perspective of states –not
companies, NGOs or individuals. The governments may need to make some political
concessions to get the support from the majority of government body that will ratify the treaty.
Costs of compliance are generally, but not necessarily, economic and political costs that
occur after the requirements of a treaty is implemented. For example, the costs of an
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environmental treaty that requires some commitments from a state include some costly changes.
Complying with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol would be expensive for the U.S. The
required U.S. commitments in the Protocol were very costly for the American people and the
American industry. The cost of complying with this treaty has been the main reason why the
U.S. did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
There are, obviously, some other costs related both to ratification and to compliance
procedures albeit aforementioned costs are major costs. Societal and reputational costs are two
other leading costs. Though, all other costs are mostly related with political costs. A change in
society’s situation or a country’s reputation directly affects the status of the country in domestic
or international politics.
In the context of vulnerability interdependence, costs of ratification and compliance are
indicators of a country’s fragility to a change in its relationship with others. Higher costs of
ratification and compliance mean more vulnerability for a country in an interdependent
relationship. Suppose that China wants to change the route of its oil products supply from
Angola to another counterparty. China needs to find a new oil products supplier and Angola
needs to find a new market for its oil products. They both need to sign contracts with other
counterparties. Whichever party has higher costs of ratification and compliance to their new
treaties, that party is more vulnerable to the changes in their bilateral relationship from the
perspective of ratification and compliance costs.

5. Issue Linkage

Issue linkage can be defined as “attempts to gain additional bargaining leverage by
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making one's own behavior on a given issue contingent on others' actions toward other issue.”55
When parties link two or more issues in international relations, they make some concessions to
each other in return of getting concessions in another agreement.56
Game theoretic terms, mostly prisoner’s dilemma game, are used in the literature of issue
linkage to explain how issue linkages help to create cooperation.57 In canonical prisoner’s
dilemma game, the Nash equilibrium (the strategy set that no player has any incentive to deviate
from) is defect-defect although the Pareto optimal outcome (best mutual outcome) is cooperatecooperate. In a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, every rational player plays according to their
best individual outcome. However, if all players know that their counterparty player will also
defect, then they can link this game to another game that is played among the same players. By
doing so, one of players can make some concessions in the first game to get concessions from the
counterparty in subsequent games. They can link one issue to other issue(s).
In the Sino-African relationship, both parties have some issues to link to some other
issues in their bilateral relations. For example, African states may use their votes in international
organizations to support the Chinese view in return of getting some concessions from China.
Looking at issue linkages from China’s perspective; China may use some trade incentives toward
the African states to get more energy products from them in return.
The hypothesis for issue linkage can be stated as that a state that can create issue
linkages will be less vulnerable in an interdependent relationship because it raises the cost of
defection for its counterparty. The other party may lose concessions it gets by cooperating in
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case of defecting. The country that can create issue linkages will be the one with more additional
bargaining leverage. In the case of the Sino-African relationship, the African countries are
regarded to have additional bargaining leverage in return for getting concessions from China.

Conclusion

In a globalizing world, relations in the international arena are increasingly based on low
politics (economics, social affairs) rather than high politics (security, survival). Therefore,
international relations theories that explain international events from the perspective of
economics and social affairs are gaining respect as more explanatory theories. Despite their
success in explaining international events, they are, in fact, more complex than theories that
argue high politics provide a better image of international relations due to being not as
parsimonious.
The role of economics rather than military is more dominant in peaceful circumstances.
Many relationships between wealthy and poor countries are based on their dependency on each
other. The reason why a poor country is dependent on a wealthier one is obvious: They need rich
ones’ money. The reasons why a wealthy country may be dependent on poor countries are
various. They may need their minerals, need to sell their goods to their markets, have some
investments that cannot be moved to somewhere else, etc. Realist theories, for example, cannot
explain these circumstances, which occur in peaceful times, as they are not necessarily a part of
the security or survival of a state.
As one of the theories that argue analyzing low politics is better to explain and
understand international relations, vulnerability interdependence theory provides a good
understanding of political analysis of international events. Keohane and Nye consider
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vulnerability interdependence as one dimension of asymmetrical interdependence, which they
define as the source of power among actors in international relations. 58 Although the theory is
put forth and well defined by Keohane and Nye,59 neither theirs nor any other study presents a
way to measure the level of vulnerability interdependence in an asymmetrical interdependent
relationship.
This study contributes to the literature by suggesting a way of measuring vulnerability
interdependence by creating an index. This chapter introduced the concepts and presented a
review of relevant literature in these fields. Asset specificity, switching costs, proportionality,
costs of ratification and compliance and issue linkages are what this study offers as the concepts
to be used in the index. These concepts are borrowed mostly from the economics literature to be
used in the field of international relations. They are compiled together in a way to represent
bilateral state relations in terms of vulnerably interdependent relationships and to create a
measurement method for vulnerability interdependence.
“What is badly defined is likely to be badly measured”.60 This chapter, hence, examined
the relevant literature very carefully and picked the related concepts that can be representative of
vulnerability interdependence the best. The reasons for selecting the five concepts as subgroups
of vulnerability interdependence are discussed in the parts where these concepts are explained.
The next chapter will present the research design of the study. It will concretize the index
by putting forth some questions. These questions are kept very clear to get an objective value
that shows the level of vulnerability interdependence. The questions of the vulnerability
interdependence index are aimed to be directed to foreign direct investment projects of a country
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to understand how much their investment projects make that country vulnerably interdependent
in its bilateral relationship with the host country.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter presents the methodology of this study. It both aims to lay out the method
that is used in the study and to provide any scholar enough information to replicate the study.
What a methodology part should entail is explained by Box-Steffensmeier, Brady and Collier
clearly.1 After giving the lyrics of a song of the Beatles that includes “revolution” and “we all
want to change the world”, they explain methodology as in the following:
“Methodology provides techniques for clarifying the theoretical meaning of
concepts such as revolution and for developing definitions of revolutions. It
offers descriptive indicators for comparing the scope of revolutionary
change, and sample surveys for gauging the support for revolutions. And it
offers an array of methods for making causal inferences that provide
insights into the causes and consequences of revolutions. All these tasks are
important and strongly interconnected. While causal inference is
fundamental in political science, making good inferences depends entirely
on adequate conceptualization and measurement of the phenomena under
study…”2
Some part of the methodology is given in the previous chapter, such as clarifying the
theoretical meaning of concepts that are used in this study along with their relevant literature.
This chapter will (1) describe the index and its questions that are used to measure the level of
vulnerability interdependence, give the rationale behind these concepts and questions of the
index about how good they are as measures of vulnerability, (2) present the data choice that is
believed to refer vulnerability the best and the source of data, (3) explain the ways adopted to
assess validity and reliability of the index, and (4) justify case selections by explaining which
subsectors and country cases are selected and why they were considered to be important for
understanding the findings of the vulnerability interdependence index.

1
2

Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology.
Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, 3–4.
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The Index of Vulnerability Interdependence

One of two most significant contributions of this study to the literature is the index of
vulnerability interdependence that aims at measuring the level of vulnerability of an investor
country. This part introduces the index in detail. The index consists of five broad concepts,
which have been presented in more detail in the previous chapter. The index aims to provide the
level of vulnerability interdependence of any two interdependent states by measuring costs of
asset specificity, switching costs, proportionality, costs of ratification and compliance, and issue
linkages.

17 Questions of the Vulnerability Interdependence Index

The proposed index operationalizing vulnerability interdependence has 17 questions.
These questions cover asset specificity, switching costs, costs of ratification and compliance,
proportionality, and issue linkages. Most of the questions are coded as binary variables; giving
either 0 or 1 according to what a project gives answer to a particular question of the index. Most
of the remaining questions are coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3. Questions 16 and 17 have answers of -1
and 1; meaning either decreasing or increasing the vulnerability level of the investor country.
Higher values always indicate higher level of vulnerability for the investor country.
The majority of the vulnerability interdependence index’s questions are directed to
productive activity, not to output product. The reason of this is that the index aims to understand
whether an investment increases the level of vulnerability of the investing party. The end-product
of an investment project does not have a significant effect on investor’s vulnerability since it is
what the investment project produces. For example, a nuclear energy investment generates
electricity as the output product. The questions are, however, directed to the nuclear energy
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facility, not electricity generation service. A couple of questions, though, are directed to the
output product. The rationale behind asking questions to output products is that they are
indicators of what productive activities might entail. A question in the category of location asset
specificity (question 3), for example, is directed to end-product of an investment since the endproduct is indicative of whether productive activity is location asset specific.
Investments that relate to buying a percentage of a company’s stakes are considered to be
investments in this company’s working area. For example, if a Chinese company bought 25% of
an Angolan oil production company, then this investment should be regarded to be in the oil
production sector. The questions of the vulnerability interdependence index should, therefore, be
answered accordingly.
Some questions cover the relationship at the state level, rather than the investment level.
For example, proportionality measures the trade relationship in the interstate level since
international trade is considered to be the best way to explain proportionality. Likewise, question
15, which measures the costs of ratification and compliance, is answered by looking at bilateral
investment treaties or free trade agreements at the state level.
Table 8: 17 Questions of the Vulnerability Interdependence Measurement Index
Asset Specificity
Location Asset Specificity
1. Are the assets or productivity mobile? (infinite immobile=3, immobile=2, mobile=1,
infinite mobile=0)
2. Are transportation costs amenable to decentralized production? (infinite not
amenable=3, not amenable=2, amenable=1, infinite amenable=0)
3. Is the value per unit of end-product’s weight high? (infinite high=0, high=1, low=2,
infinite low=3)
4. Is it the production of a natural (extracted) resource? (yes=1, no=0)
5. Are the assets generally co-located with other productive activities within a host
country? (yes=1, no=0)
Physical Asset Specificity
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6. Does production require investment in specialized (single-purpose) equipment? (yes=1,
no=0)
7. Are fixed production costs (as percent of total costs) high or low? (infinite high=3,
high=2, low=1, infinite low=0)
Human Asset Specificity
8. Does production require a specialized, high-skilled workforce? (yes=1, no=0)
9. Is the workforce mobile? (no=1, yes=0)
Plant Asset Specificity
10. Is physical plant dedicated to the productive purpose? Or can it be repurposed?
(dedicated=1, repurposed=0)
Switching Costs
Relational
11. Are there a small number of available market participants with whom to partner?
(Oligopsony or oligopoly) (yes=1, no=0)
Opportunity
12. Is the produced good storable? (no=1, yes=0) (It is always 0 if it is a public good)
Financial
13. Are assets characterized by high sunk costs? (infinite high=3, high=2, low=1, infinite
low=0)
Ratification and Compliance Costs
14. Does information asymmetry favor investing party or hosting party? (0 if it favors
investor, 1 if it favors host)
15. Is there an existing regime to monitor compliance among contracting parties? (no=1,
yes=0)
Proportionality
16. Are exports proportional among the two countries? (-1 if it favors the investing
country, 0 if it is proportional, 1 if it favors the host country)
Issue Linkages
17. What is the dyadic affinity score for the two countries? (least similar interests=-1, most
similar interests=1)

1. Questions Related to Asset Specificity

Asset specificity is considered to be the most important component of the vulnerability
interdependence index. If an investor country has sunk into a recipient country with high asset
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specific investment, then this investment increases the investor country’s level of vulnerability.
Although asset specificity is mostly associated with physical asset specificity in this concept’s
literature, other types of it are also considered in this index. Location, human and plant asset
specificity are other types that are included in the index. Almost two-third of 17 questions
indicate this term where five of them correspond to location asset specificity corresponding to
the number of different aspects related to them.
Question 1. Are the assets or productivity mobile? (infinite immobile=3, immobile=2, mobile=1,
infinite mobile=0)
This question aims to understand how easy it is to relocate an investment. Some
investment projects are difficult to relocate compared to others. Most heavy industry investment
projects are in this category. The mobility of a nuclear energy investment, for example, is not
feasible for relocation. On the other hand, many service industry projects are mobile. For
example, banking and most transportation assets are mobile naturally.
Answers for this question are given in four categories with the codes ranging from 3 to 0,
representing levels of mobility from infinite immobile to infinite mobile. Public good
investments generally fall into the category of infinite immobile and service investments are
generally regarded as infinite mobile. Private good investments are coded either as 1 or 2,
according to their mobility.
An airline investment is a private good investment, for example. In terms of mobility, it is
a mobile asset. There are, definitely, some parts of an airline investment that are not mobile, such
as airplane hangars. But the majority of an investment’s components will be taken into account
when determining its mobility. The answer should be ‘1’ for an airline investment. Another
example of mobile assets might be service within a constant infrastructure and with specialized
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equipment. University investments include both the university building itself and some
specialized equipment and services that operate the university. Some parts of the university
investment like professional labor, the expertise, and libraries can be moved whereas it might be
difficult to relocate some specialized equipment. Since the majority of a university investment
consists of mobile assets, its answer should be ‘0’ in terms of mobility dimension of location
asset specificity, which this question measures.
Infrastructure investments, by definition, are not mobile. Many of them are public goods,
which are coded as infinite immobile. For example, utilities are public goods. In utilities sector,
many drinking water investment projects include water treatment plants, storage dams, and
distribution pipelines. All components of a drinking water investment are not feasible to relocate
and use at another location. They would fall into the category of infinite immobile.
Many types of power plants (thermal power plants, coal power plants, oil power plants)
are examples of private good investments that are not easy to relocate.3 The answer for this type
of investments should be ‘2’ for this type of investments.
Question 2. Are transportation costs amenable to decentralized production? (infinite not
amenable=3, not amenable=2, amenable=1, infinite amenable=0)
This question of location asset specificity is about offshoring and outsourcing. It aims to
understand whether transportation costs are feasible to produce some components of a product in
different places and bring them together via transporting to a single assembling place. The
different places of production should be in different countries since the index measures
vulnerability interdependence at the international level. The idea of this question is that to the
degree transportation costs are low, the production can be de-centralized by producing some
3

Some power plant types, though, are feasible for relocation. Natural gas power plants are regarded as having
mobile productive tools. See “UOP Russell Modular Gas Processing Plants - Full-Length Animation.”
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components in different countries. These questions provide a way of thinking about this
question: “Is the asset merely a side of assembly?” or “Is it the place where the entire product is
produced at a single site?”.
Four categories are used in coding this question, ranging from infinite not amenable to
infinite amenable. Infinite not amenable category generally includes public goods; not amenable
and amenable categories are generally for private goods; and infinite amenable category
generally includes services.
An automobile company, for example, can machine and form all of automobile parts at
the same place that they are assembled as the complete vehicle. Or, conversely, components
could be made all over the world and shipped to a final assembly place. Since transportation
costs are amenable to decentralized production in this sector, the second way is the most
preferred way of production among automobile companies. An example from service sector
would be education. The end product of a school investment is the learning activity. It is feasible
to outsource some parts of education service via distance learning or hiring a part-time professor
from another location. For this reason, education investments would fall into the “infinite
amenable” category in terms of being feasible for decentralized production.
Transportation costs are crucial to understand whether a productive activity is feasible for
decentralized production. If fuel is expensive and so transportation costs are very high, then it is
very hard to locate parts of productive assets elsewhere. An example to this can be steel
production. The productive activity of steel requires a lot of coal. Coal is heavy and expensive to
transport. Hence, the final production in this example relies a lot on co-location of productive
activities, which are steel and coal production. Steel production would fall into the “not
amenable” category.
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Investment projects of public goods are different than factory-like investments that
produce a product as its output. For example, the vast majority of infrastructure investments do
not produce a tangible product. They, rather, produce public service in place where they are
built. Investments in road, railway or port projects fall into this category. For this type of
infrastructure investments, transportation costs are not amenable to decentralized production
since all steps of production has to be done at the site of investment. These investments would
fall into the “infinite not amenable” category.
Transportation costs’ feasibility for decentralized production should be regarded at the
international level. If some parts of the production can be provided from outside of the host
country, then it is regarded as amenable for decentralized production. Components of a drinking
water supply investment, for example, is generally built at different locations since water is easy
to distribute by pipelines. Similarly, electricity distribution investments have decentralized
production as electricity is transported via transmission lines. However, they are generally
located within a host country. Hence, their decentralized production does not fit to the aim of this
question. The answer should be ‘infinite not amenable’ for a drinking water supply investment or
electricity distribution investments.
High-technology network systems are mostly feasible for decentralized production. This
type of investments requires a significant level of know-how. Telecommunications investments
are good examples to this. Their components are feasible for producing at different locations and
their transportation costs are amenable for decentralized production.
Transportation costs’ amenability for decentralized production affects vulnerability of
investing party by increasing the cost of defection if it wants to disrupt an investment. The
reason of this is that the investing party cannot move some parts of productive activities if
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transportation costs of some goods that are required in the chain of production do not make it
feasible to move.
Question 3: Is the value per unit of product’s weight high? (infinite high=0, high=1, low=2,
infinite low=3)
This question examines the relationship between the value of product and the cost of
shipping as it shows how easy it is to offshore the production. In other words, its aim is to
understand whether some components of a production is worth offshoring from the perspective
of transportation’s feasibility. If an element is very expensive and light-weight, it is more likely
to be offshored. But if an element is low-value and heavy-weight, the production might be colocated with the final production.
The answer of this question is given in four categories: infinite high, high, low, infinite
low, which are given values from 0 to 3. The category of infinite low value per unit of weight
mostly captures public goods. Public goods, by their nature, are generally very heavy and hard to
relocate. Therefore, if an investment project is a public good that produces product or service, the
answer should be ‘3’ (infinite low). Then, the second and the third categories capture private
goods. If an output product is a private good and has low value per weight, then the answer
should be ‘2’ (low). If an output product is a private good with a high value per unit of weight,
then the answer should be ‘1’ (high). The last category is generally for service investments.
Service investments are extremely light, which makes their value per unit of weight very high.
Service investments are coded as ‘0’ (infinite high).
The weight of a product sets the price of transporting it; heavier products are more
expensive to ship. In order to offset the cost of shipping, the value per unit weight of product has
to be high. An example of this can be computer chips. Their value is high enough to make it
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worth shipping by air. Computer chips fall into the category of high value per unit of weight
goods and the answer for this good is ‘1’ (high). Oil itself, either in crude form or refined form,
should be considered as a precious product, whose value per unit of weight is high. The answer
for oil as the produced good is the same with the answer for computer chips.
The value per unit of weight of a product is regarded as an indicator of location asset
specificity and so of vulnerability because it shows how feasible it is to end an investment at a
location and move it to somewhere else.
Question 4: Is it the production of natural (extracted) resource? (yes=1, no=0)
This question aims to get whether the productive activity relates to production of
minerals. Minerals, by definition, are generally produced at the site they are found. It is not
feasible to produce oil at a location away from the oil field, for example. The same works for
gold: one cannot produce gold at a location away from the gold field. This kind of natural
(extracted) resource products are highly location specific assets.
Some productive activities might involve extracted natural resources but do not produce
them as the end product. A coal-fired power plant, for example, generate electricity as the end
product and requires using a lot of coal. Although coal is the main primary product of a coalfired power plant investment’s productive activity, it is not regarded as the production of
extracted natural resource. A coal-fired power plant is different than a coal mining investment.
Also, a pipeline investment does not include extracted natural resource production although it is
for transporting this commodity.
There are other types of natural resources that are called renewable natural resources and
mostly not extracted from the ground such as wind energy or solar energy. Investments in these
sectors are regarded as being production of non-extracted natural resources as they do not create
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vulnerability in terms of this dimension of location asset specificity. This question aims at
understanding whether the production relates natural resources whose production is only feasible
at the site where they are found/located.
Extracted natural resources are indicators of vulnerability interdependence as it makes the
investor country dependent on the hosting country, meaning that it makes the investing party
more vulnerable due to the type of product that the productive activity entails.
Question 5: Are assets generally co-located with other productive activities within a host
country? (yes=1, no=0)
Some products require multiple steps of production, meaning that more than one
productive activity is needed to produce. This question is meant to cover the entire value chain of
production. It asks whether there are steps in the product-chain that are generally co-located. It
also aims to get at the idea of whether there are complementary products or services that need to
be co-located. All production steps until the end-user gets the final product are counted as
production steps that are considered when answering this question.
Co-location of productive activities can be considered both in goods and service sectors.
Oil is a good example in the goods sector that has more than one productive activity and requires
some of its productive activities to be co-located. It is extracted from the ground but for it to be
used in various areas like transportation, it has to be refined and transported to the final
consumption destination. If the site of distribution is also counted as a step of production, then it
has three main productive activities; extraction, refinement, and transportation to the point of
consumption. The way the markets are organized today is that refinement is done near the point
of consumption. After the refinement process, it is transported a few miles to the service stations
where end-users buy gas as the end-product. Hence, assets are regarded to be not co-located with
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other productive activities for oil production investments.
External economies of scale, which simply means clustering a group of companies that
are in the same industry near to each other, trigger co-location of productive activities. The
Silicon Valley, for example, has a lot of co-located production of different steps in the value
chain. In external economies of scale, companies of the same industry come together mostly to
increase the productivity of their asset. The productivity of assets goes up when it is co-located
with other assets. They can benefit from being co-located with each other in various ways.
Decreasing the cost of transportation, increasing communication, benefiting from the pool of
skilled labor, having a pool of research and development, and creating knowledge spillovers are
some benefits of co-location of productive activities in external economies of scale.
Some investments might be feasible for decentralized production (see the explanation of
question 2) while their assets might generally be co-located with other productive activities.
Drinking water distribution or electricity distribution investments are examples of being feasible
for decentralized production but being co-located with other productive activities.4
This dimension of vulnerability should be thought about at the international level. An
investment can only make the investor party less vulnerable if some of the productive activities
are located out of the host country. For example, a telecommunications network investment must
be located at different locations in different countries for it to consider making the investor party
less vulnerable. If it is located in different locations but within a host country, then it creates
more vulnerability for the investor. (The answer should be ‘no’ for this type of cases.)
This question aims at understanding productive activities that have production steps
4

As noted in question 2’s explanation part, drinking water distribution or electricity distribution investments might
be feasible for decentralized production. They are, however, considered as not suitable for decentralized production
in this index since this index aims at understanding whether some components of production can be done in a third
country.
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located at different locations. Productive activities that are generally done at only one production
site are considered to be co-located with other productive activities. All public good investments,
for example, would fall into this category. Similarly, a house construction project would fall into
this category since all production is done at the production site.
Co-location of productive activities helps us to understand the level of vulnerability by
showing whether the investing party has losses by moving its investment from the host country.
If co-location of productive activities provides benefits for the investor, its vulnerability would
increase due to having strong motivation to stay in the host country.
Question 6: Does production require investment in specialized (single-purposed) equipment?
(yes=1, no=0)
There are some production tools that can be used for multi-purposes. A screwdriver, for
example, can be used to repair a car, to fix home, or to assemble furniture. It is a multi-purpose
tool that can be used for a lot of different productive enterprises. On the other hand, there are
some tools that are unique to a productive enterprise. For example, dies in automotive sector are
a pretty specialized product. They cannot be repurposed for other productive activities. Another
example would be a railway investment. One cannot use railway for other productive purposes
except providing transportation service on it. The question, in other words, is how easy it is to
take a physical capital and convert it for use of other productive enterprises.
Extraction of petroleum products, for example, requires investment in specialized
equipment. A pump jack can only be used in oil wells. Similarly, electricity distribution
investments (which include construction of substations, transmission lines and power distribution
facilities), drinking water supply investments (which includes construction of storage dams,
water treatment plant and water distribution pipelines), coal-fired or gas-fired power plants, and
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a fossil fuel pipeline investment require investment in specialized equipment since many
equipment are not feasible to use for other purposes in these investments.
In contrary, many types of agricultural investments, for example, do not require
investment in single-purposed equipment. Most infrastructure investments also require nonspecific tools, which can be used for other purposes too.
As discussed in the physical asset specificity part of the literature review chapter, this is
the crucial question to get the idea of whether there is an asset specific physical production
enterprise. If an asset is physical asset specific, then it does not increase the vulnerability level of
the investor country.
Question 7: Are fixed production costs (as percent of total costs) high or low? (infinite high=3,
high=2, low=1, infinite low=0)
Production costs consist of fixed costs and variable costs. Fixed production costs do not
change no matter how much or how little the production is, whereas variable production costs
increase or decrease with the number of product produced. Aircraft manufacturing, for example,
has very high fixed production cost. An aircraft manufacturer company has to do a lot of
research and development to make an airplane, which constitutes a high proportion of fixed
production costs.
Labor intensive industries tend to have low fixed production costs and high variable
production costs. Textiles, for example, have some specialized machineries that are expensive
but there is very little research and development. In a textile production, there is also a lot of
labor involved. Hence, it has high variable costs. Similarly, a hospital investment is a laborintensive investment. It requires employing well-educated medical workers which is a significant
cost for operating a hospital. Its fixed production costs are low as a percent of total production
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costs. On the other hand, pharmaceuticals and software have very high fixed costs and low
variable costs. For example, research and development of Microsoft Word software has a very
high cost for the Microsoft company. But once the company starts putting this software on a CD,
then the costs become very low. The cost of a CD and writing the software setup files on this CD
is less than one US dollar. Likewise, almost all cost of pharmaceuticals consists of research and
development. There are a lot of very expensive fixed production costs such as biochemistry,
human subject research, and critical trials. Once a pharmaceutical company invests in these fixed
costs, though, the amount it pays to produce each individual dose or each individual bottle
becomes very low.
Research and development takes an important share in the total cost of a product. It is the
starting point of a product cycle. With regard to including research and development in fixed
production costs, one should look at whether these research and development activities are done
as a part of a particular investment. For example, China’s oil extraction technology is part of its
investment that it has done for itself, not for the country that it is investing in. Therefore, these
research and development activities do not count as the fixed production cost in an oil extraction
investment in another country. However, if China developed some technology that is specific to
the country that it is investing in and this technology only works in this country, then these
research and development activities may count as the part of fixed production cost for this
investment.
The coding has four categories for this question, ranging from 3 to 0, indicating from
infinite high to infinite low share of fixed production costs. Public good investments are
generally in the category of infinite high fixed production costs. They have some variable
production costs such as maintenance costs. The majority of costs in this type of investments,
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however, are fixed production costs, which are one-time investment costs that investors have to
spend. Therefore, the answer of this question will be ‘3’ (infinite high) for the vast majority of
public good investments. Services tend to have very low fixed production costs. They generally
fall into the category of infinite low fixed production costs, which is coded as ‘0’ (infinite low).
Similar to investment projects of public goods, some projects have very high share of
fixed production costs although they are not public goods. A house construction project is an
example. Almost all costs of a house construction project are fixed production costs. Therefore,
it is coded as ‘3’ (infinite high).
High fixed production costs lead to high asset specificity as it means that an investor has
to make an important amount of investment before it starts earning. A foreign investor has to
take a lot of risks and put a lot of money into a project before it can see return on its investment.
It means that a significant amount of its money is locked up. It cannot be got out quickly. This
makes the investor vulnerable.
Question 8: Does production require a specialized, high-skilled workforce? (yes=1, no=0)
This question aims to understand whether an investment has high human asset specificity.
If it requires a specialized, high-skilled workforce for production, then it is highly human asset
specific. Running a nuclear power plant requires a high-skilled workforce whereas running a
mine requires a low-skilled workforce (miners do not need to be well-educated workers). The
university example –also discussed while explaining location asset specificity in the first
question- has a high-skilled workforce requirement. An important part of a university investment
requires recruiting faculty members at the university, which are specialized and high-skilled
workforce.
Investments related to high-technology activities are regarded mostly as requiring a high-
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skilled, specialized workforce because even if their use does not require a high-skilled
workforce, their regular maintenance and technical assistance need a high-skilled workforce.
Investments in utilities sector, agriculture-related sectors, highway construction sector,
aviation sector, and fossil fuel pipeline investments are examples of not requiring a specialized,
high-skilled workforce. Examples of sectors that require a high-skilled workforce are education,
renewable energy generation, and power plants (coal-fired, gas-fired).
Specialized, high-skilled workforce is an indicator of the investing party’s vulnerability
as it indicates one dimension of how easy it is to move an investment that requires high-skilled
workforce to a third country. Investments that require a high-skilled workforce are more difficult
to be moved to a third country.
Question 9: Is the workforce mobile? (no=1, yes=0)
This question aims to address both moving a workforce from one country to another one
and finding a substitute workforce in another country when moving an investment there.
Although it is meant to address these two dimensions, it is mostly used to refer the latter one –
finding substitute workforce elsewhere.
Productive activities that require only a low-skilled workforce is always mobile. There
are available substitute workforce elsewhere for this type of labor at any country. There is
substitute workforce elsewhere in reaping corn, for example, as it is very low-tech activity and
requires low-skilled workforce. In most cases, there will be workforce to be used for this job.
Some productive activities that require high-skilled workforce may entail non-mobile
workforce. If the required workforce is in quantum physics, for instance, then there will be far
fewer number of people that can be recruited. Therefore, it may be hard to find substitute worker
for a project that needs to recruit a quantum physic expert.
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A specification of non-mobile workforce is the requisite of having some specific
machinery for the productive activity. In investments that require engineering knowledge, there
may be some production tools that are dedicated to the productive purposes and are produced by
a limited number of producers in a sector characterized by oligopoly. If an investment requires
using this kind of machinery in the productive activity, then they are dependent on workforce
that only the producer of that tools might have. Only the producer of this machinery may provide
the workforce that is required for its maintenance and renovation. This workforce can neither be
substituted by another party nor can be moved to another location since the investor uses this
workforce from a third party. Many investments in the security sector are examples to this, in
which the investor countries may wish the required workforce only provided by themselves in
order to hide engineering details of their invested machinery’s technology.
The vast majority of foreign direct investments has mobile workforce while there are
some examples of investments that have non-mobile workforce. Examples of non-mobile
workforce include petroleum investments (locating oil field, drilling, refinement), natural gas
processing plant investments, telecommunications network investments, nuclear energy
investment, high-tech defense sector investments. Examples of mobile workforce include
education investments, transportation investments, power plant investments (coal, gas,
hydropower), alumina refinery investments, cobalt production investments, steel production
investments, and platinum production investments.
Mobility of workforce is an indicator of vulnerability of the investor by showing how
easy it is to move its workforce to another location or to find substitute workforce in another
location if it wants to break a trade or investment relationship and move its investment to
somewhere else from that country.
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If the investing party does not have an obstacle to move its investment due to not finding
workforce in a country where it wants to move its investment to, then it will not be vulnerable in
terms of workforce mobility.
Question 10: Is physical plant dedicated to the productive purpose? Or can it be repurposed?
(dedicated=1, repurposed=0)
This question aims to understand whether the investing party becomes vulnerable due to
the physical plant that is used for the investment it has done in a country. The question sounds
similar to question 6 but they address different dimensions of an investment. Question 6 is about
the specialized equipment and machinery, whereas this question is about actual facilities; the
building itself, the grounds, the foundation, etc. Using a building for multipurpose fall into this
question’s scope whereas using a machine for multipurpose fall into the scope of question 6.
Many physical plants can be repurposed. For example, if an investor builds a hospital, the
building of the hospital can be repurposed and be used as a school. So the answer will be it can
be repurposed for question 10. However, a hospital has some special equipment that cannot be
used for other purposes. Therefore, the answer of this hospital example for question 6 will be that
it requires investment in specialized (single-purposed) equipment.
Examples of dedicated physical plant include airports. An airport is only useful when it is
used for the purposes for which it is built. It can, definitely, be used for other purposes as well
but it is not as useful as other investment types to be used for other purposes. For example, a
hangar can be used to store something but it is not a form that one can maximize its use. Other
examples of dedicated facilities include coal-fired power plants, gas-fired power plants, and
hydropower plants.
Dedicated physical plants increase the vulnerability level of the investor since they
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cannot be used for other purposes. It is not profitable for the investor to stop the productivity of
the investment and use it for other purposes if the physical plant is dedicated for a productive
purpose.

2. Questions Related to Switching Costs

The next three questions address the three dimensions of switching costs; relational
switching costs, opportunity costs, and financial switching costs. The rationale behind these
questions is that the investing party will be vulnerable as its vulnerability caused by these three
dimensions of switching costs increases.
Question 11: Are there a small number of available market participants with whom to partner?
(Is it oligopsony or oligopoly?) (yes=1, no=0)
This question is about the relational switching cost dimension of vulnerability
interdependence. It addresses the problem of fewness. If there is very few number of participants
in a market, then an investor is much more vulnerable as it is less likely to switch. This
dimension of vulnerability is considered at the international level since the index aims at
understanding vulnerability in bilateral relationships.
Oil and valuable mineral markets are good examples to this dimension. Historically, oil
purchasers have signed exclusive supplier agreements with oil producers, with which they
guarantee to buy a particular amount of oil in return of getting concession from the supplier that
it will not sell its oil to someone else. Similarly, the diamond market is locked up as the diamond
industry is essentially a monopoly. There are very market participants who are willing to sell
diamond to a particular customer.
Market participants could be from both the supplier side and the buyer side. It could be a
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supplier, who supplies a component of the investor’s final product or some part that is used in the
production process or it could be buyer of an investor’s product.
A hypothetical example helps better understand this question. Suppose that China has an
agreement with Ghana on a bauxite mining project and there are no other bauxite miners in the
world for China. In this case, there are two probabilities: Ghana is the only place that the world
gets the bauxite from or all other bauxite mines are fully contracted by other miners or buyers. In
this case, the lack of available alternative suppliers makes it very costly to switch for China.
A reverse hypothetical case can also be envisioned. Suppose that China is by far the
largest buyer of cement. In this case, it will have the pricing power as it will have monopsony or
oligopsony power. Because of its market power, China will be able to play off different
suppliers. The switching cost would be very low in this reverse case of relational switching cost
dimension.
Examples of oligopsony markets can be listed as telecommunications network service,
aviation services, oil and natural gas production, and alumina refinery.
In sum, this question aims to capture the relationship between buyers and sellers and
whether or not there are available alternative buyers or sellers in the international market.
Question 12: Is the produced good storable? (no=1, yes=0)
This question is about opportunity cost. Opportunity cost can simply be defined as the
cost that an investor misses by investing in one place and not investing in another one. In other
words, it is the difference of benefits between investor’s choice and other available choices. It is
the cost of foregone investment.
This question aims to get the idea whether an investor can store some extra production in
case it wants to switch to another host country or the host country wants to cut their bilateral
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relationship. It assumes that the investor benefits from the end product by using the product for
itself. For example, suppose that an investor produces computer chips in the country it has
invested in and wants to move its investment to another host country since it foresaw its possible
gains from moving to another host country more than locating its investment in its current host
country. This investor needs to store some amount of computer chips in its warehouse to meet its
demand in the interim period of between its current supplier and future supplier. In order to
minimize the disruption in case of the counterparty ending their investment relationship, it has to
store some extra amount of supplied goods. However, if the supplied product is not storable, then
the vulnerability of the investor (buyer) goes up. Storage is only possible if the product is not
perishable.
This question is about internationally traded commodities. For example, infrastructure
investments produce an end-product but its storability is not important when answering this
question. Drinking water is a good example for infrastructure investments. It can be stored but its
storage is not for the investor party. Its storage can only be useful for the host party. For this
reason, if an end-product of an investment is not internationally traded, then it is regarded as not
storable even if it can be stored.
Investments regarding electricity generation involve a storable product, which is
electricity. However, electricity’s storability is not the same with what this question aims at
understanding about the project. Its storage in transmission lines does not last for a long time. An
important amount of electricity is lost in its transmission period. If it would be feasible to store
electricity in batteries, then it would fit for this question’s aim.
A good example of storability for a strategic commodity is the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve requirement of the International Energy Agency. The agency requires its members to
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store some amount of oil reserve, which is called the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. This
petroleum reserve decreases the vulnerability level of the OECD member countries in case of
having an oil supply disruption.
Storability has a reverse relationship with the level of investor’s vulnerability. When
storability goes up, the investor’s vulnerability goes down.
Question 13: Are assets characterized by high sunk costs? (infinite high=3, high=2, low=1,
infinite low=0)
This question addresses the costs that an investor sinks into an investment before it starts
realizing profits. Those costs cannot be pulled back in case the investor wants to move its
investment. In other words, it aims at addressing the ability to liquidate the investment assets.
This question is similar to question 7 (Are fixed production costs as percent of total costs
high or low?). While question 7 aims to address the physical asset specificity dimension of the
vulnerability interdependence, this question addresses its financial dimension. Question 7
addresses fixed production costs that an investment requires before starting a unit of production
and this question addresses the costs that cannot be pulled back even an investor wants to cancel
its investment. A fixed production cost does not necessarily mean that it is a sunk cost. For
example, some high technological machines might be the fixed production cost of a production
since it is needed to start one unit of production. However, if these machines can be moved to
somewhere else, they are not considered among sunk costs. Investments that require hightechnology are generally not associated with high sunk costs since the assets can generally be
moved to somewhere else by the investor party. A hospital investment, for example, would fall
into this category.
Public goods and services are at two extreme ends in terms of sunk costs. Public goods
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tend to have very high sunk costs while services tend to have very low sunk costs. For this
reason, four coding categories are used for answering this question, ranging from 3 to 0,
indicating from infinite high to infinite low sunk costs. Public goods are generally coded as 3 and
services are generally coded as 0. Construction investments are associated with high sunk costs,
for example.
An investment that is associated with high sunk costs makes the investing party more
vulnerable in terms of financial switching cost. It will be more costly for an investor to switch in
case of having an investment asset characterized by high sunk costs.

3. Questions Related to Ratification and Compliance Costs

The next two questions address compliance costs. They indicate whether the investing
party can trust what the hosting party says and what regime will provide solution in case of
problems of distrust among parties. Although ratification cost is significant for measuring
vulnerability at the interstate level, there is no question to measure it since ratification cost is
hard to operationalize. Albeit, it should be included to a qualitative analysis of vulnerability
interdependence.
Question 14: Does information asymmetry favor investing party or hosting party? (0 if it favors
investor, 1 if it favors host)
“Unlike asymmetrical interdependence in trade, where power goes to those who can
afford to hold back or break trade ties, information power flows to those who can edit and
credibly validate information to sort out what is both correct and important.”5
This question is about the compliance costs dimension of vulnerability. One party may
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know better about productive activity, pre-existing conditions of production site/facility or
resources required for production (e.g. natural resources, financial resources, human resources)
than the other party in investment projects. Suppose that an investor wants to start a mining
investment. It is important to know who knows better about mine reserves under the ground. For
example, Ghana can communicate with a Chinese mining company saying that it has iron
reserves that will be enough to meet the Chinese demand for the next 20 years. In such a case,
the buyer has to have the ability to verify seller’s claims. Typically, there are very high
compliance costs in cases having high asymmetries of information between the contracting
parties because there has to be some mechanisms/rules for verification of information provided
by the seller.
This question is about verifying the truthfulness of counter-party’s claims: Is the
investment recipient party capable of providing the good or service that the investor party is
contracting for? The hosting party may claim that it has a lot of oil reserves. In this case, the
investing party may want to verify the host’s claim by investing some amount of money before
making the investment itself. A reverse example also might be possible: An investor may know
better than recipient. For example, China may get information from US oil companies about
Angola’s oil reserves before making an oil field investment in Angola. It is possible that US oil
companies know better than Angolan national oil company since they have a long history of
investing in Angolan oil fields.
Information asymmetry matters also in investments where two parties have fixed-price
deals. Two parties may have a fixed-price deal for upgrading a railway, for example. In this case,
it is highly likely that the hosting party knows better about the pre-existing infrastructure and
therefore what it will cost to upgrade it to agreed status. In such an example, the information
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asymmetry favors the hosting party.
This question is important to capture the idea of ratification and compliance costs
theoretically. But it is difficult to operationalize it practically due to difficulty of finding the
details of investment project deals. The best way to get the idea of information asymmetry would
be to direct a basic question. The question of “who the seller is?” will be determinant when
deciding about which party has information advantage. The seller tends to have information
advantage. For example, if an African country is selling its natural resources to a Chinese
company, then it will be regarded that information asymmetry favors the hosting party. If an
investor is making a greenfield investment, then it will be regarded that the investor party has the
information advantage. If an investor is reconstructing/renovating a previously built investment
and it is known that there is a fixed price for the deal, for example, the hosting party will be
regarded to have information advantage.
The more the investor party has information the less it becomes vulnerable in terms of
compliance costs of an investment agreement.
Question 15: Is there an existing regime to monitor compliance among contracting parties?
(no=1, yes=0)
This question addresses compliance costs dimension of vulnerability interdependence.
There might be a regime or an institution or some set of rules to monitor compliance among
contracting parties. Having at least one of them helps contracting parties overcome problems of
distrust. There are not really commercial courts in the international system. It is very hard for
parties to find a resolution for their commercial problems.
Similar to the previous question, this question is important theoretically but hard to
operationalize due to difficulty of finding the details of investment project deals. For this reason,
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bilateral investment treaties (BIT) and free trade agreements (FTA) are used to answer this
question. They include mechanisms for settling disputes and monitoring compliance among
contracting parties.6 World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID)7 is used for BITs for any bilateral investment relationships and the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce’s (MOFCOM) website8 is used to monitor FTAs between China and the other
contracting party. If there is a BIT or FTA between China and the host country for any
investment project, then it is regarded that there is an existing regime to monitor compliance
among contracting parties.
If there is an existing regime to monitor compliance among contracting parties, then
compliance costs go down. In this case, vulnerability of the investing party will be less since it
knows that there is a regime to overcome problems of distrust, which may lead to disruption of
the bilateral relationship.

4. Question Related to Proportionality

Proportionality is measured by using one question. The question measures proportionality
at the country level by comparing export percentages of the investor country and the investment
recipient country in their bilateral trade.
Question 16: Are exports proportional among the two countries? (-1 if it favors the investing
country, 0 if it is proportional, 1 if it favors the host country)
This question looks whether the trade relationship between two countries is proportional
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or favors one party. Proportionality is measured at the interstate level. It is calculated for each
year and is given to any project in a year. For example, if the relationship between China and
Angola favors China in 2014, all Chinese projects in Angola will have -1 as the proportionality
value.
Export shares are used as the indicator of proportionality. In the codification of export
shares, -1 is given if the percentage of investor country’s exports to the investment recipient
country within its total exports is higher than the percentage of investment recipient country’s
exports to the investing country within its total exports and 1 is given if proportions favor the
investment recipient country. The index measures vulnerability interdependence from the
perspective of investor country. For this reason, -1 is given as the proportionality value to
decrease investor country’s vulnerability value if it favors the investor country.
The reason why continuous variable is not preferred over the dichotomous variable is that
the trade data of the African countries may not be reliable. Specifically, the trade data is expected
to reflect imprecise amounts of trade volumes. Hence, continuous variable of the trade data is
converted to a dichotomous variable.
The more the investor country’s exports to the investment recipient country within its
total exports compared to the investment recipient country’s exports to the investor country
within its total exports, the less the investor country becomes vulnerable. Suppose that country A
and country B have bilateral trade relationship among each other in a particular year. If country
A’s exports to country B within country A’s total exports is higher than country B’s exports to
country A within country B’s total exports, then this trade relationship favors country A. The
rational is that country B will suffer more if the trade relationship is severed by a party.
It is discussed in the proportionality part of the literature review chapter that type of
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traded commodity should also be considered to get a true picture of proportionality. For purposes
of not making the vulnerability interdependence index highly complex, the type of commodity is
disregarded in the index. Only total trade values are used in the index to get a proportionality
value.

5. Question Related to Issue Linkages

Question 17: What is the dyadic affinity score for the two countries? (least similar interests=-1,
most similar interests=1)
Question 17 examines whether the selected two countries link different issues by making
concessions in order to get some additional bargaining leverage in return. A good way to
understand whether two countries link different issues is to look at their voting similarity at the
UN as it is a good indicator of their responses to issues in international arena. In an investorrecipient relationship, the investor is likely to expect getting support from the recipient for the
issues at the international arena in return for getting the host country’s support.
Issue linkages is measured by using one parameter that belongs to a dataset on voting
similarity in the UN General Assembly. The dyadic affinity score data9 is used to represent the
level of issues that two countries link. The dataset has a data ranging from -1 to 1, indicating the
least similar interests and the most similar interests of any two countries in a given year.
The countries that have more similar interests are expected to link more issues. As
mentioned when explaining issue linkages in the previous chapter, “the hypothesis for issue
linkage can be stated as that a state that can create issue linkages will be less vulnerable in an
interdependent relationship because it raises the cost of defection for its counterparty. The other
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party may lose concessions it gets by cooperating in case of defecting.” In this case, if the host
country has issues to link in order to gain additional bargaining leverage, it will have lower level
of vulnerability, which means higher level of vulnerability for the investor party. For this reason,
1 is given for the most similar interests, indicating investor’s high level of vulnerability.
In general, issues that are linked work in favor of the country that has more bargaining
leverage. The coder should be careful about selecting the country with more bargaining leverage.
If the host country has more additional leverage in bargain, then investor would be more
vulnerable. If the investor country has more additional bargaining leverage, then it would work
in favor of the investor country and will increase host country’s vulnerability. In the SinoAfrican relations, the African countries have always more bargaining leverage, which makes
China more vulnerable in terms of issue linkages.

Data Selection

The index of vulnerability interdependence requires data at the project level. In order to
understand whether an investment makes the investing country vulnerable, one should direct the
questions listed above to each one of individual projects that an investing country makes in a
host country.
Most of the data that are used in this study are created by the author by using descriptive
information of Chinese foreign direct investments. More specifically, questions 1 to 15 require
data in Chinese investments that includes project details (investment sector and subsector,
productive activity of investment, whether it is a greenfield investment or repairing/restoring an
existing investments, the end-product obtained from this investment etc.). Question 16 creates a
new proportionality data by using export volumes of investor and host countries. Question 17
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uses dyadic affinity score as it is provided in its original source.

Dataset Selection for the Chinese FDI Data

International capital flows consist of both official and private flows. Official
Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF) are two major official sources
of international capital flows. Private flows within international capital flows consist of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), private sector loans to developing countries, and export credits. These
flow types are used to see a country’s capital flows into another country. By definition, FDI
“takes place when a corporation in one country establishes a business operation in another
country, through setting up a new wholly owned affiliate, or acquiring a local company, or
forming a joint venture in the host economy.”10
ODA and OOF, which are official sources of international capital flows, are put forth by
the OECD more than 40 years ago.11 According to the OECD definition, ODA is “government
aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.”12
Government aid includes “‘soft’ loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of the total) and
the provision of technical assistance”.13 The third major capital flow, OOF, is defined as “official
sector transactions that do not meet official development assistance (ODA) criteria”.14 OOF
includes “export credits extended directly to an aid recipient by an official agency or institution
(official direct export credits); the net acquisition by governments and central monetary
institutions of securities issued by multilateral development banks at market terms; subsidies
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(grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to developing countries; and, funds in support of
private investment”.15
Among official and private international capital flow types, FDI is considered to provide
answers for questions of vulnerability interdependence index because it consists of the kinds of
investment projects to which the index needs to direct its questions. The aggregate data in the
country level or regional level cannot answer those questions as they cannot capture
specifications of investments due to not providing enough details about projects. For this reason,
this study will use FDI data at the project level, rather than at the country level.
There are many datasets that provide FDI data. They include (1) United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) dataset, (2) UNCTAD’s country profile
pages, (3) Investment Map dataset of the International Trade Centre and (4) OECD Statistics
dataset. All of these datasets have some limitations. UNCTAD’s dataset provides inflow,
outflow, instock and outstock FDI data, but all are provided as country-level bilateral statistics.
UNCTAD’s country profile pages list detailed FDI data for some countries. However, the data
reports are not updated (dates of data are between 2011 and 2013) and China and the African
countries –except South Africa- are not in the list of countries whose data are available.
Investment Map of the International Trade Centre provides data for each country’s inward FDI
by sectors. It also provides how much a country invested in a host country’s particular sector.
The problem about this dataset is that its data for many African countries is not detailed; many of
those countries have aggregate country-level data. The reason why OECD statistics dataset is not
helpful for this study is that it only provides data for OECD countries. One side of bilateral FDI
relationship has to be an OECD member country. Neither China nor African countries are
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members of the OECD.
Although China treats most of its financial data like a state secret, it lists registered FDIs.
The Chinese government is one of the good data sources for Chinese FDI. Chinese Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) provides data in two ways: It publishes statistical bulletins16 and lists
registered FDI projects of Chinese companies17 from a database. Both datasets have some
limitations. The statistical bulletins are not updated regularly and have very limited data. As of
September 2017, the latest available FDI statistical bulletin was published on November 25,
2016. All bulletins of 2016 do not present outward FDI data. They just provide the data for top
ten inward FDI investor countries with the amounts they invested in China. Compared to
MOFCOM’s statistical bulletins, its Investment Project Information Database provide better
data. This database’s website provides data both for inward FDI projects and outward FDI
projects. The data is updated regularly by adding new projects and dataset have detailed
information about each project at the project level. For each outward FDI project, the dataset
presents project name, date, project type, industry, location of outward FDI investment, project
validity period, total amount of project capitals, total amount of investment to be attracted,
expected annual sales revenue, expected employment figure, and some description about the
project content, investor condition, and environment protection. The problem with this dataset is
that its English version presents less project data compared to its Mandarin version for outward
FDI projects. Even its Mandarin version does not comprehend as much data as some other
datasets, which is the reason why this study did not prefer using MOFCOM’s Investment Project
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Information Database.
AidData project has a good source of dataset about China’s outgoing capital flows. Its
Global Chinese Foreign Assistance is more detailed, more comprehensive and more up-to-date
compared to other datasets listed above. It includes all types of Chinese international capital
flows. Though, this dataset has only official financial flows that aim development in the recipient
country.18 It, therefore, consists of official development assistance (ODA) or other official flows
(OOF).
The China Global Investment Tracker dataset of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
is the most comprehensive dataset among all others.19 It captures foreign direct investments
(FDIs), which is a type of international private financial flows. The dataset lists investments with
an investment amount that is higher than $100 million. Omitting the investment data with values
lower than $100 million is useful for the purposes of using it in a vulnerability interdependence
index. It is a useful threshold for the index because projects with investment amounts lower than
this amount are not significant in creating vulnerability for the investor country.

China Global Investment Tracker Dataset of the AEI

The most helpful aspect of this dataset for the vulnerability interdependence index is that
its unit of analysis is the project. Having projects as the unit of analysis helps to get a clear view
of vulnerability interdependence since most of the 17 questions of vulnerability interdependence
are directed to investment projects. Datasets that provide aggregate data (either aggregate data
for any two country in a given time period or aggregate data for any sector in a bilateral
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relationship in a given time period) are not appropriate for the purposes of using them to get
answers for vulnerability interdependence index’s questions.
The China Global Investment Tracker dataset tracks various information for each
investment project record:
-

Project date: It is given as month and year.

-

Chinese entity: It is the Chinese company which makes the investment. It can be either a
private or state-owned Chinese company. The dataset only includes names of
conglomerates although the investment is done by one of their subsidiary companies.

-

Quantity: The USD amount of the Chinese FDI. The dataset has a threshold of $100
million. It omits investments whose value is lower than this amount. The value of
investments are rounded to $10 million. For example, an investment project with a value
of $243 million is listed as $240 million.

-

Share size: This row has data only if the project is invested by more than one company. If
more than one company is included in the investment, then this row shows the share size
of the Chinese company.

-

Transaction party: This information is valid for Chinese company buying pre-existing
investments. It does not have any data for greenfield investments as there is no
transaction party in a greenfield investment.
Sector, subsector, country, region, and whether the investment is a part of China’s One

Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative are other information that this dataset provides.
The publicly available data of this dataset is very helpful. However, more information
about investment projects is required to be able to answer questions on the vulnerability
interdependence index. A detailed description of each investment project is essential to grasp
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specifications of investments. The dataset provides sector and subsector information but they are
not enough to answer questions of the index. For example, an investment in real estate sector and
construction subsector might be a house construction or a cement plant construction.
Specifications of a house construction investment and a cement plant construction investment is
very different in terms of creating vulnerability for the investor party. Hence, more information
is collected from various sources about each investment project listed in this dataset. Search in
search engines in English and Mandarin languages provided detailed information about the
projects. Company websites (either conglomerate’s website or subsidiary companies’ websites)
were leading sources for gathering further information about the project. Newspapers and some
other news spots are also used to gather detailed project information.20 During the searching
period, we came across with some additional projects that are not listed in the China Global
Investment Tracker dataset. These investment projects are also added with their detailed
information.

Datasets for Other Data

Data for questions 1 to 15 are answered by the coder according to each project’s
specifications. The base for project information is CGIT dataset, which is described in previous
pages in more detail. Only questions 16 and 17 use different datasets.
Question 16 is indicative of export and import proportionality between host country and
investor country. It is simply obtained by calculating the share of the first country’s exports to
the second country within the first country’s total export volume. Two percentage values are
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calculated; one for host country and one for investor country. If investor country’s percentage of
export share is greater than host country’s percentage of export share, then this indicates that the
investor has proportionality advantage, which makes it less vulnerable. If host country has
proportionality advantage, then this makes investor country more vulnerable. Export data for
calculating proportionality value is obtained from World Bank’s WITS (World Integrated Trade
Solution) dataset.21 This dataset has some missing values. Those values are filled by the data
obtained from the Correlates of War Project’s Trade v4.0 dataset.22 There has been some missing
data even after including data from COW’s Trade v4.0 dataset. How these missing data are
handled is described in the next page in the section titled “How Are Missing Values Handled?”.
Question 17 uses a dataset, reflective of issue linkages between any two countries. Voting
preferences in the United Nations General Assembly is an indicator of how two countries link
different issues. Hence, the dyadic affinity score in United Nations General Assembly Voting
Data is used to represent issue linkages.23 Within this dataset, dyadic affinity score using 2
category (yes or no) vote data (titled as “s2un” in the dataset) is used. This indicator ranges from
-1 (least similar interests) to 1 (most similar interests). It is included in the vulnerability
interdependence as it is.

How Are Missing Values Handled?

There were some missing values in proportionality and dyadic affinity score data. An
index requires having all data for a given row. If there is a missing data point for any of the 17
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World Trade Organization, “World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) | Data on Export, Import, Tariff, NTM.”
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questions, there will not be an index score for this data point’s row since the index would be
lower as much as the value of that missing value. In other words, the index score will not be able
to be calculated without having all data points since the score will not be comparable with others.
For this reason, missing data should be extrapolated. The regression imputation method, which is
a data extrapolation method, is used to predict the missing data points. In this method, missing
data points are substituted according to regression that is obtained from the available data.
Extrapolated data are as follows:
-

Angola proportionality data for 2016 and 2017,

-

Angola dyadic affinity score for 2015, 2016, and 2017,

-

Ghana proportionality data for 2015 and 2017,

-

Ghana dyadic affinity score for 2015, 2016, and 2017,

-

Kenya proportionality data for 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017,

-

Kenya dyadic affinity score for 2015, 2016, and 2017,

-

Nigeria proportionality data for 2015, 2016, and 2017,

-

Nigeria dyadic affinity score for 2015, 2016, and 2017,

-

South Africa dyadic affinity score for 2015, 2016, and 2017.

Reliability and Validation of the Vulnerability Interdependence Index

Reliability and validation are important checkmarks for constructing an index. One
should make sure that an index should be both reliable and valid measure of intended concept.
These two concepts are sometimes confused since they are mostly used together. Hence, this part
will first define and exemplify what these concepts are. Second, the methods that are used for
providing reliability and validity of vulnerability interdependence index will be discussed.
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Reliability

Reliability “concerns the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure
yields the same results on repeated trials”.24 In other words, it is implementation of procedures
consistently across cases and getting the same results. Validity is making sure that the measure is
indeed measuring the intended concept with no systematic or random measurement error. It is
possible to have a reliable and not valid measure. A miscalibrated ruler is example of this.
Suppose that a ruler is intended to be had as 1 meter but miscalibrated by 3 centimeters, meaning
that it is 97 centimeters. Every time a person uses that ruler, he/she will get the same
measurement because he/she uses the same instrument and it gives him/her the same result.
However, the result is not valid as the person measures with the same miscalibrated ruler every
time. On the other hand, it is reliable as the person gets the same results after applying the same
procedures for measuring the intended instrument. An instrument can be reliable but not valid.
However, the inverse cannot be argued. Every valid instrument has to be reliable.
This study uses the retest method for reliability. The retest method is considered to be
appropriate to check reliability of the index because the questions of the index that this study
proposes are not subjective and the results of most questions are binary variables. All questions
are directed to a particular project, meaning that answers come from projects, not from a
person’s feelings, views, etc. This means that answers of the questions are objective. Second
point about the answers is that they do not consist of continuous variables or percentages, etc.
They give categorical values, either only 0 and 1 or four categories as 0, 1, 2, and 3. In the retest
method, “the same test is given to the same people after a period of time. The reliability of the
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test (instrument) can be estimated by examining the consistency of the responses between the
two tests”.25 In other words, it only provides temporal reliability. This method is considered to be
enough as the answers are objective and simple yes/no answers. In order to implement this
method, nine projects, reflecting the variety of different investment types, were chosen. Answers
to these projects were coded by the author in May 2018 and July 2018. The previous coding was
found to be consistent with the second coding. This means that the index is a reliable measure as
it gives the same results when the same procedures are implemented repeatedly at different
times.26

Validation

“[V]alidity concerns the crucial relationship between concept and indicator”.27 An
indicator has to correctly represent an abstract concept to be able to call it as a valid measure. For
example, if a researcher wants to measure intelligence, then an IQ test will be a valid indicator. If
the researcher uses income as intelligence’s indicator, it would not be valid. The concept
(intelligence) should be measured by using a valid indicator (IQ test). There are various methods
of controlling for validity of a test/indicator. These different methods take different approaches
in assessing the ability of a test/indicator to measure what it aims to measure.
Criterion-related validity, content validity and construct validity are three widely used
validity methods. Criterion-related validity, as Carmines and Zeller28 quote from Nunnally, “is at
issue when the purpose is to use an instrument to estimate some important form of behavior that
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is external to the measuring instrument itself, the latter being referred to as criterion.” 29 For
example, the success of a group of non-native speakers of English in the TOEFL exam can be
validated by their success in English conversations. In this case, higher correlation between
TOEFL exam (measuring instrument) and criterion (ability of conversing in English) would
indicate higher validity of the measuring instrument. The second method, “content validity
depends on the extent to which an empirical measurement reflects a specific domain of
content”.30 It is simply sampling a broad content by selecting correct samples. A test should be a
sample of the content that it purports to measure. In this method, content experts establish
validity of the test. There is no method or procedure to determine the extent to which the
assessment is content valid.
Construct validity is the most appropriate method for assessing validity of the
vulnerability interdependence index that is suggested in this study.31 Because validity is
determined upon theoretical expectations in this method: “if the performance of the measure is
consistent with theoretically derived expectations, then it is concluded that the measure is
construct valid”.32
This study will prefer the construct validity method for assessing the extent to which it is
valid. Two case study chapters will be used for this purpose. The first case study chapter will
discuss the findings of vulnerability interdependence index for four subsectors while the second
case study chapter will have a discussion of three African countries in terms of what investments
create higher or lower vulnerability score in these countries. If what the index finds is consistent
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with the narrative that is told in case study chapters, then the index will be concluded as a valid
measure of vulnerability interdependence.

Index Construction Method: Additive Aggregation

There are different methods for constructing an index. The additive method and reduction
method are the two leading methods for composite indices like the vulnerability interdependence
index. This study prefers additive method as the answers are appropriate (higher values indicates
higher vulnerability for the investor) for using it. The data reduction method is not appropriate
because the index uses subcategories of vulnerability interdependence. Each indicator of the
index measures different aspects of vulnerability and are not expected to correlate. Since the
chief aim of the reduction method is to interpret how a group of variables are related by looking
at their correlation, the reduction method is considered to be inappropriate for vulnerability
interdependence index.
A widely-used method of index construction, principal component analysis (PCA), is not
appropriate for the index because the way the index is designed and the data available violate the
most important assumption of PCA. “Principal components analysis, and more specifically factor
analysis, groups together individual indicators which are collinear to form a composite indicator
that captures as much as possible of the information common to individual indicators”.33 The
most important assumption of PCA is that the data should be suitable for data reduction (“There
needs to be a linear relationship between all variables”)34. The data we have violates this
assumption because it is not expected to correlate as it measures different aspects of
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vulnerability. Even if some variables might correlate, their correlation is not meaningful since
each of the five concepts and each questions of these concepts are distinct measures.

Additive Aggregation Index

The additive aggregation method is preferred for constructing the vulnerability
interdependence index because the index has sub-categories of vulnerability interdependence,
namely asset specificity, switching costs, ratification and compliance costs, proportionality and
issue linkages. These concepts represent different aspects of vulnerability interdependence.
Correlations among their indicators would not be meaningful in terms of data reduction method.
Additive aggregation method will be useful after the data is normalized. The index is constructed
in a way to be more suitable for an additive aggregation method because all questions of the
index is designed to have higher value for higher level of vulnerability.

Data Normalization Method: Minmax

After the additive aggregation method is selected as the most suitable method for index
construction, how data should be normalized is one of next important decisions to make. There
are various methods for data normalization. Different normalization and weighing methods may
create different outcomes for the index. Robustness tests will be carried out to understand
whether changes in data cause sensitivity for the index score in different normalization and
weighing methods.
The most suitable normalization methods are considered to be standardization by using
Z-scores, decimal scaling and minmax normalization. Z-score normalization is based on
calculating the difference between a selected sample data and the mean of sample population
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divided by the standard deviation of sample population.

The outcome of the above equation gives us the distance between our selected sample
and the mean in the unit of standard deviation. For example, if our Z score is 1.3, it means that
the selected data is 1.3 standard deviations above the mean. Z score helps us to understand the
relativity of our sample data compared to others. In other words, it helps to understand how
unusual our selected data is compared to the whole population. It does so by using a selected data
point within the selected sample population, getting mean and standard deviation. Z score
standardization assumes that the data is normally distributed. Z score table indicates how well or
bad is our selected sample compared to others by providing the information of how many
percentile the selected data is in.35
One of other major drawbacks of using Z score normalization is that it would weigh the
same value differently in different indicators. For example, 0 will not be converted to the same
value for all indicators of an index. Instead, it will be converted to values that indicate how rare
its existence is because Z score assumes a normal distribution. If it is very rare in an indicator’s
data, it will have very high or very low value since it will be away from the mean in this case.
What we expect to get from data normalization is to scale all of our data in the same
interval so that we can combine one question of vulnerability interdependence index with the
others by aggregating them. Decimal scaling and minmax normalization are two useful
techniques to have all data in the same interval. Decimal scaling helps us to convert our dataset
to range from -1 to 1 and minmax helps us to convert our dataset to range from 0 to 1.
Decimal scaling is calculated by dividing our sample value by 10 to the power the
35
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number of digits of the maximum value.36
10
(

In decimal scaling, the converted dataset’s interval is [-1,1] where minus values indicate
negative values in the original dataset. In other words, if a data is lower than 0 in the original
dataset, it will be lower than 0 in the new dataset as well.
Minmax normalization is similar to decimal scaling normalization but minmax ranges
from 0 to 1. Its calculation uses the minimum and maximum values of the sample. It simply
divides the difference between the selected sample and the minimum value by the difference
between the maximum and the minimum value.37

An advantage of using minmax normalization is that it will always give 0 for the lowest
value of an indicator and 1 for the highest value of an indicator so that the converted data will
always range from 0 to 1.
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Table 9: Comparison of Three Normalization Methods (Z-score, decimal scaling, minmax)

Z score

Pros

Cons

-It converts the dataset to range in the

-Its range is wider than other normalization

normalization same interval

methods because its value is standard

-It helps to compare a selected data

deviation value.

against others to understand how

-It has much higher/lower values for rare

unusual the selected data is.

values which makes it not feasible for
comparison in an additive index. (For
example, 0 will not be converted to the
same value for all indicators because Z
score is calculated based on how many
standard deviations the selected data is
away from the sample.)

Decimal

-It converts the dataset to range in the

-It is not comparable against other

scaling

same interval

indicators because the converted value is

normalization -Its range is narrow enough to use it in
an additive index with other indicators.

just the decimal form of the original value.
In this case, the converted value will
generally not have values of -1 and 1.

Minmax

-It converts the dataset to range in the

normalization same interval
-Its range is narrow enough to use it in
an additive index with other indicators.
-It is comparable against other
indicators because the minimum and the
maximum values in the original
indicator are converted 0 and 1.
Source: Compiled by the Author with the Information Drawn From Various Sources38

This study will use minmax normalization because it is the most useful technique for an

38
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additive index that has equal weights for all indicators of a composite index. It satisfies what an
additive index requires: it converts the dataset to range in the same interval and it is comparable
against other indicator because all normalized data range from 0 to 1.

Weighing the Indicators of the Vulnerability Interdependence Index

The question of how much each of the 17 indicators of vulnerability interdependence
index will weigh for the total index score is another significant step of constructing an additive
index. The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) will be used to determine the weights of each
indicator. AHP helps in decision-making process to weigh each indicator within its subcategories
to get a percentage score for each indicator. It makes pairwise comparisons between each
indicator of a subcategory. For example, asset specificity has four subcategories. One of its
subcategories, location asset specificity, has five indicators. A 5x5 pairwise comparison is used
for location asset specificity. Similarly, the same method is applied for other three categories of
asset specificity. Then, a 4x4 pairwise comparison is done for asset specificity itself for its
indicators (location asset specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, plant
asset specificity). The importance degree of each indicator is determined based on the expertise
of the author and weighing scores are calculated accordingly. Details of calculation for pairwise
comparisons are presented in Weighing of Index Indicators by Using Analytic Hierarchy Process
section. The results of the weights are presented in Table 10.

“Data Discretization - Preparing Datasets for Analysis”; OECD, European Union, and Joint Research CentreEuropean Commission, Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators.
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Table 10: Weighing of Vulnerability Interdependence Index's Indicators
Indicator
Asset Specificity
Location Asset Specificity
1. Are the assets or productivity mobile? (infinite immobile=3,
immobile=2, mobile=1, infinite mobile=0)
2. Are transportation costs amenable to decentralized production?
(infinite not amenable=3, not amenable=2, amenable=1, infinite
amenable=0)
3. Is the value per unit of end-product’s weight high? (infinite high=0,
high=1, low=2, infinite low=3)
4. Is it the production of a natural (extracted) resource? (yes=1, no=0)
5. Are the assets generally co-located with other productive activities
within a host country? (yes=1, no=0)
Physical Asset Specificity
6. Does production require investment in specialized (single-purpose)
equipment? (yes=1, no=0)
7. Are fixed production costs (as percent of total costs) high or low?
(infinite high=3, high=2, low=1, infinite low=0)
Human Asset Specificity
8. Does production require a specialized, high-skilled workforce?
(yes=1, no=0)
9. Is the workforce mobile? (no=1, yes=0)
Plant Asset Specificity
10. Is physical plant dedicated to the productive purpose? Or can it be
repurposed? (dedicated=1, repurposed=0)
Switching Costs
Relational
11. Are there a small number of available market participants with whom
to partner? (Oligopsony or oligopoly) (yes=1, no=0)
Opportunity
12. Is the produced good storable? (no=1, yes=0) (It is always 0 if it is a
public good)
Financial
13. Are assets characterized by high sunk costs? (infinite high=3, high=2,
low=1, infinite low=0)
Ratification and Compliance Costs
14. Does information asymmetry favor investing party or hosting party?
(0 if it favors investor, 1 if it favors host)

Weighing

0.028
0.016

0.009
0.013
0.019

0.040
0.026

0.048
0.018
0.047

0.066

0.079

0.119

0.044
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Indicator

Weighing

15. Is there an existing regime to monitor compliance among contracting
parties? (no=1, yes=0)
Proportionality
16. Are exports proportional among the two countries? (-1 if it favors the
investing country, 0 if it is proportional, 1 if it favors the host country)
Issue Linkages
17. What is the dyadic affinity score for the two countries? (least similar
interests=-1, most similar interests=1)

0.044

0.206

0.176

Justification of Case Selection

This study has two case study chapters in the following pages. One is the case study of
four subsectors of investment projects and the other one is the case study of the three African
countries.
There are 25 subsectors in which China had investments in its five top trading African
partner countries from 2005 till 2017. Four of them are selected for a detailed analysis in the
following chapter. The selection criteria for the subsectors have been their diversity in terms of
creating vulnerability for the investor party.
Service sector investments and public goods-related sector investments are at the two
extreme ends of vulnerability. Hence, one service sector and one public goods-related sector are
selected for further analysis. As the service sector, banking subsector of the finance sector is
preferred in the following chapter. The banking subsector is also one of the subsectors that have
the lowest vulnerability score. As for the public goods-related sector, this study examines
shipping subsector. Investment projects in this subsector are in fact not public goods but has the
characteristics of public goods.
Steel subsector of the metals sector is another subsector that is selected to analyze as the
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case study. It is one of the top-rated subsectors in the vulnerability interdependence index. It is
also a representative of heavy industry subsectors, which are hypothesized to be one of the highscored subsectors in the index. The last subsector that is selected for further analysis is rail
subsector of the transport sector. The reason of selecting this subsector is that it is both one of the
top-rated subsectors in the vulnerability interdependence index and has the highest amount of
investments among all 25 subsectors.
China’s trade relations has been the criteria for selecting country cases. Three of the top
five Sub-Saharan African trading partners –that are ordered according to the total of import and
export volumes of China in 2016—are selected according to the total value of their import and
export volumes. Among the five heaviest trading partners of China, three countries with the
highest levels of vulnerability are selected.
Table 11: China's Top 20 Trading Partners in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2016
Partner Name
1 South Africa

China’s Exports
(US$ Thousand)

China’s Imports
(US$ Thousand)

Export + Import
(US$ Thousand)

12,849,507.64

22,228,893.55

35,078,401.19

2 Angola

1,680,398.62

13,966,117.08

15,646,515.70

3 Nigeria

9,713,912.55

907,008.03

10,620,920.58

4 Ghana

4,666,604.09

1,309,649.87

5,976,253.96

5 Kenya

5,587,646.82

97,135.49

5,684,782.31

6 Tanzania

3,566,861.31

315,826.81

3,882,688.12

7 Congo, Dem. Rep.

992,466.99

2,084,962.10

3,077,429.09

8 Zambia

489,913.91

2,183,500.68

2,673,414.59

9 Sudan

2,129,730.00

504,705.99

2,634,435.99

10 Senegal

2,194,360.63

161,589.46

2,355,950.09

11 Benin

2,039,435.62

55,392.33

2,094,827.95

12 Togo

1,919,246.64

105,331.52

2,024,578.16
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Partner Name
13 Cameroon

China’s Exports
(US$ Thousand)

China’s Imports
(US$ Thousand)

Export + Import
(US$ Thousand)

1,557,030.06

402,230.11

1,959,260.17

377,186.73

1,439,078.97

1,816,265.70

15 Mozambique

1,308,557.80

479,356.87

1,787,914.67

16 Guinea

1,144,424.26

630,056.94

1,774,481.20

17 Liberia

1,592,580.57

48,171.16

1,640,751.73

869,707.18

747,559.05

1,617,266.23

46,253.29

1,459,751.41

1,506,004.70

387,485.50

726,879.97

1,114,365.47

14 Gabon

18 Mauritania
19 South Sudan
20 Zimbabwe

Source: Created by the Author With the Data Drawn from the World Integrated Trade Solution
Database of the World Bank39

This study will examine the characteristics of Chinese investments in the three African
countries: What sectors does China tend to invest in these countries? What goods and services do
their bilateral trade consist of? What characteristics of these countries may be factors that affect
China’s decision to make investment there?

Interpretation of Index Scores

The following two chapters will have a discussion of subsectors and country cases in
terms of their vulnerability scores. Understanding what the vulnerability interdependence index
calculates is important to apprehend the following chapters. The index calculates a vulnerability
score for each investment project, ranging from 0 to 1. Then, average of these index scores are
used for getting an index score for each subsector. It is simply obtained by calculating arithmetic
average of vulnerability scores of all investment projects in a particular subsector.

39
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Country-level amount-weighted index score calculates the extent to which an investor
country becomes vulnerable in a host country. It gets the share of each investment’s amount
within this particular country’s total investment amount. Then, each of these shares are
multiplied by the index score of each investment project’s vulnerability score. These results are
summed to get vulnerability score for each country.
Cross-country amount-weighted index score is used for comparing the extent to which an
investor country became vulnerable in various countries. This index score has further steps from
the country-level amount-weighted index score. It is simply multiplication of a country’s
vulnerability score (country-level amount-weighted index score) by the total investment amount
that this country received. It uses the total investment amount to differentiate countries from each
other according to the amount they receive from the investor. For example, a country that
receives $0.1 billion investment does not create the same vulnerability for the investor with a
country that receives $10 billion investment.
All of these four index scores calculate the vulnerability for the investor. They do not find
the degree to which the host country is vulnerable against the investor country. Though, the
specific case that this study examines –the Sino-African relations—is one-sided, meaning that
only China has investments in the African countries. There is not a significant number of
investments that the African countries had in China. For such cases, the reverse of the index
score can be used for understanding the host country’s vulnerability. It can simply be calculated
by subtracting the index score for the first three index scores from 1. For instance, if the
vulnerability score for a Chinese investment project in Angola is calculated as 0.711, it can be
interpreted that this investment project create 0.711 point vulnerability for China and 0.289 (1 0.711) point vulnerability for Angola. Such an interpretation of index scores lays out the view
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that an investor party is very likely to be more vulnerable since it is giving away something that
it may not get back in case of a disruption in its bilateral relationship with a host country.
Also, the index calculates these four index scores mostly according to foreign direct
investments that a country made in other countries. Proportionality of their bilateral trade and
issue linkages that they may create in their relationship are also considered for calculating the
vulnerability score.

Conclusion

This chapter developed an index for measuring vulnerability interdependence by building
it on the five concepts –asset specificity, switching costs, proportionality, costs of ratification and
compliance, and issue linkages—that are put forth in the previous chapter. These five concepts
are accepted as components of a country’s vulnerability.
This chapter developed the index by suggesting 17 questions, most of which are at the
investment-project level; asked to investment projects that companies of a country are made in
another country. Two of these questions are at the country level which use country data for its
answer.
A detailed explanation of the 17 questions of the vulnerability interdependence index
were presented by having a discussion of how they may create vulnerability for the investor,
which sectors are prone to create more or less vulnerability for the investor, and some other
important points that a coder should care about in the process of codification of investment
projects.
The chapter continued with a discussion of selecting appropriate data of Chinese foreign
direct investments in Africa. It discussed a couple of datasets and why they are not considered to
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be appropriate for the purposes of vulnerability interdependence index before suggesting to use
China Global Investment Tracker dataset. Also, datasets for data other than investment projects
were introduced. In these datasets, some data points were missing for some years. The section
“How Are Missing Values Handled?” had a discussion of how these data points were filled.
Missing data were extrapolated by using the available data. Then, discussion of reliability and
validity followed. For reliability, the index applied retest method because the questions of the
index do not have subjective judgements and there is not a wide range of answers. As the validity
method, this study preferred construct validity, which will analyze the findings of the index in
the two case study chapters in the following chapters.
Techniques for bringing the 17 questions together and normalizing the data to range in
the same interval were also discussed. Additive aggregation method was preferred for creating an
index method. The chief reasons of choosing this method is that all questions have different
measures of different concepts and they are designed to give an answer for indicating
vulnerability of the investor country. For data normalization, three widely-used normalization
methods were discussed and minmax normalization was preferred over others in order to make
all data to range in the same interval between 0 and 1.
It was also important to assign weights for each of 17 indicators. Analytical hierarchy
process (AHP) was used to give weight values for each one of these 17 indicators. The Appendix
part will have a wide discussion of how weightings are calculated for each indicator.
Lastly, the rationale behind case selection and a section on how one should interpret the
findings of the vulnerability interdependence index are discussed.
Two case study chapters will follow this research design chapter. In the first case study
chapter, four subsectors with different characteristics in terms of creating vulnerability will be
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discussed in terms of what level of vulnerability these investment projects may create by
contributing to asset specificity and switching costs. The second case study chapter includes
three countries, which are selected among the top five trading partners of China i.e. Angola,
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. Three of these countries with the highest vulnerability
scores –Nigeria, Angola, and Kenya—will be discussed by presenting country profiles, their
bilateral trade with China, and Chinese investments in these countries.
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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY OF INVESTMENT SECTORS
Sectors and subsectors differ in creating vulnerability for the investor and host countries.
This chapter examines investment sectors in order to understand the level of vulnerability each
sector or subsector creates for the investor country. It compares the findings of the vulnerability
interdependence index to the qualitative analysis of sectors and subsectors. It does so by using
the data of Chinese investment projects in five African countries (Angola, Ghana, Nigeria,
Kenya, and South Africa) as the sample data.
The transport sector has been a significant sector in the Chinese investments in Africa.
China has invested in the transport sector in all years from 2005 to 2017. Within this sector,
China tended to invest more in autos, rail, and shipping subsectors. There were 10 years, in
which China invested in the autos subsector while the number is 8 for the rail subsector and 7 for
the shipping subsector. Aviation has investments only in 2014 and 2016 although being a
subsector of the transport sector.1
Energy has been the second most steady among the main sectors in terms of the number
of years of Chinese investments. China had investment projects in energy sectors in 10 years
between 2005 and 2017. Within the energy sector, the gas subsector has been the most steady
subsector with investment projects in seven years while there have been five years that China has
had investment projects in hydro and oil subsectors and has also had four years in alternative and
coal subsectors.2

1
2
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Table 12: Average Index Scores and Total Number of Investments for Main Sectors
(Sorted from Largest to Smallest According to Index Score)
Sector

Average Index
Score

Total Number of
Investments

1 Transport

0.747

54

2 Metals

0.711

8

3 Utilities

0.701

14

4 Technology

0.699

5

5 Energy

0.673

48

6 Entertainment

0.638

1

7 Other

0.615

3

8 Real estate

0.600

24

9 Agriculture

0.519

4

0.471

2

10 Finance

Source: Index Scores Are Created by the Vulnerability Interdependence Index, Total Number of
Investments are Gathered by the Author from the CGIT Dataset3

Table 12 illustrates average index scores for the main investment sectors. According to
this table, the transport sector causes the highest vulnerability for the investor country. Metals,
which is a heavy industry sector, creates the second highest vulnerability. Although the energy
sector might be associated with high vulnerability due to being highly asset specific and having
high switching costs, it is ranked as the fifth most vulnerable sector.
The expectation for the finance sector’s vulnerability would be to have the lowest
vulnerability score since it has the highest mobility among others as being a service sector. The
findings of the vulnerability interdependence index affirm this expectation. It can also be
expected that the agriculture sector would not create much vulnerability for the investor country
3

Scissors.
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since it is not asset specific and there are many alternative buyers/sellers in this sector. The
agriculture sector is ranked the second lowest sector in terms of the vulnerability score.
Table 13: Average Index Score and Total Number of Investments for Subsectors
(Sorted from Largest to Smallest According to Index Score)*
Sector

Subsector

Average Index
Score

Total Number
of
Investments

Total Investment
Amount
(in million US$)

1 Transport

Aviation

0.791

2

$865

2 Metals

Steel

0.767

1

$230

3 Transport

Rail

0.766

16

$35,480

4 Transport

Shipping

0.741

10

$5,130

5 Energy

Coal

0.739

4

$1,920

6 Transport

Autos

0.734

26

$10,898

7 Energy

Oil

0.734

5

$5,480

8 Metals

-

0.721

4

$1,180

9 Metals

Copper

0.713

2

$1,740

-

0.701

14

$3,800

11 Technology

Telecom

0.699

5

$2,300

12 Energy

Gas

0.666

9

$6,490

13 Energy

Hydro

0.658

7

$7,880

14 Energy

Alternative

0.655

7

$1,310

10 Utilities

15 Energy

-

0.655

16

$7,330

16 Entertainment

-

0.638

1

$120

17 Other

Industry

0.632

1

$1,940

18 Other

Medical

0.626

1

$290

19 Metals

Aluminum

0.613

1

$1,200

20 Real estate

Property

0.611

6

$4,240

21 Real estate

Construction

0.596

18

$11,980
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Subsector

Average Index
Score

Total Number
of
Investments

Education

0.586

1

$240

-

0.519

4

$1,120

24 Finance

Banking

0.502

1

$5,600

25 Finance

Investment

0.441

1

$250

Sector
22 Other
23 Agriculture

Total Investment
Amount
(in million US$)

* Rows that do not have subsector information indicate average index score and total number of
investment projects that fit into the main category but do not fit into a subcategory.
Source: Index Scores Are Created by the Vulnerability Interdependence Index, Total Number of
Investments and Amounts are Gathered by the Author from the CGIT Dataset4

In subsector rankings, there are some slight changes compared to their ranking among the
main sectors. Investments in the energy sector, for example, create more vulnerability compared
to any other subsectors of technology sector although technology is ranked as the third in the
ranking of sector vulnerability. The two subsectors of the transport sector i.e. shipping and
aviation respectively, are followed by the steel subsector. Energy’s two subsectors are ranked
very high in subsector ranking. Albeit energy itself is ranked as the fifth most vulnerable sector
among main sectors: Oil- and coal-related energy investment projects make the investor highly
vulnerably interdependent.
In parallel to having the lowest rank in the main sector ranking, the finance sector’s
subsectors also ranked very low. Two subsectors of it ranked as the lowest two subsectors among
others in terms of their average vulnerability score.
The following sections will discuss how much vulnerability the subsectors of 163
investment projects create. It will do so by having a qualitative discussion of some selected
subsectors. The selection criteria for them have been their importance or their vulnerability

4

Scissors.
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score. Both, one of subsectors with the highest vulnerability interdependence scores and one of
the lowest scores are selected. A public good-related subsector and a service subsector are also
selected since they are expected to have different vulnerability levels compared to private good
investments.
The subsector with the highest amount of investment value (rail subsector of the transport
sector), a heavy industry subsector (metals subsector of the steel sector), a public good subsector
(shipping subsector of the transport sector), and a service sector investment (banking subsector
of the finance sector) are selected for a detailed analysis.
The following sections will delve into the details of the selected subsectors from the
perspective of two concepts of the vulnerability interdependence index –asset specificity and
switching costs—which are represented in 13 questions in the index. These two concepts are
analyzed in detail with their subcategories. The selected four subsectors are ordered according to
their vulnerability interdependence index score.
Ratification and compliance costs, proportionality, and issue linkages are excluded in
qualitative analysis of sectors. The reason of excluding ratification and compliance costs is that
they are the costs that a country’s legislative bodies pay since they measure whether an investor
company’s country can ratify an agreement and whether parties can comply with the conditions
of agreement. The reason of excluding proportionality is that it is also not sector-specific
information. Rather, it comprises of two country’s trade data. The reason of excluding issue
linkages is that it is also not a sector-specific information. It aims at understanding whether two
countries can link different issues in their interdependent relationship.
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Subsector 1: Metals – Steel

China had only one investment in the steel sector in its top five trading African countries
between 2005 and 2017. South Africa has been the host country of this investment in November
2006. Sinosteel, which is a state-owned Chinese enterprise,5 made this investment by
establishing a joint venture with Samancor Corporation, the world’s largest chrome ore owner.6
The total chrome ore reserves that this joint venture had with this investment is seven times of
China’s domestic chrome ore reserves, meaning that it may be an important source of supply for
China’s chrome ore demand.7
An important characteristic of this subsector is that it is the highest location asset specific
subsector. It binds the investor country the most in terms of location asset specificity.

Location Asset Specificity

Investment projects in this sector tend to be highly location asset specific. In terms of
location asset specificity, the first question is about mobility. Investments in the steel sector are
answered to be not mobile. Though, it is not as immobile as a public good investment. Therefore,
the coding was ‘2’ for this investment, which indicates immobility but not to the extent that a
public good investment would have. Similarly, it is not amenable for decentralized production
due to being not feasible in terms of transportation costs.8 End-products in this sector are
precious products and they are located at the same production site with other production steps.

5

State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, “Directory.”
Yu, “Sinosteel Founds Joint Venture in South Africa.”
7
Yu.
8
For production steps of chromium ore and steel, see International Chromium Development Association, “Discover
Chromium - Ore Processing”; Alliance for American Manufacturing, STEEL.
6
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In the index of vulnerability interdependence, location asset specificity of this sector is
calculated as 0.772, which ranks as the second after utilities sector.

Physical Asset Specificity

In parallel to location asset specificity, investments in the metal sector are highly physical
asset specific. Production in the steel industry requires investment in single-purposed equipment,
which are special for production in its productive activity.9 Still, its physical asset specificity is
not to the extent some sectors whose machines or tools cannot be used for other purposes. In this
sector, a loader, a bulldozer, a backhoe or a dump truck can be used for other purposes. These
type of machines can be used not only in the mining sector, but also they are useful in various
sectors, including real estate construction, road construction, moving demolition waste or
cleaning roads from snow. Also, some other machines that are used to extract the precious
mineral from soil can be used for the production of other minerals.
The score of the metal sector for physical asset specificity is calculated as 0.867, which
makes it ranked as the tenth most highly physical asset specific subsector among all 25
subsectors.

Human Asset Specificity

In the steel sector, human resources are one of asset specific components of the
production. It requires a specialized, high-skilled workforce as a sector, in which there are a lot

9

For productive equipment that are used in steel and chromium ore production, see World Steel Association,
“Overview of the Steelmaking Process”; Niemcor, Niemcor Chrome Mining South Africa; Alliance for American
Manufacturing, STEEL.
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of high-tech engineering machineries are used. There are, some parts of the production, that may
not require high-skilled workforce, such as the mining process of production. In the mining
process, low-skilled workforce can be used. However, it requires having a high-skilled
workforce when the production comes to the processing stage of mineral. Since an important part
of production requires a high-skilled workforce, it is considered to be requiring high-skilled
workforce.
The workforce is high-skilled, but it is not immobile. Substitute workforce can be found
elsewhere easily since the machineries that are used in this sector are likely to be not a type of
machines whose engineering process might be kept as company secret by their producer
companies. Many engineers are able to use these machines, which means a wide group of
engineers may substitute the workforce that is required for any step of the production in this
subsector.
The score of human asset specificity in the vulnerability interdependence index is 0.727,
which makes it the sixth most human asset specific sector among others. The finding is
consistent with the qualitative analysis.

Plant Asset Specificity

This subsection of asset specificity is about whether the production plants are specific to
the productive purpose. Alternatively, they might be able to be repurposed for another productive
purpose. In this subsector, physical plants are mostly dedicated. Even when they are not
dedicated for the productive purpose, they are dedicated for a use in its subsector. For example, a
chromium ore processing plant may be used for processing another mine that has similar
characteristics.
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Since the vulnerability index has only one indicator question for plant asset specificity
with a yes/no question, the answer is given as yes (production plant is dedicated) for this
subsector. Hence, the score for plant asset specificity in steel subsector is 1.0.

Switching Costs

Switching cost is defined as the costs associated with shifting to a different counterparty.
It is measured in three sub-dimensions; relational switching costs, opportunity switching costs,
and financial switching costs.
The first sub-dimension of switching costs is associated with oligopsony or oligopoly. In
steel subsector, we cannot talk about oligopoly or oligopsony. There are a lot of producers and
users of steel in the world.10 The second sub-dimension –opportunity cost—is about whether the
investor can store some amount of supplied product in case this investor or the host country ends
the relationship unexpectedly. All possible products in this subsector can be stored. This means
that vulnerability of the investor is low in this subsector in terms of opportunity switching cost.
The third sub-dimension –financial switching cost—aims at measuring whether the investor is
bounded in terms of financial costs in case either the investor wants to switch to another
counterparty or the host party wants to end the relationship. In this subsector, vulnerability that is
caused by financial switching costs is high since the investor has to sink a significant amount of
money before starting producing the first product.
The vulnerability interdependence index’s calculation for switching costs in this
subsector is 0.3. The analysis above simply says that the investor party becomes vulnerable only
in terms of financial switching costs. This is one-third of all three dimensions. The qualitative

10

World Steel Association, “World Steel in Figures 2018,” 8–15.
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analysis of metals subsector is quite consistent with the findings of the index about switching
costs.

Subsector 2: Transport – Rail

Rail is the subsector in which China had the highest amount of investments in its five toptrading African partners. It is almost three-fold of the following subsector –which is the
construction subsector—in terms of the investment amount. There are 16 investments in this
subsector, where 12 of them are located in Nigeria. There are three companies invested in this
subsector, China Railway Construction, China Communications Construction, and China Energy
Engineering. All three companies are Chinese state-owned entities, which are supervised and
managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State
Council.11
All 16 projects are railway construction projects with relative technological equipment
and buildings. Only one investment is solely about railway technologies, whose value is $1.1
billion.12
Investments of railway construction are regarded to be public-good investments as they
have the same characteristics with public goods in terms of non-excludability and nonrivalrousness. Although they may be owned and operated by private companies, one cannot
exclude others from using railway service and service will not expire no matter how many
people use it.

11
12

State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, “Directory.”
Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.”
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Location Asset Specificity

Investments in this subsector have two groups of assets; one relates to construction issues
such as the infrastructure of railway itself, stations, and related buildings while the other one
relates to wagons and technological equipment that are required to operate invested railway.
While the first group of assets are highly location asset specific, the second group of assets are
highly mobile. Since the majority of investment amount is spent for the invested assets relate to
the first group, the investment is considered to be a railway construction equipment. Only one
investment, whose all amount is about technological equipment is considered to have mobile
assets. All five indicators of asset specificity are answered according to the existence of these
two groups of assets.
All investments for the first group of assets are done at the site where the investment is
built. The output product, which is the transportation service for this subsector, also has to be
served at the site of investment. For this reason, there cannot be decentralized production in this
subsector, which is one indicator of location asset specificity.
In measuring value per unit of product, public goods are categorized differently than
private good investments or investments in service sectors. Public goods are very heavy and
difficult to relocate, which makes its value per unit weight of product pretty low. Low value per
unit weight indicates that the investment is not feasible for offshoring, which in turn indicates a
higher level of vulnerability for the investor.
Assets are generally co-located in the host country for railway investments in this
subsector. Some parts of railway equipment, perhaps, may be produced in another country and
then transported to the host country. Though, this study does not consider this option since it is
not very feasible to do so. Instead, it considers that assets are generally co-located for railway
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investments.
Investments in the rail subsector are not associated with energy products, which tend to
be processed at the location where it is extracted from. It is considered to be one indicator of
location asset specificity in the index. Investments in this subsector do not get a positive score
from this dimension.
Rail subsector of the transport sector is a location asset specific subsector. Though, it is
not to the extent that a heavy industry sector may have. This subsector has an index value of
0.826 for location asset specificity, which makes it ranked at the sixth place. The qualitative
analysis is consistent with the findings of the index.

Physical Asset Specificity

The rail subsector is among the subsectors that have high physical asset specificity.
Equipment that are used in this subsector’s productive activity are specialized for the productive
purpose. A larger share of productive equipment’s value is spent on single-purposed equipment,
which can only be useful when used for building a railway. Technological equipment that are
used in railway investments are also unique for a use in investments in this subsector.
High share of fixed production costs is another dimension of physical asset specificity
that cause an increase in the score of vulnerability interdependence index. Investments in the rail
subsector have a higher share of fixed production costs compared to variable production costs. A
railway (be it stations, railway or technological equipment) investor spends a significant share of
money before starting production in the investment to get the first output product.
The vulnerability interdependence index score for this subsector is 1.0, which makes it
ranked at the first place together with the shipping subsector and the utilities sector. The finding
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of the index is consistent with what might be expected from this subsector’s physical asset
specificity.

Human Asset Specificity

As mentioned in location asset specificity section, there are two groups of investment in
this subsector. These two groups have different effect on human asset specificity. While
infrastructure-related investments are not human asset specific, investments related to
technological equipment of railways are generally human asset specific investments. As noted,
there is only one investment from the second group whereas the first group has 15 investments in
the five African countries.
The first group includes land reclamation, railway construction, and construction of train
stations and related buildings. This type of investments does not require having an educated and
high-skilled workforce. Hence, the workforce for these investments are highly mobile in two
ways; they both can be substituted easily by using domestic workforce and can be moved to
another country if the investor wants to do so.
Although the number of investments is very few for the second group, investments in this
group are relatively human asset specific investments since they are technology-intensive
investments. The production in this second group’s investments requires having high-skilled
workforce whereas the workforce is mobile like in the first group.
The index score for this subsector’s human asset specificity is 0.045. It is the second least
human asset specific subsector among 25 subsectors. Since there is only one technologyintensive subsector and 15 others are about railway and supportive components construction, this
score is consistent with what we might expect to get.
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Plant Asset Specificity

Physical plants, which are railways, train stations, other related buildings, and
technological equipment, are dedicated for the productive purpose. Only a small portion of them
might be used for other purposes, such as train stations and other related buildings. However,
they would not be as useful as their use in rail subsector. Even they can be repurposed to use for
other means, the majority of investment components is considered when making the decision
whether the plants are asset specific. As the majority of money that spent for these investments
goes to railways themselves, they are considered to be plant asset specific investments.
The index score for plant asset specificity of rail subsector is 1.0, which puts it to the first
place together with 17 other subsectors.

Switching Costs

Switching costs are analyzed in three subcategories; relational, opportunity and financial
switching costs. In this subsector, relational switching costs are pretty low because there are a lot
of companies that may substitute for each other in rail sector. This subsector’s market is not
associated with oligopsony or oligopoly. In other words, there is not a small number of buyers or
sellers in this market. The investor can exit the host country’s market by selling its investment to
another company that operates in this subsector.
As discussed above, this investment has characteristics of public goods and produces
service as the output product. As is the case for service-producing investments, the investor
becomes vulnerable from the perspective of opportunity switching costs. Service, by its nature, is
not storable. The investor is not able to store some amount of the output product before
switching to another counter-party in case it wants to switch.
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The rail subsector contributes to investor’s vulnerability in terms of financial switching
costs. As having the same characteristics with a public good, this subsector’s investments are
associated with high sunk costs. The investor has liquidation problem in case it wants to cancel
railway investment. Railways, train stations, and related buildings have liquidation problem.
Only technological equipment might be liquidated.
This sector has relatively high switching costs. The score calculated by the vulnerability
interdependence index for switching costs is 0.731. Rail subsector of transport sector is ranked as
the fifth most vulnerable subsector in terms of switching costs.

Subsector 3: Transport – Shipping

The shipping subsector of the transport sector has the fourth highest vulnerability
interdependence score among subsectors. It is also ranked sixth in the number of investment
projects and ninth in the total amount of investments in this subsector. There are 10 projects that
Chinese companies invested in this subsector in Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South
Africa. Nine of them are invested by China Communications Construction, which is a publiclytraded company and is overseen by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of China13 whereas one of them is a joint venture by China Merchants and China
Development Bank, which are also state-owned entities.14 The detailed information are found for
eight of these project and the details for the remaining two are extrapolated (assumed to be
similar in terms of creating vulnerability). All of projects are about ports. While majority of them
are greenfield investments that build new ports, some are brownfield investments that upgrades
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existing ports.
An important characteristic of port projects is that they are regarded as public good
although they might be owned and operated by private companies. The reason of doing so is that
they have the same characteristics with public goods as they are associated with nonexcludability and non-rivalrousness. The following sections will discuss these 10 Chinese
investment projects in terms of their asset specificity and switching costs that may have.

Location Asset Specificity

Ports are highly location asset specific investments. Since port investments are regarded
as public good investments, they are coded to be extremely high or low. Assets in this subsector,
for example, are coded to be infinite immobile. The majority of a port investment is about
building infrastructure components, which are immovable. Transportation costs are coded to be
infinite not amenable for decentralized production since port investments are regarded to be
public good investments. Public good investments are generally not applicable for decentralized
production since they are very likely to be built at one place.
There is no weight for public good investments and investments in this category are
regarded to be extremely heavy. Hence, their value per unit weight of product should be regarded
to be infinite low which makes these investments unfeasible for offshoring (indicates a higher
level of vulnerability for the investor). In this question’s explanation, a detailed explanation
exists for why public good investments should be coded as infinite low value per unit weight of
product. The fourth question is coded as ‘no’ since this investment is not applicable to be
production of natural (extracted) resources. The fifth question is coded as ‘yes’ for a reason,
similar to the second question’s reasoning. Assets are generally co-located in shipping
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investments, which can also be applied to port investments.
Be it a greenfield or a brownfield investment, all port investments are location asset
specific investments. Hence, there is no variation in codification of the first five questions of
location asset specificity in all investments in this subsector. The index score for location asset
specificity is 0.852 for shipping subsector, which ranks it as the second among all 25 subsectors.

Physical Asset Specificity

Similar to location asset specificity, port investments have high physical asset specificity.
A port investment requires investing in cranes. Cranes do not have a wide area of use. Such big
machines cannot be used much for other purposes. Also, port investments require land
reclamation to make the land and seaside suitable for using the purposes of a port. The reclaimed
land and seaside have limited alternative uses that can be as efficient as having this area as a port
if one party wants to cut the relationship and re-use the existing investment for other purposes.
The second indicator of physical asset specificity is whether the fixed production costs
are high compared to variable production costs. In port investments, fixed production costs are
very high, as is the case in many public good investments. Investor has to sink a lot of money
before getting the first product from this investment, which is transporting the first container.
As a subsector that has pretty similar characteristics to public good investments, this
subsector has 1.0 for physical asset specificity, the highest index score. It is ranked as the first in
terms of physical asset specificity, undoubtedly.

Human Asset Specificity

In the shipping subsector of the transport sector, human resource is generally not a
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specific asset. Many workers in this subsector can be substituted since it does not require a highskilled workforce. Only crane operators should be high-skilled, but not to the extent that an
engineering-intensive sector may have.
The workforce is mobile in two ways: the investor can move its existing workforce to
another place if it wants to move its investment, and substitute workforce can be found easily as
there is not specialized workforce in this subsector.
The index score for human asset specificity is 0 for the shipping subsector, which
indicates that the human resource is not a specific asset in this group of investments.

Plant Asset Specificity

The assets in port investments are dedicated to the productive purpose. They can be
repurposed for using other purposes, but they will not be much use. A port, for instance, can be
used as a parking lot. However, the investment will not be as useful as using it as a port. Hence,
it is considered as an asset dedicated to the productive purpose, meaning that investments in
shipping subsector are plant asset specific investments.
The index score for shipping subsector’s plant asset specificity section is 1.0. It is ranked
the first in terms of this dimension, together with 16 other subsectors.

Switching Costs

In this subsector, the relational switching costs are not high. The reason is that there are a
lot of companies, which may substitute each other in terms of operating existing ports. The
relational switching costs dimension is about whether the market is characterized by oligopoly or
oligopsony. There is, definitely, no oligopsony in this subsector as there are many shipping
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companies that buy port services from ports in various places of the world. The number of
service providers also is not few in this subsector. If the investor company of port wants to end
its relationship with the host country, then the host country may find another company to operate
it easily.
In this subsector, there is no storage opportunity since it produces service as its output.
This increases the level of investor’s vulnerability interdependence in terms of opportunity costs.
Financial switching costs are also very high for the investor party. Port investments are
associated with high financial switching costs as they are characterized by high sunk costs. The
vast majority amount of total investment amount has to be done before the investment starts
operating. The variable costs, which are associated with producing a unit of product/service after
the investment is completed, are very low in this subsector.
The index score for switching costs of this subsector is 0.75, which ranks it in the second
place. While relational switching costs do not increase vulnerability, opportunity switching costs
and financial switching costs increase investor’s vulnerability in this subsector.

Subsector 4: Finance – Banking

The banking subsector is associated with low vulnerability scores. This subsector is
selected for a detailed examination because it provides an example to service-intensive
investment. There is only one Chinese investment in Angola, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and South
Africa between 2005 and 2017. This investment was made in 2007 in South Africa by buying
equities of an existing bank, meaning that it is a brownfield investment. Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC) bought 20% stake of the South African Standard
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Bank, which made the ICBC the single largest shareholder of the South African bank.15 The
investor, ICBC, is a banking company controlled by the Chinese government.16
The banking subsector is associated with low vulnerability. The score calculated by the
vulnerability interdependence index for this subsector is 0.502, which ranks it as the second least
vulnerable subsector after investment subsector of finance sector.

Location Asset Specificity

The banking subsector is a service subsector. As is the case for service sector
investments, its assets are highly mobile. The vast majority of assets in banking sector is the
money the bank has, which is the most liquidated form of any type of investments. Money can
easily be moved if the bilateral relations get worse and one of the parties wants to cut the
relationship. The remaining part of the investment that may relate to location asset specificity
consists of banking buildings, armored vehicles, and some other minor assets. Except the
buildings, most other assets are also mobile in this subsector. Since it is a service-sector
investment whose assets are highly mobile, it is coded as infinite mobile in the codification
process of the index.
In this subsector, service production is amenable to decentralized production. Some parts
of production can be produced in another country and be offshored to the final place where the
banking service is provided. Secure software is an important component of banking service, for
example. This component can be produced elsewhere and moved to the final service location of
the bank. Hence, investments in this subsector are infinitely amenable to decentralized
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production.
The value per unit weight of product is pretty high since as a service sector investment.
Service sector investments are regarded to be infinitely light, which makes its value per unit
weight infinitely high. Hence, the value per unit weight is considered to be infinite high for
banking investments. This subsector’s investments are also not a type of extracted natural
resources. This means that they do not contribute to the investor’s vulnerability from the aspect
of being an extracted resource.
The last indicator of location asset specificity, whether the assets are generally co-located
with other productive activities within a host country, also does not increase vulnerability of the
investor party in this subsector. There are insurance companies which are generally co-located
with banking service providers. Insurance is a complementary product of banking services but
the discussion is about the banking sector itself. Assets do not need to be co-located within the
host country for providing banking service. Also, in our specific investment case, the Chinese
bank buys some shares of a South African bank. In such a case, the Chinese bank would have the
vast majority of its assets (be it productive assets or non-productive assets) in its own country,
meaning that they are not co-located.
As the discussion above illustrates, this subsector has a score of 0 for location asset
specificity. It is the least location asset specific subsector among 25 subsectors.

Physical Asset Specificity

The asset specificity of investments in banking subsector is not high in this dimension of
asset specificity as well. It does not require investing in specialized (single-purposed) equipment.
Its buildings can be used for other purposes. Its armored vehicles can be useful in other areas.
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The safe deposit boxes in banks can be used to store other precious material. Equipment that are
used for providing service do not contribute to vulnerability as they can be repurposed for using
in other areas.
Fixed production costs comprise a small portion of total production costs. Most of the
costs arises as the productive activity occurs. Only aforementioned assets (bank buildings,
armored vehicles, safe deposit boxes, etc.) are part of fixed production costs. On the other hand,
variable production costs consist of labor costs, software costs, costs of banking transactions, etc.
The index score is 0 for this subsector’s physical asset specificity, which makes it ranked
the last together with investment subsector of finance sector.

Human Asset Specificity

Workforce is valuable in the banking sector. Banks have to invest in high-skilled labor in
order to not have losses due to mistakes of its personnel. Many staff members of banks have at
least bachelor degrees. Managerial-level workforce is even more educated. They have master’s
or doctoral degrees. Software engineers are another significant part of high-skilled labor in the
banking subsector. Banks have to employ a significant number of software engineers to make
their software system as much secure as possible.
Although it requires employing high-skilled workforce, the workforce is not immobile in
this subsector. Substitute workforce is accessible in other countries. The investor can find
substitute workforce to operate its investment in case it wants to move its investment out of the
host country. Also, there is no limit on moving the existing investment together with the existing
workforce. Thus, the workforce in the banking subsector is mobile in both ways.
The index score of the banking subsector for human asset specificity is 0.727, which
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makes it ranked sixth together with eight other subsectors, which have the same score for human
asset specificity.

Plant Asset Specificity

The physical plant that is used for providing banking service cannot be regarded as a
plant that is dedicated to the productive purpose. Buildings of bank branches or head office
buildings are main physical plants of banks. They can easily be repurposed for using in other
areas. They can be used as an office building, as a school, as a hospital, etc.
The index score for plant asset specificity of the banking subsector is 0, which makes it
ranked as the least vulnerable subsector in terms of plant asset specificity.

Switching Costs

Switching costs are low for investments in this subsector. There are many big and small
market participants, many of which have operations in more than one country. Hence, there is no
oligopoly or oligopsony in the banking subsector. This indicates that relational switching costs
are very low for the banking investments.
Storability problem causes a problem for the investor. As a service sector investments,
storability of the output product is not possible in banking investments. Since the investor cannot
store some amount of the output product in the interim period between cutting the relationship
and finding a new hosting party, investor’s vulnerability increases from this aspect.
Banking investments do not cause vulnerability from the aspect of financial switching
costs. The assets in this subsector are not associated with high sunk costs. Many assets can easily
be liquidated in case one of parties wants to cut their bilateral relationship. The investor can
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liquidate existing assets –except some minor ones such as buildings—and can move its
investment out of the host country if it wants to do so.
In sum, there is only opportunity switching costs for the investor in banking subsector of
finance sector. There is no relational switching costs and financial switching costs since there are
many market participants and assets can be liquidated easily. The vulnerability interdependence
index calculated a score of 0.3 for this subsector’s switching costs.

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed four subsectors. They are selected according to their diversity in
creating vulnerability for the investor party. Service sectors and public goods sectors are at the
two extreme ends of the vulnerability interdependence scores. The first one is expected to cause
the lowest vulnerability while the latter one is expected to create the most vulnerability for the
investor. Hence, two subsectors that belong to these categories are selected for further analysis in
this chapter. These subsectors have been the banking subsector and the shipping subsector.
In terms of location asset specificity, the heavy industry investments –which is
represented by steel subsector of the metals sector—ranked as the first. The assets of investments
in this subsector are difficult to relocate if there is a sudden disruption in the bilateral relationship
between the investor and the host country. The investor binds itself in terms by having locationspecific assets if it makes investment in this heavy industry sector. It is not surprising that the
examined two subsectors of the transport sector, shipping and railway subsectors, have almost
the same index score for location asset specificity. Shipping and railway subsectors are the
eighth and the ninth most location asset specific subsectors. As would be expected, the banking
subsector of the finance sector has the least location-specific assets. It has the lowest score for
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location asset specificity.
Transport sector’s two subsectors, shipping and railway, are among the most physical
asset specific subsectors. They have the highest index score. Having the characteristics of public
goods contributes their index scores to be at the top. The steel subsector is almost at the middle
of the list. Yet, its score is 0.867, which is pretty close to the highest score. This score ranks it as
the 10th most physical asset specific subsector. As a service industry subsector, banking has the
lowest score in terms of physical asset specificity. It has 0 as the index score. The ordering of
physical asset specificity from the highest to the lowest for these four subsectors has a positive
relationship with their categorization of being public good-related sector, private good-related
sector, and service-related sector.
While the scores of location asset specificity and physical asset specificity correlate with
each other, the scores of human asset specificity does not correlate with them. In the subsectors
selected, the banking subsector and steel subsector have the highest human asset specificity.
They have the same value. The rail subsector comes after them as it requires some level of
technical expertise for its technological equipment. The shipping subsector is the least human
asset specific subsector among all subsectors. Its workforce is low-skilled and can be substituted
if necessary.
As for plant asset specificity, the banking subsector has a score of 0 whereas the other
three subsectors have a score of 1.0. Rail, shipping, and steel subsectors have the same level of
plant asset specificity since their assets are dedicated to the productive purpose.
The average scores for the asset specificity rank the four subsector from the highest to the
lowest score as steel subsector, rail subsector, shipping subsector, and banking subsector.
In terms of switching costs, it is less costly for the investor to switch another counter-
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party in the subsectors of finance and steel. Their scores of switching costs are the same and
lower than the switching costs scores of two subsectors of the transport sector. What makes
shipping and rail subsectors rank higher is that the storage problem of the end product and the
liquidation problem of sunk assets.
The analysis of subsectors proved the robustness of the index. This chapter both helped to
examine whether the scores are consistent with qualitative findings and to demystify the
rationale behind the coding process by delving into the details of subsectors in regard to the
contribution of asset specificity and switching costs to the vulnerability interdependence score.
The following chapter will discuss the findings of the index in terms of country cases. The five
African countries –Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa—will be analyzed from the
aspect that their relationship with China causes vulnerability for the Chinese government or for
them.
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CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDY OF THREE AFRICAN COUNTRIES
China’s vulnerability in the African countries differs according to the sectors in which
China made investments. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of China’s top three trading
countries in terms of China’s vulnerability in these countries; Nigeria, Angola, and Kenya.
There is a difference between vulnerability score calculation of sectors and of countries.
Different than the calculation process of vulnerability scores for sectors, amounts of investment
projects are also included in the calculation of vulnerability scores for countries since
vulnerability of a similar investment with an amount of $100 million and $10 billion would not
be the same in terms of their contributions to vulnerability. Though, the amount is not needed for
calculating a sector’s vulnerability since the score would be the same for the project whatever the
amount is.
Inclusion of amounts in the calculation of vulnerability score have further steps from the
initial index score calculation. As discussed in the Research Design chapter, vulnerability score
of each investment project ranges from 0 to 1. Calculation of country-level vulnerability scores
are done in two ways. In the first way, the amounts are used for getting weighted index scores for
countries. This is to understand China’s vulnerability in a particular country. In the second way,
the amounts are multiplied by country scores that are obtained in the first way. This way is used
for comparing countries’ vulnerability levels.
The vulnerability interdependence index score for all Sub-Saharan African countries are
calculated by extrapolating the index scores of China’s five top-trading African countries. It is
considered to be sufficient for extrapolation because (1) average sector and subsector scores are
suitable for generalization since investment projects in the same subsector give similar
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vulnerability scores, (2) the total investment value in five African countries is 40% of the total
investment value in all Sub-Saharan African countries ($119 billion out of $297 billion), and (3)
the number of investments in five countries is 32% of the number of investments in all SubSaharan African countries (163 out of 507 investment projects). The available vulnerability data
comprises of around one-third of total both in terms of the number of investments and the
investment amounts. These amounts are considered to be adequate for extrapolation.
Though, there is a limitation of extrapolating the data for all Sub-Saharan African
countries. There were not Chinese investments in some sectors and subsectors in the five African
countries. Chemicals, logistics, and tourism, for example, were not among the sectors that China
invested in Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. The total number of investments
is 18 out of 507, which makes 3.55% of all African investments. The total value of missing
subsectors is $10.5 billion out of $296.9 billion, which makes 3.54% of all African investments.
Although there is a limitation for extrapolation of data, this does not cause a major problem since
it is quite low both as number of investments and as amount of investments.
The process for extrapolation is as follows:
1. Vulnerability interdependence index scores of 163 projects in Angola, Ghana, Kenya,
Nigeria, and South Africa are used for getting an average score for each subsector,
2.

These average subsector scores are attributed to each one of 344 investment projects
(163 investments projects are excluded since they are among the 507 investment projects)
in the Sub-Saharan African countries according to their subsectors,
The process for calculating country-level vulnerability sscores is as follows:

1. Each investment’s share of investment amount is calculated by diving investment value
of a particular project in a country by the total amount of investments in that country in
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all years.
2. Extrapolated scores of each investment projects are multiplied by this weighted scores
(obtained in the previous step).
3. All weighted scores are summed to get a country’s amount-weighted vulnerability
interdependence score.
The process for calculating amount-weighted cross-country scores is as follows:
1. The obtained score as the result of the previous step is multiplied by the total amount of
investments in a particular country to get this country’s amount-weighted cross-country
score.
The findings of extrapolation, country-level score calculation, and amount-weighted
cross-country score calculation for the 37 Sub-Saharan African countries are presented in Table
14.
Table 14: Vulnerability Interdependence Index Scores, Number of Investments, and
Investment Amounts of the Sub-Saharan African Countries
Country

Cross-Country
Index Score
(Amount-Weighted)

CountryLevel Index
Score

Number of
Investments

Investment
Amount
(million US$)

1

Nigeria

37,231

0.700

44

$53,156

2

Angola

16,761

0.654

41

$25,637

3

Ethiopia

14,961

0.676

44

$22,140

4

Kenya

12,464

0.685

35

$18,190

5

Zambia

10,578

0.690

37

$15,330

6

D.R. Congo

9,224

0.706

16

$13,060

7

Congo

7,752

0.703

22

$11,030

8

South Africa

7,585

0.592

19

$12,820

9

Tanzania

6,579

0.683

18

$9,630
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Country

Cross-Country
Index Score
(Amount-Weighted)

CountryLevel Index
Score

Number of
Investments

Investment
Amount
(million US$)

10

Ghana

6,557

0.712

24

$9,210

11

Chad

6,309

0.762

8

$8,280

12

Mozambique

6,291

0.675

15

$9,320

13

Uganda

5,914

0.702

12

$8,430

14

Cameroon

5,620

0.698

21

$8,050

15

Zimbabwe

5,402

0.666

19

$8,110

16

Guinea

5,211

0.691

9

$7,540

17

Sierra Leone

4,580

0.765

9

$5,990

18

Niger

4,287

0.729

6

$5,880

19

South Sudan

3,912

0.714

9

$5,480

20

Senegal

2,986

0.728

6

$4,100

21

Equatorial
Guinea

2,331

0.655

11

$3,560

22

Ivory Coast

2,194

0.686

6

$3,200

23

Namibia

1,948

0.711

4

$2,740

24

Mali

1,834

0.722

7

$2,540

25

Djibouti

1,318

0.766

4

$1,720

26

Gabon

1,282

0.705

7

$1,820

27

Madagascar

1,239

0.720

5

$1,720

28

Botswana

998

0.648

5

$1,540

29

Mauritius

762

0.663

3

$1,150

30

Benin

723

0.695

3

$1,040

31

Malawi

569

0.703

3

$810

32

Rwanda

548

0.660

5

$830

33

Liberia

518

0.751

4

$690

34

Togo

375

0.695

2

$540

35

Eritrea

362

0.725

2

$500

36

Guinea-Bissau

242

0.655

2

$370
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37

Country

Cross-Country
Index Score
(Amount-Weighted)

CountryLevel Index
Score

Number of
Investments

Investment
Amount
(million US$)

Sao Tome

199

0.737

2

$270

5,342

0.698

489

$286,423

AVERAGE/TOTAL

Sorted from Largest to Smallest According to Amount-Weighted Cross-Country Index Score
China’s top five trading partners (marked as bold) have calculated index scores. Index scores of other
countries are estimated scores.
Source: Index Scores Are Created by the Vulnerability Interdependence Index, Total Number of
Investments and Investment Amounts are Gathered by the Author from the CGIT Dataset1

The table shows that rankings of countries in country-level index score and in amountweighted cross-country index score are different. For example, China has the highest level of
vulnerability in Nigeria (see amount-weighted cross-country index score column) while Djibouti
has the highest score for country-level index score. This shows that Nigeria is the country where
China is the most vulnerably-interdependent among all Sub-Saharan African countries. Djibouti
is the country where China has the types of investment that create the most vulnerability. If total
investment amounts of Nigeria and Djibouti would be the same, Djibouti would be the country
where China is the most vulnerably-interdependent. The reason of this is sectors of Chinese
investments in Djibouti creates more vulnerability compared to sectors of Chinese investments in
Nigeria.
China’s top five trade partners ranked mostly at the top of the ranking according to
amount-weighted cross-country index scores: Nigeria ranked first; Angola ranked second; Kenya
ranked fourth; South Africa ranked eighth; and Ghana ranked 10th within 37 Sub-Saharan
African countries.
They also are among the countries that had the highest number of Chinese investments.

1

Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.”
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All of them ranked at the top 10: Nigeria ranked first, Angola ranked third, Kenya ranked fifth,
Ghana ranked sixth, and South Africa ninth in terms of the number of investments the Chinese
companies invested in these countries.
In the ranking of total investment amounts, only Ghana has slightly missed the top 10 of
the list. It ranked as the 11th country. The other four countries are among the top 10 countries that
received the highest aggregate amount of Chinese investments. Nigeria ranked first, Angola
ranked second, Kenya ranked fourth, South Africa ranked seventh, and Ghana ranked 11th in
terms of total amounts of Chinese investments from 2005 to 2017.
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Figure 11: Comparison of Country-Level Amount-Weighted Index Score, Number of
Investments, and Investment Amounts
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Source: Created by the Author With the Data Drawn from the CGIT Dataset2 and Calculated by
the Vulnerability Interdependence Index

Figure 11 illustrates the relationship between vulnerability scores, number of
investments, and investment amounts. As it can be seen from the chart, there is no relationship
between vulnerability score and number of investments or investment amounts. Yet, number of

2

Scissors.
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investments and investment amounts have similar increase or decrease trends.
What vulnerability score consists of the multiplication of average index score of sectors
and investment amounts. Hence, the vulnerability scores listed in Table 14 and illustrated in
Figure 11 are way different than vulnerability scores of countries without the investment
amounts. If the investments amounts are not included as the multiplier, the top ten countries with
the highest vulnerability scores would be (1) Djibouti, (2) Sierra Leone, (3) Chad, (4) Liberia, (5)
Sao Tome, (6) Niger, (7) Senegal, (8) Eritrea, (9) Mali, and (10) Madagascar. In vulnerability
interdependence scores with investments amounts included, none of these countries takes place
in the top 10 countries. This clearly shows why it is necessary and useful to include investment
amounts as multiplier when calculating a country’s vulnerability interdependence score rather
than using a project’s vulnerability interdependence score solely.
The following sections will analyze countries by (1) giving some basic information about
the country which might be associated with attracting investments i.e. population, GDP per
capita, and other important points about the country (2) looking at the bilateral trade that they
have with China, (3) Chinese investments in these countries, and (4) an assessment of the
selected country’s vulnerability based on the information provided in sections (1), (2), and (3).
This chapter also serves as the showcase of the vulnerability interdependence index
where the findings will be discussed and analyzed according to sectors of Chinese investments in
the selected countries. What constitutes higher or lower levels of vulnerability will be discussed
by presenting the types of Chinese investment projects that the selected countries hosted.

Country 1: Nigeria

Nigeria is the country where China became the most vulnerable among the Sub-Saharan
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African countries. China has had 44 investment projects between 2005 and 2017, with a total
investment amount of $53.16 billion.
The country is well-known with its large population, oil and natural gas reserves, and
other mineral reserves. It is the most populous and the largest economy among the Sub-Saharan
African countries.

Country Profile

Nigeria is the most populous country among the Sub-Saharan African countries with a
population of 191 million in 2017, accounting for one-fifth of all Sub-Saharan African
population. Also, it has the 7th largest population in the world.3 It is one of the countries with the
largest youth population in the world, meaning that it has a potential of exponential growth in
economics.4 The population between the ages of 0 and 24 makes the 62.15% of the overall
population.5
It is the largest economy among the Sub-Saharan African countries with the GDP of
$375.7 billion. Nigeria had an important growth rate in its GDP in the last decade. Its GDP has
risen 126% from 2007 to 2017.6
Important natural resources in this country include natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron ore,
coal, limestone, niobium, lead, and zinc.7
The country holds vast crude oil reserves. The proven crude oil reserves of Nigeria are
37,453 million barrels, which rank it as the country of the ninth largest crude oil reserves in the

3

World Bank, “World Bank Open Data.”
World Bank, “Nigeria Overview.”
5
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook - Nigeria.”
6
World Bank, “World Bank Open Data.”
7
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook - Nigeria.”
4
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world.8 It is also ranked ninth in terms of its proven natural gas reserves in the world. It has a
natural gas reserves of 5,627 billion standard cubic meters.9 In terms of its exports of crude oil
and natural gas, it is ranked eighth and 11th in 2017 with the amounts of 1.8 million barrels per
day and 32.5 billion cubic meters.10
Oil has a significant share within Nigeria’s exports in parallel with its reserves. The
amount of crude oil exports was 73 percent of its total exports in 2016. Next two largest shares
trailing after crude oil belong to petroleum gas and refined petroleum with the shares of 15
percent and 1.8 percent. All three petroleum products make 90 percent of Nigeria’s exports.
Beside petroleum products, gold is another prominent exported material. Gold’s share within all
Nigerian exports is 1.8 percent.11 Though, the amount of Nigeria’s gold exports is pretty low
within world’s largest gold exporters with 0.21 percent.12
The share of population with access to electricity was 42.7% in 2000 and rose 59.3% in
2016.13 In terms of telecommunication, its ranking is high compared to its rankings in other
areas. 81 in each 100 people have subscription to mobile cellular. Nigeria is ranked ninth in the
world in terms of access to mobile cellular with this percentage.14
The country profile shows a country with a significant mass, around half of which is
among the ages of 0 and 24. The facts above indicates that Nigeria is an important player in the
world oil market and in the world natural gas market. It both holds a great amount of oil and
natural gas reserves and exports them. Other than oil and natural gas, Nigeria has some other

8

OPEC, “Annual Statistical Bulletin 2018,” 26.
OPEC, 112.
10
OPEC, 59, 117.
11
OEC, “Nigeria (NGA) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners.”
12
OEC, “Countries That Export Gold (2016).”
13
World Bank, “World Bank Open Data.”
14
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook - Nigeria.”
9
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important mineral resources i.e. tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, and zinc. These
facts may be attractive for a country like China, who is looking for resources to meet its domestic
demand for energy and mineral resources.

Bilateral Trade

Mineral products comprise an important share in Nigeria’s exports to China. They have
the largest share within the total exports with a percentage of 68. Almost half of this amount is
crude petroleum. It has the highest export volume with an amount of $257 million, constituting
31 percent of total exports. Products of petroleum gas make 30 percent of total exports. Almost 8
percent of total Nigerian sales is other mineral products such as niobium, tantalum, vanadium,
and zirconium ore, lead ore, zinc ore, and manganese ore.15

15

OEC, “Products That Nigeria Exports to China (2016).”
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Table 15: Products that Nigeria Exported to China in 2016
Export Volume
(US$)

Percentage

Commodity

Commodity Type

257,296,550

31.0% Crude Petroleum

Mineral Products

185,864,472

22.0% Rough Wood

Wood Products

113,977,159

14.0% Propane

Mineral Products

11.0% Natural Gas

Mineral Products

95,020,253
39,088,536

4.7% Butanes

32,579,818

3.9%

17,505,392

2.1% Cocoa Beans

Foodstuffs

11,633,366

1.4% Lead Ores

Mineral Products

9,340,214

1.1% Zinc Ores

Mineral Products

8,151,289

1.0% Polyethylene

Plastics and Rubbers

Niobium, Tantalum and
Vanadium Ores

Mineral Products
Mineral Products

Source: Compiled by the Author with the Data Drawn from the Observatory of Economic
Complexity16

China is the destination for only 2.3 percent of Nigeria’s exports. It is a very small share
compared to other countries. The largest three buyers of Nigerian products are India, the U.S.,
and Spain with the percentages of 18, 12, and 8.7.17 Similarly, China has a very small share in
Nigeria’s crude oil exports. The share of China is only 0.95 percent. The largest three buyers of
Nigerian crude oil are India, the U.S., and Spain with the percentages of 22, 14, and 8.6. An
African country –South Africa—follows the largest three buyers as the fourth country.18
Nigeria’s exports to China has a similar share with commodities it exports to all
countries. When Nigeria’s natural resources and the share of China within its exports are taken

16

OEC.
OEC, “Nigeria (NGA) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners.”
18
OEC, “Export Destinations of Crude Petroleum from Nigeria (2016).”
17
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into account, it can be concluded that China does not have a special partnership with Nigeria in
terms of natural resources although Nigeria has precious energy resources for China i.e. oil and
natural gas. China has not taken the precious natural resources yet but it does not mean that its
imports of energy products will have the same trend in the future. Nigeria is an important
supplier of energy resources that China needs for its rising energy demand.
The reverse side of the bilateral relationship –China’s exports to Nigeria—consist of
various products. China sells to Nigeria whatever it sells to other countries as the world’s
factory. The largest share belongs to machine exports with a 29 percent. Machines exports
include telephones, electrical transformers, stone processing machines, electric generating sets,
video displays, liquid pumps, insulated wire, valves, and computers. The second largest share
belongs to textile exports with a 17 percent. Textile includes raw materials for textile production
as well as men and women suits. Metal exports is the third largest group in China’s exports to
Nigeria. It has a share of 12 percent. Aluminum plating, iron structures, coated flat-rolled iron,
and aluminum bars are what metal exports comprises of. Transportation equipment and plastics
and rubbers come fourth and fifth with percentages of 7.4 percent and 7.3 percent. The remaining
export commodities also vary; chemical products, footwear and headwear, stone and glass, paper
goods, and foodstuffs.19
Traded goods between the two countries show that there is not a special relationship
between the two countries in terms of their bilateral trade. China does not have a significant
share within Nigeria’s natural resource sales. Similarly, Nigeria does not buy a particular good
from China. Its imports from China diversified.

19

OEC, “Products That China Exports to Nigeria (2016).”
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Chinese Investments in Nigeria

The Chinese companies had 44 investments in Nigeria between 2005 and 2017. The total
investment amount has been $53.16 billion between these years. Country-level amount-weighted
index score for China’s vulnerability in Nigeria was 0.7 as presented in Table 14.
Table 16: Number of Investments, Total Investment Amounts, and Vulnerability Score of
Subsectors in Nigeria
Sector

Subsector

Number of
Investments

Total Amount
(million US$)

Subsector's
Vulnerability Score

Energy

.

6

$3,710

0.665

Energy

Gas

4

$3,770

0.680

Energy

Hydro

1

$1,290

0.753

Energy

Oil

2

$2,670

0.778

Real estate

Construction

5

$2,990

0.629

Real estate

Property

1

$1,910

0.666

Technology

Telecom

3

$1,650

0.721

Transport

Autos

6

$4,916

0.777

Transport

Rail

12

$28,300

0.777

Transport

Aviation

1

$680

0.837

Transport

Shipping

3

$1,270

0.742

44

$53,156

TOTAL

Source: Index Scores Are Created by the Vulnerability Interdependence Index, Total Number of
Investments and Investment Amounts are Gathered by the Author from the CGIT Dataset20

The subsector with the highest vulnerability score is aviation subsector of transport
sector—also ranked at the top of subsector ranking in the previous chapter. It is followed by
other subsectors of the transport sector. Telecom subsector and oil subsector are ranked trailing

20

Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker.”
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after transport sector’s subsectors. The projects that created the least vulnerability for China have
been in the construction subsector.
Their effect on China’s overall vulnerability against Nigeria –cross-country amountweighted index score—has almost the same ranking with their total amount since the index value
for comparing how much a subsector creates vulnerability for China in total is calculated as its
average vulnerability score times the total investment amount.
Nigeria is known with its natural resources. Chinese investments regarding natural
resources are few. There are two investments of buying stakes of oil mining licenses. One project
in oil subsector and one project of the energy sector (with no subsector). One of them is buying
stakes of oil mining license from Nigeria’s petroleum company, SAPETRO in 2006 and a second
one from Total, a French multinational company, in 2012. While the first investment had an
amount of $2.27 billion, the second one’s amount was $2.5 billion.21 These two investments
make 5.02 percent of all Chinese investments in Nigeria from 2005 till 2017. Also, they are the
fourth and sixth largest investments China had in Nigeria. Considering the characteristics of oil
subsector, we can conclude that this is a significant amount within the amount of other
investment projects. More precisely, China has shown interest in Nigerian oil in terms of making
investments.
Other investments in the energy sector includes five natural gas-fired power plant
investments, one natural gas processing plant investment, one natural gas pipeline investment,
two hydropower plant investments, one thermal power station investment, and one investment
regarding transmission lines and relevant substations. These other investments of the energy
sector are mostly about Nigeria’s energy infrastructure (transmission lines and substations).
21

Chengyu, “CNOOC Limited - 2005 Annual Results Announcement”; Total, “Nigeria: Total Announces the Sale
of Its Participating Interest in the Offshore OML 138.”
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Investing in cement is an indicator of having an intent to invest in other infrastructure
investments. Vast majority of Chinese investments in Nigeria’s real estate sector are cement
plant investments. All investments in construction subsector of the real estate sector are
construction of cement plants. The total investment value for cement plant investments make
$2.99 billion, which is the 5.7 percent of all Chinese investments in Nigeria.
Investments in the technology sector consists of one security camera installation
investment and two high-tech cell phone technology installation investments.
An important share of projects belong to the transport sector. Its share is 65.5 percent
within all Chinese investments in Nigeria. Investments in autos subsector are all about road
construction or road rehabilitation. Chinese companies have spent $4.92 billion for building
Nigeria’s roads. One investment in aviation subsector is about building new terminals for the
airports in five different cities of Nigeria, which has an amount of $0.68 billion. Rail subsector
has the highest share within all subsectors with a share of 53.7 percent. The total amount spent
for rail investments is $28.26 billion. Vast majority of these investments are about railway
building while some of them are about upgrading and modernizing existing railways. There are
three investment in shipping subsector. Two of them are about building ports while one is about
buying stakes of an existing port from another company.

Conclusion

Nigeria is one of the most prominent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The points that
make it a prominent African country are its population, the share of young population, its large
economy, its energy and other mineral resources, and the number and amount of Chinese
investments.
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Chinese investments are mostly clustered in the transport sector, which also has the
highest vulnerability score among the sectors China has investments in Nigeria. Public good
investments are expected to create more vulnerability compared to private good investments, as
discussed in the previous chapter. All investments in the transport sector have the characteristics
of public goods. Investments in this sector mostly aim at easing transportation by building new
roads, ports, railways, and airports. Easing transportation contributes facilitating trade in an
important way. Hence, China may finally aim at expanding its share in Nigeria’s trade by
making a lot of investments regarding transportation infrastructure.
Nigeria has vast amount of oil and natural gas reserves. Although it might be a good
place for China to meet an important portion of its rising energy demand, there is not much
Chinese investments regarding Nigeria’s oil resources. There are only two investments of China
buying some share of oil mining license. These two investments’ amount only consist of 5
percent of the amount of all Chinese investments in Nigeria.
In parallel with the fewness of its investments regarding oil mining, China does not have
a special place in Nigeria’s oil exports. Its share within Nigeria’s crude oil exports is only 0.95
percent.
A prominent category of investments is cement plant construction investments. China
may aim at using the output product of these investments in its other investments. Most of other
investments –except oil mining, transportation, and cement plant construction investments—are
infrastructure-related investments. They mostly aim at electrifying the country either by
investing in transmission line and substations, or constructing power stations.
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Country 2: Angola

Angola is a country known with its oil production in Africa. Although its oil reserves are
less than the country with the largest proven oil reserves—Nigeria, it is the largest producer of
oil in its continent.
Angola is the country where China became the second most vulnerable in Sub-Saharan
Africa. It invested 41 projects with a total investment amount of $25.64 billion between 2005
and 2017.

Country Profile

Similar to Nigeria, Angola is also well-known with its oil reserves. It has the second
largest proven oil reserves in Africa and 17th largest in the world with an amount of 8,384
million barrels of oil.22
The population of Angola is 29.8 million according to the 2017 data –ranks the country
ninth within the Sub-Saharan African countries.23 Angola has a young population, which might
be an igniter for further economic growth if this young population is used appropriately. People
between the ages 0 and 25 makes 66.37 percent of the Angolan population.24
Angola is one of big economies among the Sub-Saharan African nations. The size of
Angolan economy ranks it third within the Sub-Saharan African nations. It comes after Nigeria
and South Africa. Its GDP is $124.209 billion.25 After the end of its four decades-long civil war
in 2002, it became the second fastest growing economy in Sub-Saharan Africa according to the
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average annual growth rates of GDP between 2002 and 2017.26 Increase in crude oil production,
construction efforts aftermath of the long-lasted civil war, and agriculture are important factors
that supported economic growth.27 Though, global economic recession, low oil prices, the
depreciation of kwanza (Angolan currency), lower than expected growth in non-oil sectors
stalled the Angolan economy in recent years.28 Its average growth rate between 2012 and 2017 is
3.27 percent, which ranks the country 34th among the Sub-Saharan African countries.29
Angola’s important natural resources include petroleum, diamonds, iron ore, phosphates,
copper, feldspar, gold, bauxite, and uranium.30
The country has the second largest petroleum reserves in Africa. Although, its reserves
are less than Nigeria, Angola was the first in terms of crude oil production in 2015, 2016 and
2017. The amount of produced crude oil is 1,632 thousand barrels per day in 2017, which ranks
the country at the top within African countries and 12th in the world.31
The vast majority of Angola’s exported products consists of petroleum products and
diamond. The share of petroleum products within Angola’s exports is 91 percent while
diamond’s share is 7.5 percent.32
China buys the largest amount of Angolan exports. The share of exports to China is 49
percent. Other top export destinations of Angola are the U.S., India, and South Africa; with the
shares of 10 percent, 7.1 percent, and 5 percent respectively.33
Angola presents a similar profile with Nigeria. Both have important crude oil reserves,
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have young population, and are among the top economies of Africa. Although its population is
not very high among other African nations, it poses an advantage for further economic growth
with its young population. Angola has fewer proven oil reserves compared to Nigeria—which
holds the largest crude oil reserves in Africa, but it produces more petroleum products than
Nigeria. Angola’s oil production level might be an important factor to attract China’s attention.

Bilateral Trade

The trade between Angola and China is dominated by Angola’s petroleum products sales
to China. Although China and Angola had a very similar country profiles, their foreign trade
patterns are way different than each other. Crude petroleum make 99.3 percent and all petroleum
products make 99.8 percent of all Angolan exports to China. It does not include various products
different than Nigeria, whose crude petroleum sales make only 31 percent of its exports to China.
The fact that China almost only buys crude petroleum does not mean that China buys all
crude petroleum from Angola. China’s has the largest share among the buyers of Angolan crude
petroleum with a share of 54 percent. The next largest buyers are the U.S., India and South
Africa with the shares of 10 percent, 6.7 percent, and 5.6 percent.34
The reverse side of the trade relations –China’s exports to Angola—has similarity with
what China exports to Nigeria. China sells various products. The largest group of products is
machines with a share of 28 percent. China sells telephones, electrical control boards, electrical
transformers, insulated wires, video displays, computers and other machinery products in this
category. Textile exports makes 12 percent of total Chinese exports to Angola. In this category,
China sells men’s suits, women’s suits, used clothes, house linens, and other textile products.
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The other groups of products are metals with 12 percent, footwear and headwear with 8 percent,
and mineral products with 7.1 percent. It is noteworthy that China sells mineral products to
Angola. All of these mineral products consists of refined petroleum.35 China buys crude oil and
sells refined petroleum to Angola in return.
The bilateral trade between China and Angola shows that Angola sells almost only
petroleum products to China whereas its imports from China are diversified. Angola sells more
than half of its oil to China. It indicates that China has a somewhat special place in Angola’s oil
sales.

Chinese Investments in Angola

China had 41 investment projects in Angola, trailing after 44 investment projects in
Nigeria and 44 projects in Ethiopia. The total invested amount is $25.6 billion. Country-level
index score of Angola is 0.654 as presented in Table 14. It ranks 35th in terms of country-level
index score, which means that the sector and amount of investments that China made in Angola
does not create high levels of vulnerability.
Table 17: Number of Investments, Total Investment Amounts, and Vulnerability Score of
Subsectors in Angola
Number of
Investments

Total Amount
(million US$)

Subsector's
Vulnerability Score

Agriculture

2

$280

0.497

Energy

2

$1,200

0.616

Sector

35

Subsector

Energy

Alternative

1

$200

0.695

Energy

Gas

1

$990

0.661

Energy

Hydro

2

$3,570

0.647

OEC, “Products That China Exports to Angola (2016).”
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Sector

Subsector

Energy

Number of
Investments

Total Amount
(million US$)

Subsector's
Vulnerability Score

2

$2,260

0.710

1

$120

0.638

Oil

Entertainment
Other

Education

1

$240

0.586

Real estate

Construction

8

$6,890

0.563

Real estate

Property

2

$1,790

0.590

Technology

Telecom

1

$270

0.635

Transport

Autos

5

$1,012

0.755

Transport

Rail

1

$1,830

0.811

Transport

Aviation

1

$185

0.745

Transport

Shipping

3

$2,400

0.735

8

$2,400

0.698

41

$25,637

Utilities
TOTAL

Source: Index Scores Are Created by the Vulnerability Interdependence Index, Total Number of
Investments and Investment Amounts are Gathered by the Author from the CGIT Dataset36

The subsector with the highest vulnerability score among China’s investments in Angola
is transport sector’s rail subsector. Investments in other subsectors of the transport sector create
the next highest vulnerability scores. Ranking of subsectors according to vulnerability score is
rail subsector, autos subsector, aviation subsector, and shipping subsector. The next highest
vulnerability score belongs to oil subsector, which is expected to be important in China’s
investments in Angola since oil is the commodity which takes a very large place in Angola’s
exports to China. Agriculture, construction, and education are the subsectors that create the least
vulnerability for China in its investments in Angola.
Investments in the transport sector are almost all about facilitating transportation by
building new roads, railways, ports, and airports or expanding the capacity of the current ones.
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Oil is a notable subsector in Angola as the country is the largest exporter of petroleum
products. China had two investments in oil subsectors, both are related to buying stakes in oil
exploration blocks. China bought oil mining licenses in May 2006 and in June 2013. Two of
these investments make 8.8 percent of all investments.
Other investments in the energy sector according to their vulnerability scores are one
garbage power generation project in alternative subsector, one gas-fired power plant project in
gas subsector, one hydro power plant in hydro subsector, and two electrification projects, which
are not attributed to a subsector since they do not fit into any subsector but fits into the energy
sector. The amount of all investments in the energy sector is $7.42 billion, which makes 28.9
percent of all Chinese investments in Angola.
The utilities sector has investments regarding electricity and drinking water infrastructure
of Angola. There are four electrification investments, whose total investment amount is $1.93
billion; four drinking water supply investments with a total investment amount of $0.68 billion;
and one investment about roads, drinking water, drainage system, and sewage system with a
value of $0.61 billion.
There are 11 investment projects about construction, seven of which are in construction
subsector while two are in property subsector, one is in education and one is in entertainment
subsectors. The total amount of construction projects are $8.78 billion.
The profile of Chinese investments in Angola shows that China mostly invested in
Angola’s infrastructure with three investment projects exceptions. Two of these three projects
are in oil subsector, which are about buying stakes of oil mining licenses whereas one of them is
about cement plant construction.
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Conclusion

Angola is an important country in the Sub-Saharan African region. It is important
because it holds the second largest oil reserves and is the top producer of crude oil among the
African nations. It has a young population. It is a rising economy, whose GDP is always in the
rise owing to growth in oil production and reconstruction efforts since its four decades-lasted
civil war ended in 2002.
China has invested in Angola almost completely in infrastructure projects. Angola is in
need of infrastructure for the vast majority of the country after its civil war ended. China, with its
identity as an investor that is interested in building Africa’s infrastructure, is interested in
Angola’s infrastructure as well. It has various infrastructure in various subsectors, including
agricultural investments, power plant investments, stadium construction investment, house
building investments, high-technology network system investment for mobile phone,
electrification investments, drinking water supply investments, and transportation investments.
The relationship between China and Angola is somewhat special. China is the largest
buyer of Angolan petroleum products. Angola exports more than half of its oil to China. It is the
second largest recipient of Chinese investments among the Sub-Saharan African countries.
Despite China is by far the largest importer of Angolan oil, it had only two investments
regarding oil mining licenses which had a total amount of $2.26 billion.

Country 3: Kenya

Important characteristics of Kenya is different than characteristics of Nigeria and Angola.
China does not have an interest in Kenya’s energy resources since there is no production of
petroleum products. As will be told in “Chinese Investments” section, China is interested in
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conducting oil exploration in the continent.

Country Profile

Kenya has neither a country with rich energy resources nor exports a significant portion
of its goods to China. It differs from Nigeria and Angola in their relations with China from this
aspect. Nigeria and Angola hold vast energy resources and China is an important destination for
their exports.
Although it is an important player in its region—East Africa, indicators show that it is a
relatively modest country within the Sub-Saharan African nations. Its population is around 50
million, which ranks Kenya as the sixth most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa.37
The young population between the ages of 0 and 24 makes 59.2 percent of the total
population in Kenya.38 It indicates that the country has a potential of further economic growth if
the young population is used appropriately.
Agriculture is the backbone of Kenya’s economy. Around one-third of GDP comes from
agricultural activities, in which around 75 percent of the whole population has affiliations either
working full-time or part-time in agricultural activities. Tourism is also a significant source of
economic input in Kenya. Despite there are some high visible terrorist attacks in touristic places
of Kenya between 2013 and 2015, the sector recovered and rebounded again in 2016 and 2017.39
The country is in need of infrastructure investments.40 Kenya is also found to be the most
attractive second African country for investors. Investors think that its growing economy and
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emerging ICT sector as well as its pragmatic government in its relations with investors facilitate
their business in the country.41 In 2016, Kenya got the most investment from the members of the
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, which includes the top investors of the world.42

Bilateral Trade

The bilateral trade between China and Kenya is heavily dominated by China’s sales to
Kenya compared to Kenyan exports to China. While the amount of China’s exports is $5,588
million, Kenya exports only $97 million to China in 2016.43 In other words, their bilateral trade
comprises 98 percent of China’s sales to Kenya and 2 percent of Kenya’s sales to China. For this
reason, this section will start with an analysis of what China sells to Kenya.
China was the origin of 35 percent of Kenyan imports in 2016. The next four import
origins of Kenya are India with 16 percent, Japan with 4.5 percent, the United Arab Emirates
with 4.0 percent, and South Africa with 3.5 percent.44
The commodities that China sells to Kenya is similar to its sales to Nigeria and Angola.
The group of commodities that China exports to Kenya with their shares are: machines with 27
percent, textiles with 24 percent, metals with 12 percent, plastics and rubbers with 6.3 percent,
and miscellaneous with 5.3 percent. Within the machines group, China sells telephones, electric
generating sets, insulated wire, computers, video displays, etc. As textile product, it sells
women’s and men’s suits, fabric, shirts, cotton, t-shirts, etc. The major products in the metals
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group are steel bars, iron structures, flat-rolled steel, etc.45
China has a very small place in Kenya’s export destinations. Only 1.9 percent of Kenyan
exports destines in China. The top five buyers of Kenyan products are the United States with 11
percent, the Netherlands with 9.9 percent, Uganda with 9.4 percent, Pakistan with 8.4 percent,
and the United Kingdom with 8.2 percent. Kenya’s top export products are tea with 23 percent,
cut flowers with 14 percent, coffee with 4.7 percent, titanium ore with 2.3 percent, non-knit
men’s suits with 2.2 percent, and tropical fruits with 2.1 percent.46
Kenya’s exports to China, which is only two percent of their bilateral trade, consists of
various commodity groups. Mineral products make 65 percent of Kenya’s exports while animal
hides make 16 percent, vegetable products make 7.7 percent, textiles make 5.7 percent, animal
products make 2.6 percent, and plastics and rubbers make 2.5 percent. Within mineral products,
Kenya exports consist of titanium ore (41 percent of total exports) and niobium, tantalum,
vanadium and zirconium ore (24 percent of total exports).
The bilateral trade between Kenya and China does not show a special trade relationship.
Neither China has an important place in Kenya’s sales nor it buys a significant amount of a
product. The only noticing point about their trade relationship is that China is the origin of
slightly more than one-third of Kenyan imports. Though, it does not convey a special meaning
since China has the same share for other countries as well, as the world’s factory.

Chinese Investments in Kenya

China had 34 investment projects in Kenya, with a total investment amount of $17.9
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billion. It is the fifth Sub-Saharan African country in terms of the number of Chinese
investments. The top four countries with the highest number of investments are Nigeria (44
investments), Ethiopia (44 investments), Angola (41 investments), and Zambia (37 investments).
In terms of making China vulnerable, it ranks as the fourth country, coming after Nigeria,
Angola, and Ethiopia.
Table 18: Number of Investments, Total Investment Amounts, and Vulnerability Score of
Subsectors in Kenya
Number of
Investments

Total Amount
(million USD)

Subsector's
Vulnerability Score

Agriculture

1

$640

0.487

Energy

6

$1,690

0.647

Sector

Subsector

Energy

Alternative

4

$620

0.662

Energy

Hydro

2

$2,110

0.653

Energy

Coal

1

$1,010

0.695

Other

Industry

1

$1,940

0.632

Real estate

Construction

2

$390

0.595

Real estate

Property

2

$430

0.578

Transport

Autos

9

$2,940

0.728

Transport

Rail

3

$5,350

0.709

Transport

Shipping

1

$480

0.767

2

$300

0.706

34

$17,900

Utilities
TOTAL

Source: Index Scores Are Created by the Vulnerability Interdependence Index, Total Number of
Investments and Investment Amounts are Gathered by the Author from the CGIT Dataset47

The subsector that makes China the most vulnerable is shipping, which has a
vulnerability score of 0.767. Two other subsectors of the transport sector follows it; autos with a
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vulnerability score of 0.728 and rail with a vulnerability score of 0.709 comes after shipping
subsector. These three subsector holds the characteristics of public goods. Another sector that
has the characteristics of public goods, utilities, trails after three subsectors of the transport sector
with a vulnerability score of 0.706. The fifth subsector that makes China the most vulnerable is
coal subsector of the energy sector.
The least vulnerable subsectors for China in its investments in Kenya are agriculture,
property, and construction subsectors. Their respective vulnerability scores are 0.487, 0.578, and
0.595.
In the transport sector, China had six road construction investments, three road
rehabilitation/modernization investments, two railway investments, one investment regarding
technological equipment used in railways, and one port investment. The total amount of
investments in the transport sector makes half of the total amount of the all Chinese investments
in Kenya.
There is one electrification and one drinking water supply investment project in the
utilities sector with a relatively small investment amount, whose value is $300 million.
The energy sector consists of two hydro power plant investments, one geothermal power
plant investment, one coal-fired power plant investment, two wind power plant investments, two
photovoltaic power plant investments, and five electrification investments. The total amount of
these projects make $5.43 billion. Hydro power plant investment comprises $1.75 billion and
coal-fired power plant investment comprises $1.01 billion of the total investment amount in the
energy sector.
There is no Chinese investment in Kenya’s energy resources since there is no
economically viable oil or natural gas resources in the country. But this does not mean that China

202
is not interested in finding oil in the country. China had an agreement with Kenya for conducting
“oil exploration in six blocks covering 115,343 sq km in north and south Kenya”.48
Industry subsector in the other sector category has one investment regarding construction
of industrial park for creating a special economic zone. It a public good-type investment which
includes infrastructure building for the high-end special economic zone and has an investment
amount of $1.94 billion.
Investment projects of the real estate sector entail two house construction projects, one
mall construction and one cement plant construction investments. Their total amount makes
$0.82 billion. The agriculture sector has one investment project for irrigation system, which has
an investment amount of $0.64 billion.
Chinese investment projects in Kenya are indicator of China’s intent to contribute
Kenya’s infrastructure. The vast majority of investments are about strengthening Kenya’s
infrastructure. There is only two exceptions—irrigation system investment and cement plant
construction investment. The latter one also aims at supporting other investment projects,
meaning that it contributes strengthening Kenya’s infrastructure.

Conclusion

Subsectors that make China the most vulnerable in its investments in Kenya are all
subsectors of the transport sector. Shipping, autos, and rail creates the highest vulnerability for
China respectively. The utilities sector trails after them. Both the transport sector and the utilities
sector have characteristics of public goods, which –as described in the previous chapter—are
expected to create the highest levels of vulnerability for the investor.
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Kenya does not have a significant point that might attract China. China, in parallel with
other investor countries that invested in Kenya, is interested in strengthening Kenya’s
infrastructure. For this purpose, China had many infrastructure-related investments in Kenya
from 2005 to 2017.
The number of Chinese investments in the two leading sectors of Kenya i.e. agriculture
and tourism is very few. China had only one investment project in the agriculture sector and did
not have any investment project in the tourism sector.

Conclusion

This chapter started with an important finding of the dissertation. It presented the findings
of the vulnerability interdependence index in Table 14. The table had 37 Sub-Saharan African
countries. Chinese investment projects in five of these countries are analyzed in detail and coded
for the 17 questions of the vulnerability interdependence index in order to get an index score.
The index scores are extrapolated by using investment projects in these five countries for the
remaining 344 investment projects in the remaining 32 African countries. Table 14 presented the
findings by ranking countries according to their cross-country amount-weighted index scores.
The findings indicate that China became the most vulnerable in Nigeria among the Sub-Saharan
African nations in terms of making investments. Other four countries that followed Nigeria are
Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia.
A discussion of three countries followed China’s vulnerability scores in Sub-Saharan
Africa. These three countries are among the China’s top trading five countries. The top three
countries that make China the most vulnerable i.e. Nigeria, Angola, and Kenya are selected.
Nigeria is the country with the richest proven oil reserves although it became the second
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highest oil producer in the last couple of years. It has the largest population in Africa with a very
large share of young population. Furthermore, it is the largest economy among the Sub-Saharan
African countries in terms of their GDPs. Chinese investments in this country is not different
than Chinese investments in other African countries. China mostly invested in infrastructural
projects in Nigeria with a few exceptions. These exceptions include buying stakes in two oil
mining licenses. Even though China bought oil mining licenses, their bilateral trade does not
reflect this. China does not have a status of favored nation in terms of Nigeria’s oil sales. Albeit
around one-third of Nigerian exports to China is crude petroleum and other one-third is
petroleum gas (propane and natural gas), it does not take a significant place in Nigeria’s exports
since China’s share is only 2.3 percent within the whole Nigerian exports.
Angola is another major African player in the global oil market. It became the top oil
producer in its continent in 2015, 2016, and 2017 albeit it holds the second richest oil reserves
trailing after Nigeria. Different than its relations with Nigeria, China had a special place in
Angola’s oil sales. Angola exports 54 percent of its crude petroleum to China.
The special trade relationship between China and Angola is not reflected in Chinese
investments in Angola. Investment projects of Chinese companies are similar to their investment
projects in other African countries. They have invested in infrastructure projects in Angola as
well. There are only two investments regarding the rights of oil exploration.
Kenya is found to be the second most attractive country for making infrastructure
investments. China’s investments are in line with other countries’ investments in Kenya.
Investors from various countries focused on strengthening Kenya’s infrastructure. Chinese
investments are also about building infrastructure.
Different than Nigeria and Angola, Kenya does not have a special commodity that China
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is in need of. Hence, their bilateral relationship is unable to be examined from the perspective of
whether they provide a favored nation status to China in their exports. Yet, the reverse side of
their bilateral trade provides China a favored nation status to some extent. Kenya has been a
marketplace for Chinese products. China has been the origin of 35 percent of Kenya’s imports in
2016.
These three countries did not rank in the top five in terms of country-level amountweighted index score. Nigeria’s score is 0.7 for this score while Angola has 0.654 and Kenya has
0.685 as country-level index score. These scores rank them as 19th, 35th, and 26th respectively
within 37 Sub-Saharan African countries. What makes these countries ranked at the top in the
ranking of cross-country amount-weighted index score are the total amount China has sunk in
these countries. The more China invests in a country, the more it became vulnerable. For this
reason, China became more vulnerable in these countries.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
This dissertation contributed to the literature by suggesting an index to measure Keohane
and Nye’s well-known vulnerability interdependence theory and applying this index to the SinoAfrican relations to understand in which countries China became vulnerable. The index used 163
Chinese investment project cases in its top five trading partners in Sub-Saharan Africa; South
Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya respectively. It also used country-level data for two
of its indicators.
The study started by presenting a general background of China increasing its presence in
the African continent. The reason of its presence in the region is dominated by its outward
financial activities. China started to increase in investing in other countries after the beginning of
the 1990s, with its well-known state policy of “going global”. This policy has urged both private
companies and state-owned enterprises to start new operations or extend their existing operations
in foreign countries.
The second chapter reviewed Keohane and Nye’s vulnerability interdependence theory
by differing it from sensitivity interdependence and complex interdependence. The origins of this
theory was also reviewed in this chapter. In that respect, Hirschman’s work on the effect of
foreign trade on exercising power, Wagner’s unexploited bargaining power concept, and
Vernon’s obsolescing bargaining model are analyzed. This chapter also introduced five concepts
that are considered to be the best measures of vulnerability interdependence i.e. asset specificity,
switching costs, costs of ratification and compliance, proportionality, and issue linkages. Most of
these five concepts are borrowed the economics literature and updated to make them applicable
to country-level analysis. The questions of the vulnerability interdependence index are derived
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from the discussion of these concepts in this chapter.
The third chapter included research design. It started with presenting the 17 questions of
vulnerability interdependence index. These questions are discussed in terms of how they relate
and contribute to an investor country’s vulnerability and what answer some particular investment
types should have for these questions. After questions were introduced, the relevant datasets are
discussed and the reason why the dataset of China Global Investment Tracker was selected was
explained. Also, dataset selection process for other data was also described. Reliability and
validity checks trailed after the narrative about choosing the right dataset.
After reliability and validity checks, index construction methods were discussed.
Additive aggregation method is preferred for vulnerability interdependence index because the 17
questions are designed to give answer that can be added on each other to give a vulnerability
score. A discussion on data normalization methods followed index construction method. Minmax
normalization method is selected for normalizing each answer of 17 questions since it makes
answers of all questions ranged from 0 to 1.
In an additive aggregation index, it was important to determine weighing of each
indicator question. Analytical hierarchy process was used for determining the weights of each
indicator in a consistent way. Appendix section have a discussion of details for how analytical
hierarchy process is run to obtain weights of indicators.
In the case study of subsectors, four subsectors with different characteristics in terms of
creating vulnerability for the investor party were analyzed in detail. They were analyzed
according to the degree they are location asset specific, physical asset specific, human asset
specific, and plant asset specific. Also, their contribution to higher or lower levels of switching
costs was discussed.
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The second case study chapter picked three countries among China’s top five trading
partners in the African continent according to the level of vulnerability they create for China.
Nigeria, Angola, and Kenya are examined in detail by delving into their country profiles,
bilateral trades with China, and characteristics of Chinese investments that they hosted in their
countries. A last section assessed the first three sections in order to understand what may attract
China to invest in these countries and whether China’s sector selection is determined by other
characteristics of a particular country.
The case studies of Nigeria, Angola, and Kenya have some common points. It was
important to examine Nigeria and Angola since they are Africa’s top two oil producers. While
China had a significant amount of oil trade with Angola, the same trend did not work for Nigeria.
China has not had a special place in Nigeria’s oil sales. There might be various reasons why
China is unable to receive Nigerian oil while it gets an important amount of Angolan oil although
it has almost the same amount of investments in both countries. But, considering Kenya as well,
it is important to stress that China made investments in infrastructure in these three countries
whatever the amount of natural resources they held or whatever they sell to China. Even though
infrastructure investments create higher levels of vulnerability for China, it continues investing
in infrastructure investments.
The findings of the index indicate that China became vulnerable in its relations with the
African nations as hypothesized in the introduction chapter. The index also found that
investments in heavy industries, such as industries related to steel production or mineral
production are ranked within the top investment cases with the highest vulnerability scores.
China’s investments increase China’s vulnerability in each one of the African countries.
Though, China also benefits from these countries –either by providing strong infrastructure in
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these countries or getting direct benefits from them to some extent like supplying some part of its
demand to petroleum products or other mineral resources. The analysis of this dissertation
indicates China benefits from investing in Africa although its level of vulnerability rises with the
investments it make. The benefits it has might either be getting something in return like oil or
other mineral products or having a developing marketplace for its products. The three country
case studies showed that China received oil from Angola and Nigeria in return for investing in
these countries while Kenya has been a useful marketplace for Chinese goods in return for
Chinese investments in strengthening infrastructure.
One should be cautious in interpreting the results of the vulnerability interdependence
index. There might be other elements that diminish the level of investor country’s vulnerability.
For example, the way China finances its investments in Africa is important to consider when
assessing its vulnerability. Most of the money that is used in these investments is supplied by
loans that China provides to host countries. These loans are advantageous for the African
recipients compared to the loans provided by other major financer countries or institutions:
China does not look at the economic size of recipient country when considering whether to
provide loans whereas the size of economy is a criteria for other major financers; and there is
less wait-time for Chinese loans compared to loans come from other loan providers.
Stepping back and looking at the big picture of vulnerability interdependence theory
provide us the understanding that China ought to adjust its foreign policy towards these African
countries since its investments in these countries make China more and more vulnerable.
Though, as the analysis of Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2005 and the
background chapter on the Sino-African relations showed there is no significant change in
Chinese foreign policy despite its rising level of vulnerability in these countries. The chief reason
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of this is that China might aim at getting other benefits like having economic influence with the
money it gives away.1
The fact that China does not change its foreign policy toward the African countries
although it is getting more vulnerable with the investments Chinese companies make indicates a
limitation of this study: large economies are not hurt by the money it gives away to the extent
that a mid-size or small economy would be hurt. Large economies tend to have more issues to
link with their investments as they might target getting other political, diplomatic or economic
benefits by investing. A large-scale economy would have a wider range of topics in its foreign
policy agenda. This limitation makes it difficult to contrast two countries with large economy
despite they have the same particular project in the same host country under the same conditions.
The index would find the same vulnerability score for those two countries. However, as pointed
out in the previous page, one should be cautious about taking other possible elements into
consideration when assessing the vulnerability score for an investor country: “Where predictions
based on patterns of asymmetrical interdependence are incorrect, one must look closely for the
reasons. They will often be found in the bargaining process that translates power resources into
power over outcomes.”2
Assessing a complete vulnerability of interdependent parties would also require what
parties are able to do in the absence of relations. The index of vulnerability interdependence does
not aim at illustrating a complete picture of vulnerability. It, rather, only aims at measuring the
level of vulnerability for interdependent parties by looking at investments.

1
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APPENDIX
Weighing of Index Indicators by Using Analytic Hierarchy Process
Analytic Hierarch Process (AHP) is used to weigh each indicator in additive composite
indices. It is developed by Thomas Saaty1 in the late 1980s with a concern of “the scaling
problem and what sort of numbers to use, and how to correctly combine the priorities resulting
from them”.2
The weighing of indicators is presented on page 139. The calculation of weights is based
on author’s expertise in the vulnerability interdependence literature. Some concepts’ literature
might weigh more on a subcategory while this study might give more weight on another
subcategory, for example. Importance of categories, subcategories, or questions for vulnerability
interdependence index has been the primary consideration point for their weight values. Also,
data availability is considered in the decision-making process of weighing. Although the best
available dataset is used for each question, some datasets may not represent their respective
question exactly. For example, the weight of issue linkages question kept at a low point
compared to others due to unavailability of a dataset to represent it completely. Rationale behind
weight calculation for some indicators is explained below.
The central issue in AHP is assigning a comparison value for each pair of indicators. For
example, a buyer may need to make decision for buying a printer based on its price, service
availability, auxiliary equipment availability, printing speed and printer color. Probably, these
specifications would not have equal weight for this buyer; they would have different importance
levels for making a decision on which printer to buy. In order to apply AHP to the decisionmaking process of this buyer, one should prepare a table for pairwise comparison of each
1
2

Saaty, “How to Make a Decision”; Saaty, “The Analytic Hierarchy Process—What It Is and How It Is Used.”
Saaty, “How to Make a Decision,” 10.
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specification. Then, the buyer should make a decision how important one of each of two
specifications over another. Saaty suggests to give a number from 1 to 9, higher number
indicating that this indicator is more important. For example, the buyer may think that price is 7
times more important than service availability. Then, the buyer should write 7 to the priceservice availability cell and 1/7 to the service availability-price cell. Similarly, printing speed
may be 9 times more important than printer color. Then, the table should be filled as in the
example table below. If any two specification has equal importance, than 1 should be given to
both of them as in the example of service availability and auxiliary equipment availability in the
following table.
Table 19: An Example of Pairwise Comparison
Service
Availability

Auxiliary
Availability

1

7

1/3

2

7

1/7

1

1

3

5

3

1

1

3

7

Printing Speed

1/2

1/3

1/3

1

9

Printer Color

1/7

1/5

1/7

1/9

1

Price
Price
Service Availability
Auxiliary Availability

Printing
Speed

Printer Color

Next steps of calculation is (1) getting sum of each column, (2) dividing the value by the
sum to obtain a percentage value, and (3) averaging percentage values in all rows. These average
values are called as criteria values. They indicate the importance degree of an indicator for the
decision-maker. There are more steps of calculation for obtaining consistency ratio to understand
whether the decision-maker is consistent in his/her preferences for each two indicators. These
steps are (1) multiplying importance scores (values shown in Table 19) by the criteria values, (2)
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getting the sum of each row which is called as weighted sum value, (3) dividing weighted sum
value by criteria weights, (4) getting average of these values (which gives us the
calculating consistency index value by dividing the difference between
compared elements by the number of compared elements minus 1 (

value), (5)

and the number of
), and (6) getting the

consistency ratio by dividing consistency index value by random index value which is a
consistency index of a randomly generated pairwise index. If the calculated consistency ratio is
between 0 and 0.1, then the decision-maker is consistent in his/her importance levels for all
pairwise comparisons of any two elements.
Consistency ratio is calculated for all subcategories in the vulnerability interdependence
index. The vulnerability interdependence is provided in the following chart in branch view to
better understand pairwise comparisons for each subcategories. The pairwise comparisons are
made for:
-

Subcategories of the main index; asset specificity, switching costs, ratification and
compliance costs, proportionality (indicator 16), issue linkages (indicator 17),

-

Subcategories of asset specificity; location asset specificity, physical asset specificity,
human asset specificity, plant asset specificity (indicator 10),

-

Subcategories of location asset specificity; indicators 1 to 5,

-

Subcategories of physical asset specificity; indicators 6 and 7,

-

Subcategories of human asset specificity; indicators 8 and 9,

-

Subcategories of switching costs; relational switching costs (indicator 11), opportunity
switching costs (indicator 12), financial switching costs (indicator 13),

-

Subcategories of ratification and compliance costs (indicators 14 and 15).
Instead of determining an importance value for each pairwise comparison, an importance
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value between 1 and 9 is given to each indicator. For example, importance value for asset
specificity is 9, importance value for switching cost is 9, importance value for ratification and
compliance costs is 3, importance value for proportionality is 7, and importance value for issue
linkages is 6. Importance value of each pairwise comparison is calculated by dividing these
values. For example, the value of importance for a pairwise comparison of asset specificity and
proportionality is calculated as 9/7=1.286. Calculating importance values by using this method
makes the AHP completely consistent. Hence, there is no consistency ratio concern in this
method as importance values are calculated by each indicator’s importance value.
Table 20 shows below the indicators of vulnerability interdependence index in the branch
view to illustrate all pairwise comparisons of the index.
Table 20: Pairwise Comparison Table for Subcategories of the Vulnerability
Interdependence Index
Asset
Specificity

Switching
Cost

Ratificatio
n and
Complianc
e Cost

Proportion
ality

Asset Specificity

1.00

9/9

9/3

9/7

Switching Cost

9/9

1.00

9/3

Ratification and
Compliance Cost

3/9

3/9

Proportionality

7/9

Issue Linkages

6/9

Indicators

Issue
Linkages

Importance

Weight

9/6

9

0.265

9/7

9/6

9

0.265

1.00

3/7

3/6

3

0.088

7/9

7/3

1.00

7/6

7

0.206

6/9

6/3

6/7

1.00

6

0.176

Table 20, Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, Table 24, Table 25, and Table 26 show pairwise
comparisons for each one of categories shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Vulnerability Interdependence Index In Branch View
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Asset Specificity
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Vulnerability
Interdependence

Switching Costs
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Opportunity
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Financial

Q13

Q14
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Q16

Issue Linkages

Q17
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Table 21: Pairwise Comparison Table for Subcategories of Asset Specificity
Location
Asset
Specificity

Physical
Asset
Specificity

Human Asset
Specificity

Plant Asset
Specificity

Importance

Weight

Location Asset
Specificity

1.00

1.29

1.29

1.80

9

0.085

Physical Asset
Specificity

0.78

1.00

1.00

1.40

7

0.066

Human Asset
Specificity

0.78

1.00

1.00

1.40

5

0.066

Plant Asset
Specificity

0.56

0.71

0.71

1.00

5

0.047

Indicators

Table 22: Pairwise Comparison Table for Subcategories of Location Asset Specificity
Indicators

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Question 4

Question 5

Importance

Weight

Question 1

1.00

1.80

3.00

2.25

1.50

9

0.028

Question 2

0.56

1.00

1.67

1.25

0.83

5

0.016

Question 3

0.33

0.60

1.00

0.75

0.50

4

0.009

Question 4

0.44

0.80

1.33

1.00

0.67

3

0.013

Question 5

0.67

1.20

2.00

1.50

1.00

6

0.019

Question 1 : Are the assets or productivity mobile?
Question 2 : Are transportation costs amenable to decentralized production?
Question 3 : Is the value per unit of end-product’s weight high?
Question 4 : Is it the production of a natural (extracted) resource?
Question 5 : Are the assets generally co-located with other productive activities within a host country?
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Table 23: Pairwise Comparison Table for Subcategories of Physical Asset Specificity
Indicators

Question 6

Question 7

Importance

Weight

Question 6

1.00

1.50

9

0.040

Question 7

0.67

1.00

6

0.026

Question 6 : Does production require investment in specialized (single-purpose) equipment?
Question 7 : Are fixed production costs (as percent of total costs) high or low?

Table 24: Pairwise Comparison Table for Subcategories of Human Asset Specificity
Item Description

Question 8

Question 9

Importance

Weight

Question 8

1.00

2.67

8

0.048

Question 9

0.38

1.00

3

0.018

Question 8: Does production require a specialized, high-skilled workforce?
Question 9: Is the workforce mobile?

Table 25: Pairwise Comparison Table for Subcategories of Switching Costs
Item Description

Relational

Opportunity

Financial

Importance

Weight

Relational

1.00

0.83

0.56

5

0.066

Opportunity

1.20

1.00

0.67

6

0.079

Financial

1.80

1.50

1.00

9

0.119
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Table 26: Pairwise Comparison Table for Subcategories of Ratification and Compliance
Costs
Item Description

Question 14

Question 15

Importance

Weight

Question 14

1.00

1.00

7

0.044

Question 15

1.00

1.00

7

0.044

Question 14: Does information asymmetry favor investing party or hosting party?
Question 15: Is there an existing regime to monitor compliance among contracting parties?
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